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Most theories about the cultivation of virtue fall under the 
general umbrella of the role model approach, according to which virtue 
is acquired by emulating role models, and where those role models 
are usually conceived of as superior in some relevant respect to the 
learners. I will argue here that although we need role models to 
cultivate virtue, they are not sufficient. We also need good and close 
relationships with people who are not our superiors. I draw special 
attention to the notion of character friendship as conceived by 
Aristotle, as an antidote for the common misleading overemphasis on 
role models. My primary goal is to show how much we stand to gain 
by including character friendship in our account of virtue cultivation.  
Friendship is a close relationship characterized by mutual 
appreciation, well-wishing, and mutual acknowledgment of such 
appreciation and well-wishing. Character friendship is a friendship 
grounded in the mutual appreciation of the friends’ good characters, 
and a basic agreement and concern for the good. I hope to show here 
that such a relationship (a) constitutes a unique form of experience in 
which we share or inhabit a substantial way of seeing with a close 




particular person (my-self and the other’s self); (c) develops other 
emotions important for the cultivation of virtue besides admiration, 
such as love, shame, trust, and hope; and (d) is a praxis in which 
cooperative interactions and discussions function as a bridge between 
habituation of virtue at home and public life. Character friendship is an 
experience which provides necessary elements for human cultivation 
of virtue that the sole experience of having a role model does not. 
There is empirical evidence that seems to give at least some 
indirect support to my thesis. According to developmental and social 
psychology, friendship in general is fundamental for human (moral and 
cognitive) development from a very early age. There are also good 
reasons to think adolescents know what a good friend is, an exhibit 
aspiration to be good friends and engage in what we call character 
friendships. As a consequence of this, I argue greater emphasis 
should be placed on the role of friendship within educational contexts. 
We, as adults, should acknowledge, care, and facilitate children’s and 
adolescent’s friendships within schools and homes, and implement 







Virtues are to human beings what singing is to birds and what 
building hives is to worker bees. They are grounded in our human 
nature and their exercise is part and parcel of what it is to live a good 
human life. A bird that cannot sing or a worker bee that cannot build 
hives would have difficult times living with others, leading a good life as 
a bird and as a bee. Without virtues human beings would not flourish.  
Yet, unlike the singing of the birds or the building of bee hives, 
human virtues do not come naturally to us. Like our language or our 
capability to sing or dance, virtues need to be cultivated. They are 
rooted in our nature, but they need time, effort, and the help of others 
to develop. 
This subject caught the attention of people from ancient cultures 
within both the Eastern and the Western world, and then it lost its 
centrality (at least, in large parts of the Western world) for some time 
until the twentieth century, when it regained its former appeal. Despite 
its origins in antiquity, nevertheless, the nature of virtue, the extent to 
which it is rooted in human nature, and how deep its connection to 
human flourishing is, is still a matter of debate. The issue of how virtue 




Notwithstanding this, however, there seems to be high degree of 
agreement among virtue theorists about some points regarding virtue 
cultivation. First, to my knowledge there is general agreement that 
virtue cultivation is a matter of habituation. How such habituation is 
conceived and what specifically should be habituated in order to 
become virtuous is, again, a matter of contention. But the general idea 
that virtue requires habituation might be the most generally accepted 
claim across various virtue theories. Second, the process of virtue 
cultivation is conceived as something that must start as early in life as 
possible, and because of that parents, teachers, and tutors are who 
lead and direct it. They are – or should be - like role models who 
exemplify virtue for the learners and who, eventually, help them 
understand what it is to be virtuous. Fictitious characters, rock stars, 
actresses, and professional athletes could also function as models of 
virtue. The process, it is said, is mainly motivated by admiration and 
emulation, and could last our whole life.   
I want to challenge part of this second idea. In this work, I argue 
that most theories about the cultivation of virtue claim virtue is acquired 
by emulating role models, where those role models are usually 
conceived of as superior in some relevant respects to the learners. This 
common overemphasis on role models is misguided and misleading, 




friendship. My primary aim is to show how much we could gain by 
including character friendship centrally in our account of virtue 
cultivation. 
In chapter I, I start by examining some definitions of virtue. 
Following Aristotle (fundamentally his Nicomachean Ethics), virtues are 
defined as human excellences, character traits or dispositions to have 
the appropriate motives that lead their possessor to act in the 
appropriate way. The exercise of virtues is a constitutive part of human 
flourishing. The second section of this chapter considers the discussion 
about the two kinds of virtues: moral and intellectual, and evaluates 
whether there are good reasons to maintain such a distinction. I argue 
intellectual and moral virtues are only superficially different, because to 
a certain point their particular ends are different; but they are 
interdependent because those ends are, after all, components of the 
human good. The third section is about some answers to the question 
whether virtue can be taught. I start with the answers of Plato/Socrates 
and Aristotle, and then I move to some contemporary answers. I 
consider the view of Julia Annas (2011), according to which learning 
virtue is like learning some practical skills such as playing violin. It is a 
matter of intelligent habituation. Then I consider Rosalind Hursthouse’s 
(2001) idea that the cultivation of virtue consists mainly and firstly on 




of the reasons. Finally, I examine Linda Zagzebski’s exemplarist virtue 
theory (2010, 2013, and 2017), where she argues that the process of 
virtue cultivation is motivated by the emotion of admiration, which 
conduces to emulation. This chapter concludes with the suggestion that 
maybe something important to the whole picture of virtue cultivation is 
missing: what we learn when engaged in close relationships with non-
superiors, like in the special case of friendship.  
In order to see why friendship is important for virtue cultivation, 
chapter II starts with some considerations about the nature of 
friendship. Friendship is a close relationship characterized by mutual 
appreciation, well-wishing, and mutual acknowledgment of such 
appreciation and well-wishing. Some of the main features of friendship 
are examined here, like its being constitutive of human well-being, its 
instrumental and its intrinsic value, as well as its being necessary for a 
happy self-sufficient life within an Aristotelian perspective. I claim this 
derives from Aristotle’s conception of the self as social. The second 
section of this chapter specifies what good or character friendships are. 
Good friends appreciate each other’s good characters, and see each 
other as a mirror, as another self. This means this relationship is based 
on a certain similarity between the friends, a similarity in the sort of 
things they enjoy and value in life. Character friends share time together 




Despite some acknowledgment within traditional moral theory of the 
importance of friendship for human flourishing, the issue of the 
justification for the love we feel toward our friends raises, unfortunately, 
almost a general suspicion. The third section of this chapter examines 
two of the main reasons for such a suspicion: i) the idea that our love 
for our friends comes from self-love and, because of that, is egoistic; ii) 
even if friendship is not ultimately egoistic, it is difficult to justify love for 
a particular person within an impartialist framework. Analyzing 
Aristotle’s distinction between proper and improper self-love, we see 
that the love for a character friend does not spring from self-love but 
rather for the good character embodied in the friend. On the other hand, 
following Laurence Blum (1980), I argue that the second reason for the 
suspicion about the moral status of friendship is based on a 
shortsighted view of what a comprehensive moral theory should 
encompass. Properly understood, partial concerns must be seen as 
justified as impartial concerns. The second chapter concludes claiming 
genuine (partial) concern for our loved ones is as moral as the 
(impartial) concern for all humanity.    
Chapter III explains in more detail why character friendship is 
fundamental for virtue cultivation. I argue it is a special kind of 
experience and source of certain knowledge, emotions, and praxis 




caveats and then section two explores what makes character friendship 
special. I argue character friendship (a) constitutes a unique form of 
experience in which we share or inhabit a substantial way of seeing with 
a close other; (b) facilitates a unique form of knowledge, the knowledge 
of a particular person (my-self and the other’s self); (c) develops other 
emotions important for the cultivation of virtue besides admiration, such 
as love, shame, trust, and hope; and (d) is a praxis in which cooperative 
interactions and discussions function as a bridge between habituation 
of virtue at home and the public life. Character friendship is an 
experience which provides necessary elements for human cultivation of 
virtue that the sole experience of having a role model does not. I 
conclude the chapter with a brief reflection of why I think the role model 
account is incomplete.  
In chapter IV I start by introducing some empirical results from 
developmental and social psychology that seem to support my thesis 
that character friendship is fundamental for virtue cultivation, specially 
from adolescence onward. Extrapolating some empirical results from 
Judy Dunn (2004) and Walker et al. (2016) about children’s friendships, 
I contend that contrary to major extent views within the tradition assert, 
adolescents can engage in character friendships. Based on this, in the 
second part of the chapter I derive some practical implications of my 




reasons to think we, as adults, should do something to help children 
and adolescents to engage and maintain character friendships, I 
consider some strategies that we could implement both at homes and 
in schools. As a starting point, I say we could acknowledge, care, and 
facilitate character friendships among children and adolescents. Then 
following Nel Noddings (2008), I recognize the value of modelling, 
dialogue, practice and confirmation, as she understands these notions. 
I also follow Noddings (1994) in considering ordinary conversations, as 
well as what she calls interpersonal reasoning (1991), as highly 
valuable for moral education. In the third part of this chapter I briefly 
explore if some practical applications of the thesis are available.   
The V and last chapter is a brief reflection on what I found and 






Chapter I. On the cultivation of virtue 
“Socrates' mistake, Aristotle himself says, 
is that ‘he used to inquire what virtue is,  
but not how and from what sources it arises’  
(EE 1216b10–11; 1216b19–22).” Sherman, 1991: 157 
 
1. Virtue 
A virtue is a character trait or disposition to have the 
appropriate motives that leads its possessor to act in the appropriate 
way. Virtues are human excellences and their exercise is a 
constitutive part of human well-being. 
As Aristotle puts it in his Nicomachean Ethics (NE), there are 
life situations that almost every human being faces and there is a 
spectrum of possible responses to those situations that usually goes 
from excess to defect. The appropriate response, which is usually in 
the middle of that spectrum, would be the virtuous response. Those 
situations are spheres, and so he claims there is a sphere of life 
where we have to deal with fear, for which the virtue would be courage 
(1115a61117b21), and a sphere in life in which we deal with pleasures 
(mainly bodily), for which the virtue is temperance (1117b23-




goods such as money and honor, and there are the virtues of 
generosity and magnificence in the prior (1119b23-1123a34), and 
magnanimity and proper pride in the latter (1123a35-1125b26). In the 
sphere of anger the virtue is mildness (1125b27-1126b11), in the 
sphere of truth-telling, truthfulness (1127a14-1127b35), in 
amusements, wit (1128a1-1128b9), and in the sphere of meeting 
people in daily life is the virtue of friendliness (1126b12-1127a13)1. 
In order to better understand Aristotle’s view of what a virtue is, 
let’s see in more detail how he talks about one of his paradigmatic 
virtues, courage. Regarding the sphere in which we have to deal with 
fear, he claims courage is a mean between feelings of fear and 
confidence, but not about everything: only about what there are good 
reasons to think are worthy matters. He says:  
… Whoever stands firm against the right things and fears the right 
things, for the right end, in the right way, at the right time, and is 
correspondingly confident, is the brave person; for the brave person’s 
actions and feelings accord with what something is worth, and follow 
what reason prescribes. (NE, III, 1115b, 19-23).  
 
There are some features of this definition that should be 
noticed. Firstly, virtues in general are defined by Aristotle as character 
                                                          
1 Aristotle distinguishes between friendliness and friendship. Since this distinction is 
important for my thesis, I will talk more about it in Chapter II. This is not an 
exhausting list of all the Aristotelian virtues and its spheres. These, along with 
justice, are virtues of character, but there are also virtues of thought, such as 
prudence, understanding, wisdom, good deliberation, and comprehension (NE, 




traits that make the agent act for the right end, in the right way, at the 
right time. In other words, virtuous agents act for the right reasons. 
Some would say the right reasons are mostly defined by our nature 
(Anscombe: 1958, Foot: 2001), some that such reasons are mainly 
defined by the practices and moral traditions in which we are 
(MacIntyre: 1981), and some others still would argue that acting for 
the right reasons means the virtuous agent acts for moral principles, 
out of a sense of duty (Hursthouse: 20012). It is also worth noticing 
that in virtue theory the “right reasons” are not typically viewed as 
reasons in one traditional sense, as the pure product of our rational 
faculty (as defined by Kant, 1787), but rather as a combination of 
beliefs, emotions, and understanding (Zagzebski, 2017; Hursthouse, 
2001). 
Secondly, and following from the previous point, Aristotle 
claims that in the virtuous agent actions and feelings accord with 
reason. This is what we mean when we say that virtues give the agent 
the appropriate motives to act well. Having the right motives to act 
amounts to knowing what to do and why, as well as actually desiring 
                                                          
2 Hursthouse’ (2001) position is interesting because she argues that virtue ethics is 
not as far from deontic ethics as philosophers usually claim. In this sense, it is 
possible to derive guide action principles from virtue ethics in the same way that it 
is possible to do it from Kantian ethics. She calls those principles V-principles, and 
says they would be something like: “act honesty”, “act justly”… and so on. 
According to her, “right action” is defined in terms of the virtuous agent. That is, a 




to do it. Part of this is included in the notion of having right reasons to 
act, in the sense that to know what to do and why is to know which 
good reasons we have to act. But having the right motives to act 
includes also to feel the appropriate emotions and the desire to do the 
right thing. This requires having emotions with rational content.  
This means that in typical virtue theoretic accounts, emotions 
are cognitive. Emotions are conceived as constituted (or at least 
partially) by judgments that can be right or wrong. Emotions are seen 
as part of our rational nature. We are animals, and because of that we 
share some emotions with non-human animals, but since we are 
rational animals our emotions can also be rational - not merely driven 
by instinct. In Hursthouse’ (2001) words:  
The emotion that in the other animals is essentially connected to 
physical self‐preservation or preservation of the species can be 
transformed in human beings into an emotion connected with the 
preservation of what is best, most worth preserving, in us and our 
species. And the correctness (or incorrectness) of our view of that is 
an aspect of our rationality. (p. 111).  
 
 
Thirdly, for Aristotle virtues are defined as character traits or 
dispositions because they must be deeply rooted in the agent’s 
character, and enable her to act well most of the time. To be 
courageous, for instance, an agent must respond courageously most 
of the time she faces fear. An isolated act performed with courage 




Fourth, since having the right motives implies knowing what to 
do, virtues also enable their possessor to act well in the sense they 
give her a sort of effectiveness. An agent lacks virtue if the agent has 
just good intentions or good reasons to act well but most of the time 
she cannot bring about the good goal she intends. There must be a 
tendency to reach the goal when she acts. This is what Zagzebski 
calls the success component of virtue (1996: 100, 149). Although this 
feature could be controversial,3 following Zagzebski I think it is an 
important requisite in order to call someone a virtuous agent.  
Fifth, virtues benefit their possessor (Hursthouse, 2001). 
Virtues are human excellences and their exercise is a constitutive part 
of human well-being or flourishing, because they express human 
nature (Foot, 2001). Such human nature is mainly defined by our 
being rational animals.4 Since human beings are political animals, 
they need to live with others in a socially organized way in order to 
fully develop their nature. The main difference between other social 
animals and human beings is our use of reason. There are many 
different forms of social human organization, and some argue there 
                                                          
3 See, for instance, W. P. Alston (2000) who claims that this feature cannot be an 
essential part of the concept of virtue because it only works for some virtues (p. 
186).    
4 According to Aristotle, man is by nature a “zoon politikon”, a political animal (The 
Politics, I, ii, 1253a3). In (1999) A. McIntyre claims that such condition of being 
rational and political animals makes us also dependent one from another. We 




are character strengths or virtues necessary to be part of them, which 
could be relative to those forms of organizations (practices and 
traditions, see MacIntyre 1981). Nevertheless, although the exercise 
of the virtues could differ in different contexts, the definition of virtue is 
not relative to those contexts. Such a definition derives from the notion 
of human flourishing or well-being (Nussbaum, 1987)5. Since virtues 
are excellences of human nature – which is mostly defined by our 
rationality and social dependency - their exercise benefits their 
possessors by enabling them to lead good human lives.    
Finally, it is important to notice that the notions of human nature 
and human well-being are not absolute, but aim at objectivity. In a 
sense, they should not make us think there is only one way of 
flourishing or leading a good life. For a person to flourish she does not 
need to live in a particular place or within a specific society, 
community or tradition; nor be an intellectual, a politician or a monk. 
Nevertheless, there is also a sense in which we could say that there is 
only one way in which a good human life could be lived: rationally 
(Hursthouse, 2001). In this sense, the concepts of human nature and 
                                                          
5 There are some exceptions from this characterization. L. Zagzebski, for instance, 
proposes a definition of virtue that is not dependent upon the concept of human 




human well-being are objective. In a broad sense they determine what 
is rational for humans to do and what is not.  
 
2. Kinds of virtues 
According to Aristotle (NE) there are two kinds of virtues: moral 
virtues and intellectual virtues. Intellectual virtues are defined as 
character traits that make their possessors care about good thinking, 
judgment, knowledge, and understanding. Moral virtues are defined as 
dispositions to have the motives to behave rightly, e.g. justly, 
courageously, or compassionately.  
Although there are many virtues in both groups, the issue of 
distinguishing the intellectual from the moral raises some pressing 
questions. How can we distinguish a moral from an intellectual virtue? 
Is there really a substantial difference? How do particular intellectual 
virtues relate to particular moral virtues, or how does the relation go in 
general? We could group potential answers to the question of whether 
there is a clear distinction between moral and intellectual virtues as 
follows:  
1. Moral and intellectual virtues are not different. Although we 
talk of moral and intellectual virtues it is just a matter of language, but 
there is ultimately only one type of virtue. This seems to be Socrates’ 




2. Moral and intellectual virtues are not different in a substantial 
way, and one type of virtue is a proper subset of the other. This is the 
subset thesis, according to Baehr’s (2011) taxonomy. Zagzebski’s 
view (1996) fits here, because she claims intellectual virtues are a 
subset of moral virtues. In other words, “Intellectual virtues are best 
viewed as forms of moral virtue” (p. 139).    
3.  Moral and intellectual virtues are different in a substantial 
way, but a) they are interrelated (Baehr himself holds this position that 
he calls moderated position), or b) they are independent 
(independence thesis). This means there are individuals with moral 
virtues without intellectual virtue, and individuals with intellectual virtue 
without moral virtue. This is the liberal position, according to Baehr 
(2011)6.  
In this section I will argue for a variation of the second position. 
I think intellectual and moral virtues are interdependent and only 
superficially different. They are different because their aims are 
different, but they are interdependent because their ends are 
components of the human good. 
First of all, they are so closely related that for many of them we 
have the same names (moral and intellectual honesty, moral and 
                                                          
6 Although this seems to be a common position among people, I could not find a 




intellectual fairness, moral and intellectual courage); second, it seems 
that most of the time the exercise of a moral virtue requires an 
intellectual virtue, and the exercise of an intellectual virtue requires of 
a moral one; third, in an Aristotelian sense, moral virtue requires 
phronesis, which he characterized as an intellectual virtue. As a result 
of this, I think the general relation between moral and intellectual 
virtues is one of interdependence. That is, they are different in a 
certain sense, but one kind of virtue requires of the other in order to be 
a proper virtue of its kind.  
When Aristotle was trying to name the virtues, he realized that 
at his time they didn’t have names for all of them. So, for some he 
made up names and for others he simply left them nameless. Even 
now, one could question whether we have the same names for certain 
moral and intellectual virtues just out of a lack in language, or whether 
this is mostly a matter of the nature of the virtues themselves and their 
relationships. I think some moral and intellectual virtues share the 
same name because they are so closely related, they share a 
common root. We talk of moral and intellectual honesty, moral and 
intellectual fairness, moral and intellectual courage, and so on 
because although we recognize a difference in the manifestation of 
each virtue, we at the same time recognize they share a common 




Let’s analyze courage, for instance. It was originally placed by 
Aristotle (NE) among the individual virtues of character, along with 
temperance, generosity, magnificence, and magnanimity, the virtue 
concerned with small honors, mildness, friendliness, truthfulness, wit, 
and justice. He claims courage is a mean between feelings of fear and 
confidence, but not about everything: there are sorts of frightening 
conditions that concern the brave person. Although he initially 
restricted those conditions to “the most frightening thing… in the finest 
conditions,” which according to him is death in war, his subsequent 
discussion of courage allows us to think that its scope is actually 
wider. Again, take Aristotle’s definition of courage we already gave 
(Ch. I, 1). He says:  
… Whoever stands firm against the right things and fears the right 
things, for the right end, in the right way, at the right time, and is 
correspondingly confident, is the brave person; for the brave person’s 
actions and feelings accord with what something is worth, and follow 
what reason prescribes. (NE, III, 1115b, 19-23).  
 
I suggest we could say that a person is courageous when she 
risks something important for what she has good reasons to think it is 
a good cause. Obviously, the question now is how to know when 
those conditions are met. Is it brave when a man who likes hunting for 
sport has to fight in the darkness against a wild animal? He is certainly 
risking his life and facing death, but I doubt this could be properly 




for a fine cause, he just likes to hunt and he does not need to be doing 
it. Only if he needed to hunt for survival could it count as courage, 
because the concept seems to involve more than only overcoming 
fear and facing death. I think Aristotle claims death in war is death in 
the finest conditions for an important reason. It is the fighting in 
defense of worthy people, ideas, and values that really counts as 
courage. Interpretations according to which his definition of courage 
states that only actual soldiers or warriors can be courageous are 
misleading. I suggest that “war” here should be taken as fights we 
have to go through in our lives, and “death” as the possible 
consequences of those fights.  
Imagine now someone who is standing against his community 
going into war because, among other things, he believes political 
means must be exhausted before using military force, and because 
war is a terrible waste of both economic and human resources. 
Although he thinks the values of his community should be protected, 
he also believes this is not the right method. Because of that, he leads 
campaigns and demonstrations against the government and those 
who support war. Could we consider him courageous? I think the 
answer is yes, even in an Aristotelian sense. He is courageous trying 
to avoid war because war is not always (and maybe only in few cases 




take it to be a good cause, a worthy end. Mostly, standing actively 
against what his government and the majority of the members of his 
community take to be the right solution is difficult. It is also a fight, a 
struggle of a different nature. Those who stand against what their 
community think is the right path also have to face fear and take the 
risks of being isolated and losing their jobs, prestige, families and 
friends, and even their own lives. This example, some would say, is a 
good example of the moral virtue of courage.   
Now think of a scientist who makes a challenging hypothesis to 
solve a theoretical problem within a specific area of mathematics. She 
works tirelessly to provide evidence to support her hypothesis without 
success for three decades, at the end of which she finally finds the 
conclusive evidence needed to demonstrate it. Could we also say she 
is courageous even though the case does not involve war or facing 
death? Again, I think the answer is yes. Her formulation of the 
challenging hypothesis, her sticking to it for so many years despite the 
fact of not finding conclusive proof, and the fact that she keeps trying 
to find it shows her courage. She risked her prestige as a scientist and 
had to face frustration for so long. Examples of this sort are examples 
of intellectual courage.  
In short, we could say that a person is courageous when she 




friends, colleagues or members of the community, her belongings – 
material or symbolic, or even her life) for what she has good reasons 
to think is a good cause. This is the common root of both kinds of 
virtue. But it is called moral courage when the end is moral, such as 
the case of the man against war, and intellectual courage when the 
end is epistemic (such as the search of truth, knowledge or 
understanding), as in the case of the scientist. They differ in the end.  
There is a second sense in which moral and intellectual virtues 
seem to be deeply related. In most of the cases, one kind of virtue is 
necessary for having a virtue of the other kind. The case for 
intellectual virtues as necessary conditions for moral virtues appears 
more straightforward, since any instance of moral virtue requires at 
least to get facts right. That is, a moral agent needs attentiveness, 
truthfulness, sensitivity to details, open-mindedness, and some other 
intellectual virtues in order to know when, where, why, and how to act 
because otherwise her action will not be a proper instantiation of a 
moral virtue. You will need to care about truth in order to have the 
moral virtue of honesty, and you cannot be compassionate or 
generous in a situation in which you really do not know what is going 
on. As Zagzebski claims, since virtue is a success concept, 
No one has the virtue of fairness or courage or compassion or 
generosity without generally being in cognitive contact with the 
aspect of reality handled by the respective virtue. Otherwise, one 




mistakes in beliefs or perceptions in the possession of a moral virtue, 
but no one who regularly misperceives the situation or has mistaken 
beliefs about what should or should not be done in such cases can 
be said to possess the moral virtue that governs cases of that type 
(…) Being reasonably intelligent within a certain area of life is part of 
having almost any moral virtue (p. 149).  
 
On the other hand, we can see that there are also several ways 
in which intellectual virtues logically or causally require moral virtues. 
Moral vices such as envy or pride could hinder the cultivation of 
intellectual virtues because knowledge is a social product and the 
search for understanding requires other’s works, perspectives and 
support. In the same sense, an agent who seeks to develop his 
intellectual virtues will need moral virtues such as patience, 
perseverance, and courage in order to attain the truth, and search for 
knowledge and understanding. Take, for instance, open-mindedness 
as understood by Wayne Riggs (2010). According to him, “open-
mindedness is primarily an attitude toward oneself as a believer” (p. 
172) which requires one to acknowledge and to be aware of one’s 
fallibility as a believer. This attitude requires the moral virtue of 
humility.    
Finally, a third way in which we could think of a relationship 
between intellectual and moral virtues is paying attention to the 
Aristotelian suggestion according to which phronesis is needed to 




to him, phronesis is “a truth-attaining intellectual quality concerned 
with doing and with the things that are good for human beings” (NE 
VI.5). Although there is a large debate about Aristotle’s placing this 
virtue in the rational part of the soul, as well as about his division of 
the soul into rational and non-rational parts, I think that the function he 
gives to phronesis is illuminating. Phronesis commands when and 
how a specific virtue is needed (not only if intellectual or moral but 
also which particular virtue within each cluster of virtues). I picture its 
role as similar to an orchestra’s conductor. The performance of a good 
piece of music will require that every single musician knows how to 
play the instrument well, but also that they follow the conductor’s 
indications accurately. The role of a good musician in the performance 
of a symphony, for instance, will be similar to the role of each virtue: 
they must do it well individually but also depend upon one another in 
order to sound like a symphony. And although every musician must 
know when and how to perform their parts, they must also follow the 
conductor’s guidance. In this sense, I agree with Zagzebski in that 
phronesis is a higher-order virtue that governs both intellectual and 
moral virtues in the same way.       
In summary, my position would be another way of interpreting 
the second position above, according to which moral and intellectual 




Zagzebski’s position in that I do not hold the subset thesis because I 
do not think one type of virtue is a subset of the other. 
I conceive moral and intellectual virtues as different but not in a 
substantial way, and I think each type of virtue needs the other in 
order to be what it is. This does not imply that having one virtue is 
having all of them,7 but rather that what we call a moral virtue such as 
moral courage, for instance, would require some intellectual virtues 
(such as truthfulness), and that an intellectual virtue such as open-
mindedness would require some moral virtues (or at least one, 
humility). My guess is that it is so because an important part of the 
definition of a character trait as a virtue (and not simply as a skill or 
ability) is its wholeness. In other words, maybe a virtue is a virtue 
because it has both moral and intellectual excellences as its 
components, and also because it must be connected to human 
flourishing.    
                                                          
7 This would be what has been called the unity thesis. There are two main 
formulations of this doctrine. One of them states that courage, justice, 
temperance… are just different names to refer the same thing, because virtue is 
one thing. The other formulation claims that in order to have courage, for instance, 
one needs all the other virtues; so having one amounts to have them all. In the 
Protagoras, the main Socratic dialogue where this issue is discussed by Plato, 
Socrates asks Protagoras whether he thinks the relationship among all those virtues 
and the whole virtue is like parts of gold (first formulation) or like parts in a face 
(second formulation). There is still a great debate whether Socrates holds the thesis 
in any of its formulations. For a good treatment in favor of the idea that Socrates 
holds it under the first formulation or identity view, see, for instance Terry Penner 
(1973). For a good argumentation in favor of the idea that Plato holds it under the 




As a consequence of this analysis, when I talk here about the 
cultivation of virtue I am not talking about a specific virtue or set of 
virtues, but rather I am using the expression as a generic notion that 
could encompass either what is usually called moral virtue or what is 
usually called intellectual virtue. Although in Chapter IV I talk of “moral 
development” and “virtue cultivation” as part of the same process, it 
must be clear that I think moral development goes hand in hand with 
cognitive development and vice versa. So my interest is more for the 
cultivation of virtue as a sort of complex of capacities, borrowing 
Nancy Sherman’s (1991) words:  
A comprehensive account of the acquisition of Aristotelian virtue 
would require going through the full range of virtues implicit in 
goodness, and saying something about what the subconstituents of 
each virtue are and how they might be acquired, e.g. for courage, 
how fear must be felt but confronted, the sorts of circumstances and 
beliefs appropriate to the right response, exposure to which might 
cultivate that response. Different passions will be involved in different 
virtues, and different circumstances will be appropriate for the 
exercise of each. The opportunities and resources for cultivating one 
virtue need not coincide with the opportunities for cultivating another. 
Some passions might be more resistant to reform than others, and 
some vices more blameworthy (1119a22–32). Though Aristotle 
himself undertakes this sort of extensive accounting of the virtues, I 
cannot go through it in detail. Rather, what I wish to do is to consider 
virtue in a general way as a complex of capacities—perceptual, 
affective, and deliberative—and suggest how these capacities are 
cultivated. (p.166) 
 
In what follows, then, I will consider some ancient and 
contemporary views on the question whether virtue in this general 









3. Can virtue be taught?  
3.1. Some ancient views  
3.1.1. Socrates/Plato: virtue cannot be taught, but can be 
prompted   
The Meno is the main dialogue in which Socrates tries to 
answer the question whether virtue can be taught, and it marks the 
beginning of many debates in Western philosophy about this subject. 
If we just take what the text superficially shows, Socrates’ answer is 
negative: virtue cannot be taught because it is a gift from the gods. 
Aristotle, on the other side, claims intellectual virtue can be taught, 
and moral virtue can be brought about by habituation. How should we 
understand these answers? What can they tell us now? I think good 
answers to these questions need to take into account different implicit 
nuances in the concept of virtue and the way we think of something 
being taught. After analyzing those notions, my answer is “yes, virtue 




When Meno asks Socrates whether virtue can be taught, his 
initial answer is that he does not even know what virtue is and 
because of that he does not know any subsidiary thing about it. As a 
consequence, Socrates proposes Meno to investigate what virtue is in 
the first place.8 At this point Meno poses his paradox – or “the learner 
paradox” - in which he asks how it could be possible to look for 
something that one does not know, since one doesn’t know what one 
is looking for.9 
Socrates answers that since the soul is immortal, it has seen all 
the things in the underworld and, because of that, it can “learn” or 
remember everything about virtue or other things when correctly 
prompted.10 But then Meno asks again whether among the things in 
the soul virtue is teachable or not. This time Socrates goes a little bit 
                                                          
8 What has been called “the Socratic Fallacy”, which consists in saying that it is 
impossible to say something about a thing if we do not have a definition of such a 
thing with which we can start in the first place. For more on this see Geach, 1966, 
who take this to be an objection to Socratic philosophy. See also Beversluis and 
Vlastos, 1994 for a more charitable view of the Socratic position.  
9 Some interpreters say the paradox depends on an equivocation of a key term or 
clause (McCabe, 2009). That is, that maybe Plato is distinguishing here between 
tacit or manifest knowledge (Bluck, 1964; Mathews, 1999). Some others say that 
what Plato wants to highlight here is a fallacy or ambiguity that is lying behind the 
surface, that the paradox is employed to introduce important philosophical 
problems (Benson, 2015). 
10 This is Plato’s theory of recollection, which can be found mainly in Pheado and 
Meno. In the Meno, the conversation with the slave boy is meant to show the 
existence of prenatal knowledge and the possibility of self-discovery if someone is 
properly prompted. According to Plato, what can actualize such possibility is the 
application of the method of hypothesis. For more on this, see Scott, 2006; 




further than before and ventures the hypothesis that if virtue is a kind 
of knowledge it is teachable; and at first sight it seems to be so, he 
says, because virtue is knowledge of good and bad. Nevertheless, as 
usual in his dialogues, the refutation of this hypothesis comes soon: if 
something is teachable, then there must be people who teach it and 
people who learn it, but there are not teachers of virtue. Those 
sophists who say they can teach virtue in fact cannot do it; moreover, 
worthy people themselves cannot teach it to their own children. If 
there are no teachers of virtue then virtue is not knowledge and 
cannot be taught. Then, virtue must be right opinion that has not been 
taught. His conclusion is that if virtue is not knowledge, and cannot be 
taught, statesmen who do the right things, as well as soothsayers and 
prophets, must be called “divine” because they assert that they have 
right opinions, without having knowledge at all: “…Virtue would be 
neither an inborn quality nor taught, but comes to those who possess 
it as a gift from the gods which is not accompanied by understanding” 
(100a-b). 
Although this is what the text shows and the most common 
interpretations are skeptical, saying either that this conclusion is an 
expression of Socrates’ ignorance11 or that he really thinks virtue 
                                                          
11 Vlastos’ (1991) position is that this is a transitional dialogue and expresses mostly 




cannot be taught because it is a gift from god,12 I think another 
interpretation of the text is possible.13 I will dare to formulate a bold 
hypothesis for this interpretation, even though I have no textual 
evidence now for it. If virtue is knowledge and knowledge is 
recollection, and our souls can recall something when properly 
prompted, Socrates is asking what the appropriate way to prompt our 
souls is.14 Maybe he thinks there are no formal teachers of virtue (at 
                                                          
taught. Under this skeptic interpretation, the Meno’s conclusion is an expression of 
Socrates’ ignorance. It seems that those who think Socrates commits “the Socratic 
Fallacy” (P. Geach, 1966) when he talks of a concept without giving a clear 
definition of it support this position.  
12 An interesting argument in this direction is presented in Mark Reuter (2001). He 
claims there are other Platonic texts (the Seventh Letter, Plato’s discussion of the 
education of the philosopher in Republic 6, the Laws 715ae7-716b7) that support 
the interpretation according to which Plato believes in divine providence in this 
issue. In other words, he argues that for Plato goodness is a gift from God. Reuter 
also claims that “This hypothesis has been made in recent times by Morrow (1960) 
and in antiquity by Alcinous (Louis and Whittaker 1990).” (p. 91, note 34).  
13 In fact, although Mark Reuter (2001) supports the part of the skeptic 
interpretation according to which Plato’s view is that in the path to virtue there is 
divine intervention, he denies the skeptic conclusion scholars derive from it. That 
is, he claims this does not mean there is no human responsibility in becoming 
virtuous. According to him, although in Plato’s view goodness (or virtue in general) 
is a divine gift, it still needs to be cultivated and can be taught: “…the remedy for 
vice and the road to goodness will be found in the effort to become like god. This 
goal is attainable for human beings because we already have a portion of the divine 
present within our rational psyche. Neither god nor this gift is something imposed 
on us from the outside. Rather the recognition of this gift, its cultivation, and 
development, represent a type of understanding. It is the recognition of our divine 
origins that give us our impulse to take up philosophy (cf. Republic 611e4) and our 
love of wisdom that prescribes the path of purification whereby we attain 
goodness (cf. Phaedo 69a-e). How far down this path we go remains up to us”. (p. 
94).  
14 A similar interpretation would be that of D. Scott (2006). He claims that according 
to Plato real virtue comes by recollection and the virtue of politicians, “shade 




least in his time), but this does not mean that virtue cannot be learned. 
Moreover, I think it is possible to read the conclusion of the dialogue 
as an application of his irony. It is so difficult to believe that a man who 
devoted all his life to the task of trying to make others think about what 
it means to live a good life did so while thinking it was pointless. His 
life, as well as his death as described in the Apology, seem to show 
he believed reflection could makes us better as human beings, and 
eventually could make us virtuous.  
It is reasonable to believe that the conversation with the slave 
illustrates Socrates thinks there are not teachers (of virtue or anything) 
if we understand teaching as giving something to someone that she 
did not have before. But maybe he believes it is possible to teach 
something in the sense of helping others to remember it. So what I 
suggest is to interpret his question like asking whether somebody can 
help us to remember virtue. I think his answer would be yes.  
Nevertheless, it is important to make some remarks about my 
suggestion for this interpretation of Socrates’ position. First of all, 
Socrates could be calling attention to the fact that although the 
process of teaching and learning in general seems to entail a direct 
                                                          
with the Meno’s conclusion is to show (via the dialogue with the slave) that any 
knowledge, including knowledge of virtue, is possible only by means of the 




relation of a teacher and a learner, it is not necessarily so. This 
interpretation allows us to say that there could be processes such as 
those of teaching and learning virtue in which there are learners 
without being formal teachers of it. Someone could become virtuous 
through her own experience, reflection, and searching. This does not 
mean, however, that there have not been helpers or “teachers” in her 
learning of virtue. Her experience is an experience of living with 
others, trying to know them, to understand them, to make a better life 
among them, and in this sense it is possible to say they have been 
“teachers of virtue.” Her own reflection is also penetrated by her 
experience with others with whom she lives her life, but also by the 
experience she gets from others who lived in other times (from books, 
movies…). Her search of virtue is helped in many ways by the 
searching of others.   
Second, in this sense, saying that there are teachers of virtue 
does not necessarily mean there is direct and deliberated instruction. 
That is, the teacher need not be present, or she could be present and, 
nonetheless, teach us something without knowing it or even without 




intentional (Müller, unpublished). I think this is so because we also 
learn through other’s experience, through their example.15 
According to Anselm W. Müller (unpublished), for instance, in 
order to become virtuous human beings we need what he calls 
“ethical upbringing,” which from his point of view must start with 
children and be done mainly by parents. But what is most interesting 
in his point of view is his rejection of what he calls an “intentionalist 
view of upbringing.” In his words, there is a mistake in “our tendency 
to expect activity or action where there is a verb – a predicate that 
attributes a kind of doing. More particularly, we tend to think that if 
children are to learn from their parents how to act and to live, the 
parents must somehow teach them how to act and to live; and this 
teaching must, it seems, consist in characteristic intentional action or 
activity performed with a further intention to effect an increase in virtue 
in the child” (p. 4). Applying a Wittgensteinian analysis, he suggests 
rather to look at the grammar of upbringing in order to understand it 
better. He claims ethical upbringing is a kind of poiesis, but different 
from paradigmatic forms of doing, like playing violin for instance, in the 
following senses:  
                                                          
15 This connects with Linda Zagzebski’s suggestion (2012) according to which virtue 
can be taught pointing out moral exemplars. In this sense narratives, both real and 
fictional, would constitute the main source of teaching virtue.  




1). Ethical upbringing requires temporal continuity because it is 
a responsibility, not an activity. While a violinist who is producing bad 
sounds could say she is not actually playing but testing a new string or 
tuning her instrument, it doesn’t make any sense if a parent gives a 
similar answer. He cannot say something like: “I am not actually 
bringing up the child but testing her reactions or testing a new 
pedagogical theory.”  
2). It does not make any sense either if a parent says: “Oh, I 
am not trying to bring her up, I am trying to do something else,” 
because whether he brings up the child or not does not depend on his 
intention. Although the quality of the upbringing may vary depending 
on the intention, the fact of the upbringing itself doesn’t depend upon 
the parent’s intention. Intention is not a necessary component of 
upbringing.  
3). Evaluation of the agent is also different in this case. The 
violinist could say she is making bad sounds because she intends to 
do so, but she can do it better if she wants. This sort of answer would 
put a parent even in a worse position.  
4). There are not “acts of upbringing” and it does not consist in 
any such acts (or “educational measures”). Bringing up a child would 
imply a) performing certain actions but also not to perform others; b) 




c). that since children learn mainly from the upbringer’s ethical 
example, it is in part a matter of unintended behavior; d) that although 
there are some intentional actions, they need not be actions 
performed with the further intention of influencing the character of the 
child; and e) that you have a general conception of what kind of 
character should be developed, but in general it is not so.  
As a consequence, he says the grammar of bringing up a child 
works in the same way than acting well does, at least in one sense: 
“Aristotle explains this sense of acting by saying that the inherent telos 
of prattein is its own goodness rather than anything produced by and 
separable from it. It is an immanent telos: it is nothing beyond acting in 
a certain way – namely: well (eu prattein) – or, roughly speaking, the 
practice of the ethical virtues and practical wisdom” (p. 10). In this 
sense, he claims, bringing up a child has the same grammar as 
acting, and the ethical upbringing would in fact consist in acting well, 
in practicing virtues.  
Finally, coming back to our original question (i.e., whether 
virtue can be taught), Müller concludes that if his analysis is correct 
and the intentionalist view of upbringing is wrong, then you cannot be 
said to teach virtue when you are bringing up a child well, in the sense 
that you are not doing something additional. Nevertheless, he claims 




or people that should do it, he claims it must initiate in the family, 
preferably with the parents; and finally he considers some of the 
circumstances under which the development of moral virtue could be 
facilitated: an environment with moral examples and good interactions. 
Müller’s analysis of the grammar of upbringing shows teaching 
virtue does not require intentionality. In other words, I think it supports 
the idea that having the intention to teach virtue is not necessary nor 
sufficient for teaching virtue. In sum, there is a sense in which 
according to Socrates virtue cannot be taught, if we understand this as 
the transferring of information from a teacher to a learner in a direct 
and intentional way. But I suggest Socrates’ position could be 
interpreted as saying that although it seems there are not formal 
teachers of virtue (at least in his time), there are nevertheless people 
and experiences that prompt our souls in a way that make us 
remember virtue.  
 
3.1.2. Aristotle: virtue can be learned through habituation and 
teaching      
Aristotle defines virtue as a stable disposition of character that 
makes its possessor know what the right thing to do is in a specific 
circumstance. That is, it enables her to know the “mean” or middle 




argues that there are two kinds of virtues: moral and intellectual. In 
regard to their cultivation, it seems there is a sort of common ground 
for both kinds of virtues. 
First, there is what Aristotle calls “natural virtue” or “proto-
virtue” (intellectual and moral) that must be cultivated in order to 
become proper virtue. He says: “…virtues arise in us neither by nature 
nor against nature. Rather, we are by nature able to acquire them, and 
we are completed through habit.” (1103a25-26). Natural virtue, also 
called “childish virtue” because it is said to be already in most children, 
is like a natural tendency in human beings to be inclined to do the right 
thing. It is not proper or complete virtue because it does not involve 
yet choice and practical intelligence or wisdom.16 
Second, such cultivation has to do mainly with pleasure and 
pain, with learning to feel joy and grief for the appropriate things: “… 
virtue of character is about pleasures and pains. For pleasure causes 
us to do base actions, and pain causes us to abstain from fine ones” 
(1104b9-11). The virtuous person finds pleasure in acting virtuously, 
which distinguishes her from the continent, who does the right thing 
but whose reasons and emotions are not in accord with one another. 
                                                          
16 For more on this notion, see Hayden Ramsay (2010), where he argues that the 
notion on natural virtue could be a solution for some problems within the unity of 




In the continent there is a struggle. Since people who are continent do 
not find pleasure in fine actions, they fight with their feelings.17  
Third, such cultivation must start early in life. Aristotle claims: 
“…we need to have had the appropriate upbringing – right from early 
youth, as Plato says - to make us find enjoyment or pain in the right 
things; for this is the correct education” (1104b11-13).   
Despite this common ground for the cultivation of both kinds of 
virtues, though, Aristotle seems to introduce a distinction. He claims 
that “Virtue of thought arises and grows mostly from teaching; that is 
why it needs experience and time. Virtue of character results from 
habit...” (NE 1103a15-18). Someone could suggest that this means 
within the Aristotelian view intellectual virtues require teachers 
whereas moral virtue do not. It is so, the argument could go, because 
like Socrates, Aristotle thinks moral virtue cannot be taught. 
Nevertheless, this interpretation would not only go against other 
textual evidence that show Aristotle thinks moral virtue can (and must) 
be taught,18 but would also imply that moral virtues do not require 
experience or time either. Is this the case?  
                                                          
17 See Philippa Foot (1978) and Julia Annas (2003). Karen E. Stohr (2003) calls this 
“the harmony thesis”, and argues that such thesis, as widely understood, is 
mistaken because “…there are occasions where a virtuous agent will find right 
action painful and difficult.” (p. 339).  
18 There are several references to moral education and teaching virtue along NE, 




First, by definition habits are dispositions to act in certain ways 
that need both time and experience to develop. There is no other way 
to acquire a habit than just doing what the habit consists in. Second, 
although habits simpliciter are formed by repetitive acts to which 
human beings become “accustomed,” and because of that some 
would say they do not require being taught/learned from/by others, it 
nevertheless seems that moral virtues need some sort of teacher.19 
So what could be the distinction Aristotle is making here?  
Despite the fact that there are good reasons to think that in his 
view both intellectual and moral virtues work together in a fully 
virtuous person,20 maybe he sees an important difference in the way 
both kinds of virtues are cultivated. He should not be interpreted as 
claiming intellectual virtues can be taught and moral virtues cannot, 
but rather as claiming that the two kinds of virtues might be taught and 
learned differently.  
Leaving aside Aristotle’s reference to time and experience, 
since it makes sense to assume that both kinds of virtues require 
them, again we should pay more attention to what he says: “Virtue of 
                                                          
19 As we saw, it does not have to be a formal teacher, not even a person. It could be 
an experience or a situation. It must be clear also that Aristotle’s claim that virtue 
comes through habituation does not mean it is a mechanical learning. See Nancy 
Sherman (2003).  




thought arises and grows mostly from teaching… Virtue of character 
results from habit...”  (NE 1103a15-18, my emphasis). And at the end 
of his NE, he distinguishes again between “habit” and “argument and 
teaching” (1179b20-32), and gives priority to habit over teaching and 
argument:  
…some think it is nature that makes people good; some think it is 
habit; some that it is teaching […] Arguments and teaching surely do 
not prevail on everyone, but the soul of the student needs to have 
been prepared by habits for enjoying and hating finely, like ground 
that is to nourish the seed. (1179b20-27).  
 
 Aristotle seems to be claiming that intellectual virtues are more 
likely to be learned through direct teaching whereas moral virtues are 
not. Maybe we can shed some light over this issue by looking at 
Burbules and Peters account of two different pedagogies.21 Deriving 
pedagogical implications from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, they claim 
there are two kinds of different but complementary pedagogies 
expressed in Wittgenstein’s work: one they call pedagogy of the sense 
in which precision about the language and the possibility of verification 
is fundamental, the other they call pedagogy of the nonsense where 
language is not expected to represent reality. They claim that this 
                                                          
21 Nicholas Burbules and Michael Peters, "Tractarian Pedagogies: Sense and 
Nonsense." 
http://faculty.education.illinois.edu/burbules/syllabi/Materials/tlp.html.http://facu





distinction, illuminated by Wittgenstein’s “of what can be said” and “of 
what cannot be said but shown,” tells us that there are subjects about 
which we cannot talk but we can show or be shown. Instead of 
verifiable propositions, the pedagogy of nonsense uses as its 
resources metaphors, similes, allusions, puzzles, paradoxical 
questions, obscure anecdotes, aphorisms and so on. My claim is that 
this interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus not only supports the 
idea that teaching virtue need not be intentional but also that it need 
not have a formal teacher or even a person who explicitly does 
something. In a certain sense, different experiences in life work as 
those resources do: they “show” us what cannot be said. 
What this interpretation lacks in direct textual evidence, it gains 
in explanatory power: Aristotle may not have actually believed that the 
cultivation of both intellectual and moral virtues share a component 
that is mostly learned indirectly, a component that cannot be said but 
shown by those who help us in this process, but we can understand it 
in this way.22 Both kind of virtues require habituation, time, and 
                                                          
22 I am arguing here that different experiences and people help us in the process of 
virtue cultivation, but the goal of my dissertation is to argue in favor of the idea 
that character friends are fundamental in it. I am doing this because the traditional 
view is that virtue is cultivated mainly by imitating or emulating a role model. L. 
Zagzebski, for instance, claims: “I propose that the stages of learning the 
intellectual virtues are exactly parallel to the stages of learning the moral virtues as 
described by Aristotle. They begin with the imitation of virtuous persons, require 
practice which develops certain habits of feeling and acting, and usually include an 




experience, as well as the development of good judgement. The 
process initiates with habituation, but as many have suggested, such 
habituation is not in any case a mechanical process (J. Annas, 2011; 
Sherman, 1982, 2003). How it should go is still a matter of discussion, 
and part of the aim of this dissertation is to suggest a way of 
complementing the traditional view about it, according to which this 
process is mainly guided by role models, conceived most of the time 
as superiors to the learners.  
 
3. 2. Some contemporary views  
Virtue theory in Western philosophy traces back to Plato and 
Aristotle, and the theory had an important place in philosophy over 
time, but during the modern period interest in it was lost. Although the 
concept of virtue never disappeared completely from the philosophical 
scene, in modern philosophy its role was almost always subsidiary of 
some other concepts.23 In contemporary philosophy, the rebirth of the 
focus on virtue as a central moral concept started the second half of 
the twentieth century, first in moral philosophy with Elizabeth 
                                                          
parallel to the stage of moral self-control in the acquisition of a moral virtue. In 
both cases the imitation is of a person who has phronesis.” (1996: 150).  
23 In Kantian moral philosophy, for instance, the main concept is that of a good will, 
and virtue is defined as “the moral strength of a human being's will in fulfilling his 
duty” (Kant, 1996, 6:405). It is important to notice, however, that there have been 
recent reinterpretations of Kantian moral theory as a virtue ethics theory. See, for 




Anscombe (1958), and then in epistemology with Ernest Sosa (1980). 
Both Anscombe and Sosa proposed to bring the concept back to the 
center of the scene. Since then, virtue ethics theories define concepts 
such as right act, good state of affairs, good aims, and good life, 
among others, by reference to the concept of virtue (Hursthouse, 
1999; Zagzebski, forthcoming). And virtue epistemology theories 
define their epistemic ends and methods by reference to the concept 
of virtue (Sosa, 1991; McDowell, 1994; Zagzebski, 1996).     
It seems that the mere justification of this shift of focus is so 
contentious for contemporary philosophy that some important issues 
have not been treated enough yet. This is the case, for instance, for 
the question of how to become virtuous. Once someone is convinced 
that the shift to focusing on virtue is worthwhile, how can she become 
virtuous or help others to do so?  
There are, nevertheless, some interesting treatments of this 
subject in contemporary philosophy. All of them give a positive answer 
to the question whether virtue can be taught, and give some 
indications about how it could be done. Almost all of them talk in terms 
of a teacher, a master, a model… teaching or facilitating the process 
of pupils who are learning virtue, by way of giving them the opportunity 
to “see” and practice the relevant actions that would eventually 




terms, they hold some sort of variation of the role modeling approach, 
according to which virtue is acquired by emulating role models, and 
where those role models are usually conceived of as superior in some 
relevant respect to the learners. Although I think this approach is right 
in that we need a model in order to learn and cultivate virtue, I contend 
it is not sufficient. I will argue in the following chapters that we learn 
virtue not only from models – usually conceived in the role modeling 
approach as superiors - but also from our relationships with non-
superiors. 
The most widely-accepted answer to the question about how 
virtue is taught/learned is by habituation. This answer is popular not 
only because it is held by Aristotle (NE 1103a15-18, 1103b28-
1104b39), but also because it connects habituation with the very 
nature of virtue. This is important because, as Julia Annas (2011) 
claims, our idea of how we learn virtue is inherent to the concept of 
virtue. Since virtue is conceived as a character trait that is reliable in 
leading its possessor to act rightly, virtue is mostly a matter of 
becoming habituated to respond to people and situations in a certain 
way. This response attempts to integrate the right act, the right 
motives, and the right circumstances. In general, in virtue theory 




Although this general view seems to be held in common 
agreement among virtue theorists, the way they conceive this process 
of habituation has several divergent points. Some virtue theorists think 
habituation mostly consists in developing our practical reasoning by 
way of acting and giving/receiving reasons. That is, by acting right and 
knowing why something is the right thing to do (Annas, 2011). Others 
claim that since acting virtuously is having the appropriate feelings, 
such habituation must consist mainly in the education of emotions 
(Hursthouse, 2001). In a similar vein, another account says that since 
emotions are reasons to act, habituation for virtue would consist in the 
education of emotions that constitute good reasons to act. The most 
important of those emotions is, according to Zagzebski (2017), the 
emotion of admiration. Some others hold a sort of synthesis between 
these two elements, and say habituation is a critical and reflective 
practice that evolves from basic cultivation of affections throughout 
filial attachments, goes to a more active cultivation of rational 
capacities where the help of tutors and inspiration from models are 
crucial, and eventually culminates with the emergence of full rationality 
(Nancy Sherman, 1982, 1991). I will consider the first three accounts 






3.2.1. Julia Annas: learning virtue as learning a practical skill    
Julia Annas (2011) argues that virtues are like certain skills, 
because exercising a virtue involves practical reasoning similar to that 
required to exercise a practical skill, such as playing piano or tennis. A 
virtue is a reliable disposition that needs to be learned by habituation, 
but a habituation that makes the practitioner more intelligent rather 
than routinized. That is, her account does not apply to every skill (such 
as those that make part of our everyday life, many physical routines, 
rituals or abilities that we usually call skills, or those in which natural 
talent has a big contribution), but to those skills in which two features 
are present: the need to learn and the drive to aspire.  
Since Annas conceives the drive to aspire as a constant 
seeking of understanding of what one is doing, a desire to improve it 
and to do it by oneself, I think this feature is the most important for her 
purpose of showing that virtues are like some skills. It allows her to 
say that both virtues and those skills are learned thought practice, but 
cannot be routinized. This means that the skilled person, as well as 
the virtuous person, will become so by doing what they are learning, 
and will improve with practice. At the beginning of their journey, they 
will need to think carefully about what they are doing, but eventually 




This doesn’t mean however, that their acts are mechanized. A 
person who is learning how to play piano, for instance, needs to think 
about every single one of her movements. With practice, she will 
eventually become better and will not need to think constantly about 
them. Nevertheless, her mastery at her performance will depend on 
her playing in a non-mechanical way. If she plays mechanistically she 
is not a master at playing piano. In the same way, a person learns to 
be courageous by doing courageous acts, and at the beginning that 
could imply that she needs to think carefully about what this means 
and analyze carefully every single situation in which she thinks she is 
required to be courageous. But the courageous agent does not need 
to go through all this process anymore because having the virtue is 
knowing where and when to apply it, and why. Despite this, both the 
master at playing piano and the courageous person would be able to 
explain what they have done and why, when asked. 
This is fundamental to the concept of virtue, since acting 
virtuously requires that the agent act for the right reasons and having 
the appropriate feelings. So the drive to aspire leads the skilled person 
and the virtuous person to seek to get better at the practice, and to 
know what they are doing and why. This feature of some skills and of 
virtues also allows Annas to distinguish between the learner and the 




and the context in which she is learning. She must follow what the 
teacher says. Nevertheless, she needs to ask herself why the teacher 
does and says what she does and says. That is, the learner needs to 
have this drive to aspire that leads her to try to understand what they 
are doing, and needs to figure out which things of what the teacher 
does are essential to the skill and which ones are not. But she must 
also know that in order to achieve mastery she has to detach herself 
at some point from the teacher. She has to do it by herself. Otherwise 
she will be just copying the teacher. This will require from the expert or 
teacher not only that she tells the learner what to do and how, but also 
that she gives him reasons of why they are doing what they are doing. 
Those reasons function as explanations and, because of that, require 
some degree of articulacy.  
Nevertheless, it is important to notice that Annas claims we 
already have some virtues (and vices) by the time we start thinking 
and talking about virtues. Parents, teachers, and neighbors have 
taught us (or at least have tried to) how to be loyal, brave, and honest. 
Their examples gave us some sort of character education. Said in 
other way, we do not learn virtues in the abstract, or only by reading 
books or watching movie characters, but instead we learn them in 




We learn in a multitude of embedded contexts, which can stand in 
various relations, from overlapping to conflicting: family, school, 
church, employment, siblings, friends, neighborhoods, and internet. 
When we learn to be virtuous, then, the need to learn is less obvious 
than it is with skills, since our surroundings are overflowing with 
teachers, and often it is not obvious at the time that we are learning 
to be generous or brave in learning how to do things; most people 
discern this only much later. Moreover, it is also not till much later 
that we are in a position to ask about our teachers’ credentials as 
teachers of virtue, or to feel ourselves in a position to correct them. 
(p. 21-22 my emphasis).24  
 
Although Annas recognizes that there are many contexts of 
ethical education, she focuses on the context of children and parents 
because she says it seems to be the clearest case (p. 21). So she 
claims that at the beginning, due to the need to learn, children learn 
virtue by copying parents, their role model. But this is not mindless 
absorption. Since the drive to aspire moves children to try to 
understand, they ask their parents and themselves which are the 
essential elements that characterize virtuous actions. 
Summarizing, Annas argues that like certain skills, virtue is 
mainly a matter of practice and practical reasoning. This conception 
has at least three salient features. First, it is a rational picture of the 
nature of virtue and the way we learn it. Second, it conceives 
teaching/learning virtue mostly as intelligent habituation or training 
                                                          
24 With the special emphasis I want to call attention over the fact that Annas is 
saying here something similar to what I just said before about the Socratic and the 
Aristotelian position. That is, (i) that there are many different teachers of virtue 
who are not always noticed at the time they are teaching, and (ii) that such process 




(that is, acting and giving and receiving reasons). Nevertheless, 
according to her view this process seems to start blind or mindless (at 
least in the sense we just copy what models do without knowing why, 
without being able to give or receive reasons), and then it becomes 
articulated. Third, models play a fundamental role in this process by 
way of exemplifying the right way to act and give (and sometimes also 
to ask for) reasons for acting in that way.  
I think Annas’ picture of virtue is right but incomplete. The idea 
of how we become virtuous is constituent of our concept of virtue, and 
this is why it is worth thinking more about this issue. Because acting 
virtuously requires practical wisdom, the development of practical 
reasoning is fundamental to the cultivation of virtue. In this sense, 
learning to give and receive reasons for acting is part of intelligent 
habituation. But acting virtuously and being virtuous require more than 
knowing the relevant reasons to act and be in those ways. It requires 
also having the appropriate emotions. Moreover, some would say 
acting virtuously and being virtuous consist mostly in having the 
appropriate emotions, and in what follows we will consider a view in 






3.2.2. Rosalind Hursthouse: learning virtue by educating our 
emotions    
According to Hursthouse (2001), the Aristotelian approach to 
human rationality is superior to that of the Kantians because it 
conceives of emotions as rational, not merely as animal impulses that 
need to be controlled. As a consequence, in virtue theory emotions 
have cognitive value; they can be right or wrong. In her words, “In the 
person with the virtues, these emotions will be felt on the right 
occasions, towards the right people or objects, for the right reasons, 
where ‘right’ means ‘correct’, as in ‘The right answer to “What is the 
capital of New Zealand?’‘ is “Wellington”” (2001, p. 108). Emotions 
involve ideas, thoughts, perceptions or images of good and evil (taken 
in a general sense).  
As a consequence, Hursthouse argues that education of our 
emotions is a big part of what is needed to attain virtue. She claims we 
can see this is true by examining racism as an example of 
miseducation. Racism arouses a large variety of negative feelings in a 
racist person. The racist feels fear of people of the other group, anger 
and contempt at their achievements, delight in their downfalls, hate, 
and suspicion, among other feelings. But it is unlikely that those 
feelings are natural. They need to be inculcated at a very early age, 




different kinds of representations, myths, archetypes, and metaphors. 
As a consequence, Hursthouse says, it is clear that “‘the’ way in which 
the training of the emotions shapes one's thoughts of generic good 
and evil cannot be divided neatly into the rational and the non‐rational” 
(2001, p. 114).  
These racist attitudes could be considered rational (in the 
descriptive, not the normative sense of the term), appropriate to 
rational animals insofar as they allow applications of words such as 
‘good’ and ‘evil’ (it associates the word ‘good’ with representations of 
people of the same race or group as intelligent, brave, clean, sensible; 
and the word ‘evil’ with representations of people from other races or 
groups as dangerous, ignorant, perverted, dirty…). Moreover, that 
training sometimes includes sort of explanations or justifications for 
such associations (they are perverted and ignorant because they don’t 
think, feel or act as we do; they are dangerous because they cannot 
control themselves…).  
Nevertheless, racism is also non-rational. First, because it 
comes from unconscious imitation. Children learn to respond 
emotionally in the way adults do. Secondly, that training is non-rational 
because the process described above as rational is infested with 
falsehoods. The application of the words, as well as the putative 




The result of such training, as we know, is hard to undo. 
Hursthouse argues that reason can help, and also habitual 
acquaintance and intimacy with people different from us, but total re-
training seems in certain sense impossible (p. 115). We can realize 
how weak our understanding of others is, how misleading our view of 
them is, but the result of early training of our emotions through 
imitation of emotional responses of others, images and 
representations transmitted by different means could be impossible to 
overcome. Nevertheless, while total re-training could seem 
impossible, those who were trained in such a way should fight against 
the views inculcated and try to cultivate the right emotions, not only 
because we do not know at which point such re-training stops being 
effective but also because we are accountable for what we feel and 
think about others. Moreover, we must seek harmony between reason 
and emotion as long it is possible for us because otherwise we will not 
be able to act virtuously.     
…the whole idea that a human agent could do what she should, in 
every particular instance, while her emotions are way out of line, is a 
complete fantasy. Our understanding of what will hurt, offend, 
damage, undermine, distress or reassure, help, succor, support, or 
please our fellow human beings is at least as much emotional as it is 
theoretical. Dedicated adherence to rules or principles of charity and 
justice achieves a great deal, but it is only someone arrogant and 
self‐righteous who supposes, given a conventional upbringing in 
which racism is embedded, that they can apply such rules and 
principles with the right imagination and sensitivity to other groups. 





As we can see, the “giving and receiving reasons” which Annas 
considers fundamental to the cultivation of virtue is not enough for 
Hursthouse. Moreover, merely giving and receiving reasons 
sometimes could be even used to cover or justify bad attitudes and 
actions towards others (p.p. 118-119). In cultivation of virtue, 
Hursthouse argues, education of our emotions is the most 
fundamental issue.  
A question remains for Hursthouse: how does this education of 
the emotions work? It seems it is the result of a combination of 1) 
images transmitted by every tradition through models like parents, 
teachers, neighbors, characters in books, stories, media, 2) the way 
that we learn language, and 3) the reasons we give and receive to act 
in a certain way (like in Annas’ approach).   
Hursthouse argues that virtue ethics can give us an account of 
moral motivation “— that is, of acting from (a sense of) duty, on or 
from (moral) principle, because you think you (morally) ought to, or are 
(morally) required to, or because you think it's (morally) right—taking 
all these different phrases to be equivalent for present purposes” (p. 
121).25 Because of that, the third element above is very important for 
her viewpoint. She holds that the virtuous agent acts out of the right 
                                                          
25 Against Elizabeth Anscombe’s (1958), Bernard Williams’ (1976), and Philippa 




emotion, where “right” means that the emotion is shaped by reason, 
and the reason says it is reasonable (or “out of the sense of duty”) to 
do so and so. According to Hursthouse, to say that someone acts out 
of a sense of duty is to ascribe to her a settled state of good character, 
it is to say that she acts from virtue. This does not mean that she 
actually says or recognizes that something must be done because is 
right, “neither the avowals nor the concurrent sentences are sufficient 
for moral motivation” (p. 140). 
What is both necessary and sufficient for moral motivation is to 
act from virtue. Like in Aristotle, in Hursthouse’s view the perfectly 
virtuous agent sets the standard for “moral motivation.” As a 
consequence, she conceives moral development as a matter of 
degree. According to her, although some children could do what is V 
(virtuous) for the X (right) reasons, we cannot ascribe to them the 
believing in such reasons since they are not the expression of the 
children’s own values. This seems to apply also to most young 
teenagers, and even some adults. But there is not a standard point at 
which this changes radically. 
Acting from virtue includes having the right beliefs, and to 
ascribe beliefs to someone we require more than her mere utterance 
of them, we require from her an embedded way of acting.  Because of 




good general answer to the question ‘Why is it right to do so‐and‐so?’ 
speeds up their moral development, but that is not to say that teaching 
them to produce the good answer gives them moral understanding on 
the spot” (p. 144). It could help, but it is not enough. Such moral 
understanding comes with moral motivation, which in her view is a 
combination of the right sensibility to grasp what is in play in the 
situation (the right emotion), and the right beliefs (V must be done 
because of X –“it is the right thing to do,” “because it is the duty”…).  
It seems that in her view one element is not possible without 
the other. That is, there are not right emotions without the help of 
reasons (or right beliefs), and there are not right reasons or beliefs 
without the help of emotions. Nevertheless, she puts more emphasis 
in the need of the education of emotions, and remarks several times 
that reason could help in the re-formation of wrong emotions which 
are the result of bad trainings - like in the case of racism - but claims 
total re-formation is impossible. She is not explicit about whether re-
formation the other way around is possible: the case of wrong beliefs 
changed or re-formed via emotions.   
Summarizing, Hursthouse thinks emotions are (or can be) 
rational and are a constituent part of virtue; because of that the 
process of teaching and learning virtue goes beyond giving and 




and oneself in the right way, a training to have the appropriate 
emotions. Since we start by copying emotional responses from 
parents, teachers, and members of our community, in such training 
models play a fundamental role. With the learning of language comes 
also the learning of beliefs and reasons, which functions to justify the 
emotional responses already learnt. When this process is misguided, 
as in the case of racism, reason can help us to revise and correct our 
beliefs and emotions. But it must be clear that the re-formation of our 
emotions could take more time and effort, and we will not attain virtue 
as long as our emotional responses are not appropriate.  
Although Hursthouse’s picture of the cultivation of virtue as 
going beyond teaching and learning to give and receive reasons, and 
as including the appropriate training of our emotions is more complete, 
it still lacks a better explanation of the process as a whole. Some 
questions that come to mind are, for instance, how and why this 
process starts, and how is its revision possible? What is the role of 
others in it?  
 
3.2.3. Linda Zagzebski: cultivating virtue through the emotion of 
admiration 
Zagzebski’s (2010) moral theory based on the emotion of 




some questions of this nature. She claims emotions are reasons, and 
we pick out exemplars of moral goodness with our emotion of 
admiration. That is, by direct reference to exemplars we identify what 
a good person is (or should be), and that identification counts as a 
reason to act. She borrows the model of identification of exemplars 
from the direct reference theory developed by Hilary Putnam (1975) 
and Saul Kripke (1980) according to which some natural kind terms 
like “water”, “human”, and “gold” function in language even when the 
users of the language do not know the exact nature of them, just by 
way of pointing out to whatever instances of the things to which the 
terms refer. This explains why terms like “water” and “gold” were used 
satisfactorily even before the atomic structure of gold and water was 
discovered. People just identified them by saying something like 
“water is whatever is the same liquid as this, and gold is whatever is 
the same element as that.”  
Likewise, in Zagzebski’s moral theory “good” - as well as other 
basic moral terms such as right act, good life, virtue, and good 
outcome- is defined26 by reference to exemplars of moral goodness. It 
                                                          
26 It is important to have in mind that her purpose is not to define concepts but 
rather to draw a map of our moral reality, “to construct a comprehensive ethical 
theory” (2016, Ch. 1). She does defines moral concepts but her definitions have no-
conceptual content. Her definitions are giving by way of pointing out exemplars, 




is a non-conceptual foundational theory, based in an emotion that 
functions like a natural faculty which help us to pick out exemplars of 
goodness.27 
That the emotion of admiration is like a natural faculty does not 
mean, however, that the reference cannot be mistaken. There could 
be exemplars that we admire for what we think is their moral 
goodness but who are not really admirable. Zagzebski claims 
empirical investigation can help us to reveal the deep nature that 
makes someone a good person: her motivational structure. As in the 
case of the term “water”, in which scientists knew it was its deep 
nature which makes something water and empirical investigation 
revealed the exact molecular structure of it, in the case of the term 
“good person” we know it is the person’s deep nature what makes her 
good, and we need empirical studies to see how her motivational 
structure works. But since “the determination of what is deep and 
important is not itself empirical, there would be necessary a posteriori 
truths in ethics that can be discovered in a way that parallels the 
discovery of the nature of water” (p. 16).   
                                                          
27 Notice that this idea of admiration as a human faculty that help us to identify 
exemplars of goodness seems to takes us back to the idea of human nature. 
Nevertheless, in conversation with Zagzebski she argued that although this may be 
the case, in her theory this second notion is not doing the same work that it is 
usually doing in traditional naturalistic virtue theories. Her theory is not grounded 




Regarding the process of acquiring and learning virtue, she 
argues that since exemplars are the most admirable and, because of 
that, imitable, “moral learning, like most other forms of learning, is 
principally done by imitation” (2013: 14). We want to be like the 
exemplars and that moves us to moral improvement. She claims the 
emotion of admiration is educated through the emotional reaction to 
the example of other people, and also through popular narratives 
present in every community. 
In (2017) Zagzebski changes “imitation” to “emulation,” saying 
emulation is a form of imitation in which the person is seen as a model 
in some respect. Whereas imitation of some acts could be done 
without wanting to be like the model, because imitation is closer to 
copying, emulation seems to refer to a deeper motivation. They who 
emulate want to be like the model. Moreover, they want to emulate her 
because she is a model of goodness. In this sense, emulation is a 
thicker concept in Zagzebski’s theory since it has an evaluative 
element that expresses the moral goodness of the model:  
Admiration explains why she would want to be like the person she 
emulates, not just for the pleasure of imitating, but because she sees 
the person she emulates as good. She emulates the admired person 
qua good, not just qua something it would be fun to imitate… 
Emulation arising from admiration can explain how virtuous motives 





But in order to be like the model or exemplar, those who 
emulate need to go further than just emulating an overt act. They need 
to have the appropriate motivations (emotions and reasons). Is it 
possible to do so by following an exemplar? Moreover, even if it is 
possible, would it be legitimate to call virtuous someone who acts as 
she does because she is emulating an exemplar?  
Zagzebski thinks we can acquire the right emotions by way of 
emulating an exemplar. Since human beings have a natural inclination 
to imitate and our basic psychic structure is similar, we are mind-
readers.28 This allows us to picture or project our future selves in the 
image of the ideal self (exemplar) and emulate her emotions, which is 
called prospection.  
On the other hand, the second question asks whether an act 
which is made not by purely generous motives but instead by the 
desire to emulate someone could genuinely be called generous. 
Zagzebski argues that an act motivated in that way is not generous, 
but it is legitimate to say that someone acts virtuously even though 
she is emulating an exemplar. That is so because the desire to be like 
                                                          
28 This hypothesis is supported by the simulation theory, based on the discovery of 
the mirror neurons system. According to it, there are neurons that fire both when 
someone does something and when she sees someone else doing it, like in the case 
of dancing. In a way, those neurons “mirror” what other neurons do in the other’s 




the model functions as a second order desire that guides the action, 
but the action itself needs not be motivated by that desire. Rather, it is 
motivated by the desire to acquire the exemplar’s motive and act like 
her:  
…one’s admiration for an exemplar can be suspended while one 
inhabits the psychological state of the exemplar and feels whatever 
the exemplar feels. One’s motive for acting in this way can then be 
the same as the motive of the exemplar, not admiration. (p. 11, note 
10).  
 
So it seems that according to Zagzebski we can train our 
emotions by emulating an exemplar. But if acting virtuously requires 
having the right reasons, can we acquire those reasons in the same 
way? First, it is important to notice here that in the debate about the 
role that emotions and reasons play in moral behavior, Zagzebski 
claims emotions are reasons (p. 17). As such, they can be mistaken - 
irrational. Emotions like admiration or disgust are right, reasonable, 
when we reflect upon them, evaluate their coherence with some other 
relevant beliefs we have, compare them with emotions other people 
we trust have, and see they survive this conscientious reflection. 
Because those are trustworthy emotions, they constitute good reasons 
to act.  
Nevertheless, Zagzebski also recognizes the importance of 
beliefs as reasons to act. Can we acquire the exemplar’s beliefs by 




something just picturing ourselves as having the beliefs of the 
exemplars (as it works in the case of emotions), my admiration by X 
could include epistemic admiration, which is admiration for the way X 
forms her beliefs, and this could be a second order reason to believe 
that what she believes is true (2012). In this case, if X believes p, my 
admiration for X counts as evidence in favor of the truth of p.  
Furthermore, if it is true that acting virtuously requires not only 
the right reasons (emotions and beliefs), but also understanding of the 
way those reasons justify actions (Zagzebski is not sure whether this 
is the case, p. 25), can we get that from the exemplar? Her answer is 
“no,” because moral reasoning works like any other reasoning: 
someone can show us the connections but we will see them only if we 
have already trained our natural ability to see them. This does not 
mean, however, that exemplars cannot help us to improve our moral 
reasoning. As in the case of specific beliefs, our admiration for 
someone can suggest us a line of thought that we had not considered 
before but now seems more plausible due to the fact that the 
exemplar holds it. Nevertheless, we do not acquire the ability to see 
the connection among beliefs and among motives and acts by 
emulating an exemplar. With other’s help we develop it by ourselves.   
Summarizing, like most virtue theorists Zagzebski holds a 




reasons. In her theory, the emotion of admiration is the main motor of 
virtue cultivation. It is like a natural faculty that in general allows us to 
pick up exemplars of moral goodness, and moves us to want to be like 
them. Admiration conduces to emulation. In this sense, the process of 
teaching/learning virtue is prompted by the admiration of exemplars 
(real and fictitious). Emotions, beliefs, and comprehension could be 
attained through them, although not always by emulation. By trying to 
emulate an exemplar I could enact the emotion for compassion or 
courage, but I cannot acquire the exemplar’s beliefs about 
compassion or courage in the same way. Nevertheless, my admiration 
of her could include epistemic admiration and count as evidence in 
favor of the truth of those beliefs. In the same way, this admiration 
could help me gain understanding of different moral situations.     
I would like to stress Zagzebski’s idea that emotions are 
reasons. Thus understood, Annas’ idea of learning virtue as a process 
of intelligent habituation in which we learn to act in a certain way and 
also to give and receive reasons for acting in such a way gains a 
richer meaning. Those reasons can be thought as either beliefs or 
emotions, and this means emotions need also be educated. Although 
this is Hursthouse’ thesis, her approach is not clear enough about how 
such education is possible, perhaps because she treats this issue in a 




Moreover, when she talks of moral motivation as including also the 
right reasons or beliefs, she does not say much about how to develop 
either of them. Zagzebski’s theory offers a good suggestion of how 
moral education could go. Although it does not talk of how the process 
starts, her theory of moral development as motivated by the emotion 
of admiration provides a positive view of how cases of miseducation 
like those mentioned by Hursthouse could be treated. So while 
Hursthouse’s approach only gives us some hints of how reason can 
partially help us to re-form our emotions in the right way (note that in 
her view emotions are not reasons, but could be reasonable), 
Zagzebski shows us how the identification of an exemplar motivates 
our moral improvement by giving us reasons – in the form of right 
emotions, beliefs, and maybe understanding - to act and become like 
the exemplar. Like Hursthouse, Zagzebski claims that in the cultivation 
of virtue, emotions play the most important role. But Zagzebski goes 
further, since she identifies an emotion that moves us to moral 
improvement, the emotion of admiration.     
Zagzebski argues that good moral theories should work as 
maps. They should simplify and systematize the moral scenario, 
giving us understanding of moral phenomena and giving us the 
possibility to revise our practices and change them if needed. I think 




could work. Moreover, since her theory is based not in a concept but 
rather in an emotion (which makes the theory structurally foundational) 
it succeeds also in providing a practical bridge between theory and 
practice. Nevertheless, she says:  
At some point in our moral development, we will do less emulating 
and more self-reflective management. The process is the same as 
that used by exemplars. In fact, it is the same process used by any 
self. Exemplars are just persons who do an especially good job of 
directing the self. Emulation of an exemplar does not exhaust the 
creation of a moral self, and emulation is not sufficient to become 
morally virtuous in the highest degree. But it is a good thing if we 
never lose track of who the exemplars are (p. 27). 
 
Although a good moral theory aims at simplifying, we must be 
careful to see which important elements are left behind. I think our 
moral life is so rich and full of different experiences, relationships and 
people that the emotion of admiration and the subsequent desire to 
emulate the exemplar defined by Zagzebski is not enough to explain 
the process of virtue cultivation. And I am not convinced that what is 
missing in the picture is just self-reflective management. My aim here 
is to add at least one more element to the map, constituted by what 
happens when we are engaged in close relationships with moral non-





Chapter II. Friendship 
 
“When two go together,  
they are more capable  
of understanding and acting.” 
Aristotle (NE, 8, I).  
  
 
“The smallest indivisible human unit is two people, not one; one is a fiction” 
 (Tony Kushner, 1993: 307). Cited by Carmichael (2007:285).  
 
“You can’t be a self by yourself”  
(Hazel Markus, 2005). Cited by Carmichael (2007:285). 
 
“The attribute we call individuality is constructed in relation”. 







1. About the nature of friendship 
The account of friendship I will try to develop is mainly inspired 
by Aristotle’s, but is not intended to be strictly Aristotelian. That is, I 
am not trying to develop a rigorous interpretation of his texts but rather 
to use them to support what I think is a good notion of friendship. 
Aristotle starts Book VIII of the Nicomachean Ethics (NE) claiming 
friendship is a virtue or involves virtue. I will take it as involving virtue, 
for several reasons. First, he does not talk of it as a virtue at any other 
place. Second, Aristotle’s characterization of virtues usually defines 




of character, at least in the sense that it is not “seated” in one person. 
Although there is a form of friendship – the most complete, according 
to him - that requires good character, friendship is not something that I 
cultivate in my character. Third, Aristotle makes a distinction between 
friendship (philia) and friendliness (philein), the second more properly 
fitting the characteristics of a virtue. He claims friendliness is a social 
virtue (1126b11-1127a13), it is “…just what we mean in speaking of a 
decent friend, except that the friend is also fond of us” (1126b22). The 
person who exhibits friendliness is “…concerned with the pleasures 
and pains that arise in meeting people” (1126b30).29 As a 
consequence of these reasons, in what follows I take friendship more 
as involving virtue than as a virtue.  
 
1. 1. The scope  
Friendship is a relationship characterized by mutual well-
wishing, affection, and mutual acknowledgment of this mutual well-
wishing and affection (Aristotle, NE 1155b32–35). That is, in every 
aspect of the relationship, a friend wishes good for the other, for the 
                                                          
29 For more on this distinction, see White, 1990. See also M. Pakaluk (1991), where 
he claims that whereas Aristotle’s treatment of friendship in the NE is about close 
and affectionate relationships, his treatment of it in the Rhetoric is more about how 
public speakers should talk to the audience. In this sense, he argues, philia would 
appropriately be rendered as ‘love’ in the first case, and philein as ‘friendliness’ in 




other’s sake, and the friend knows about these good wishes.30 
According to Aristotle, such a relationship can be based on virtue, 
pleasure, or utility, but only friendship based on virtue is complete 
(NE, Book VIII, Ch. 3). This does not mean, however, that friends who 
are in complete friendship cannot provide pleasure or usefulness for 
each other, but rather that these are not the primary grounds of the 
relationship. In fact, pleasure or enjoyment of each other’s company 
seems to be an important feature of complete friendship.31 
The Greek word philia, usually translated in English as 
friendship, is also translated as “brotherly love.” So despite the fact 
that in the ancient world “friendship” used to include connotations of 
family ties, many treatments of the subject restrict the word to 
                                                          
30 There seems to be general agreement about this feature. Most of the scholars 
claim a key feature of friendship is that friends wish for the other’s well-being 
(Cooper, 1980; M. Nussbaum, 1986). Nevertheless, T. Irwin (1999) argues that “the 
inferior forms of friendship are not fully friendships, since they lack the essential 
elemental of goodwill” (his notes on the NE, notes to Book VIII, Chapter 4, 
paragraph 1). 
31  Badhwar (1993) calls the third kind of friendship ‘end virtue’, but her 
characterization of it goes in the same direction: “End friendships usually are useful 
in many ways, and friends must at least aim to be useful in certain ways if they are 
to be real friends. They remain end friendships, however, because what is central 
to them is the happiness that is intrinsic to the love, and not the happiness that 
results from the satisfaction of one's goals” (p. 14). Kant also talked of three kinds 
of friendship, based on need, taste, and disposition or sentiment (“Lecture on 
Friendship”, in Pakaluk 1991: 212-215). Like in Aristotle, only the third kind is real 
friendship, mostly characterized in Kant by disclosure. He says we achieve complete 




relationships outside the family realm.32 My conception of friendship 
admits the possibility of real friendship among members of a family, 
and contrary to what many traditional philosophers held, my account 
presupposes women can be friends with other women as well as with 
                                                          
32 They do so usually to place more emphasis on what is considered a fundamental 
feature of this close relationship: that we choose our friends. We will discuss this 




men,33 and that good marriages are a form of real friendships.34 
Moreover, I will argue in favor of the thesis that children can be real 
                                                          
33 For opposite views, see Schopenhauer (1851), where he claims “The fundamental 
defect of the female character is a lack of a sense of justice. This originates first and 
foremost in their want of rationality and capacity for reflection but it is 
strengthened by the fact that, as the weaker sex, they are driven to rely not on 
force but on cunning: hence their instinctive subtlety and their ineradicable 
tendency to tell lies: for, as nature has equipped the lion with claws and teeth, the 
elephant with tusks, the wild boar with fangs, the bull with horns and the cuttlefish 
with ink, so it has equipped woman with the power of dissimulation as her means 
of attack and defense, and has transformed into this gift all the strength it has 
bestowed on man in the form of physical strength and the power of reasoning. 
Dissimulation is thus inborn in her and consequently to be found in the stupid 
woman almost as often as in the clever one. To make use of it at every opportunity 
is as natural to her as it is for an animal to employ its means of defense whenever it 
is attacked, and when she does so she feels that to some extent she is only 
exercising her rights. A completely truthful woman who does not practice 
dissimulation is perhaps an impossibility, which is why women see through the 
dissimulation of others so easily it is inadvisable to attempt it with them. – But this 
fundamental defect which I have said they possess, together with all that is 
associated with it, gives rise to falsity, unfaithfulness, treachery, ingratitude, etc. 
Women are guilty of perjury far more often than men. It is questionable whether 
they ought to be allowed to take an oath at all.” It is clear that a person with these 
characteristics is incapable of engaging in friendship, since friendship requires trust, 
respect, honesty, and love for the other.  
Aristotle claims friendship is possible among men and women when he 
talks about friendship between unequals (1158b11-19). Nevertheless, it seems he 
would not conceive possible character friendship between them. About this, M. 
Nussbaum argues: “His [Aristotle’s] investigation of the potential of women for 
excellence is notoriously crude and hasty. He is able to bypass the problem of 
developing their capabilities and he is able to deny them a share in the highest 
philia, as a result of bare assertions about their incapability for full adult moral 
choice that show no sign of either sensitivity or close attention. Had he devoted to 
the psychology of women, or even to their physiology (about which he makes many 
ludicrous and easily corrigible errors) even a fraction of the sustained care that he 
devoted to the lives and bodies of shellfish, the method [of appearances] would 
have been better served.” (1986: 371).   
34 See, for instance, Thomas Aquinas (1269-72), who claimed marriage is the 
greatest degree of friendship. Mary L. Shanley (1993) argues J. S. Mill holds this 
position in The Subjection of Woman (1869), where he argued in favor of equality 




friends, both with other children and with adults, and that this 
possibility constitutes a rich ground for the cultivation of virtues that 
remains mostly unexplored within virtue theory despite considerable 
support from psychology (I will expand on this in Chapter IV). 
Nevertheless, since my focus rests on a qualified form of friendship 
that requires time and effort by those who are involved, I do not take it 
to be a sort of natural relationship but rather as a chosen one. So 
even though I grant that members of the same family could be friends, 
they can only attain the complete form of friendship because they 
want it, not just as a matter of their natural bond.   
On the other hand, in ancient Greece philia could also be used 
to refer to the affection one could feel for a business partner, an 
acquaintance, or even for fellow citizens. Although it seems Aristotle 
was aware of this use of the term, it is clear that when he talks of 
virtue or complete friendship he is referring to the closer and more 
intimate relationship we are engaged in a one-to-one relationship with 
someone we value. I am also subscribing to this second and narrow 
sense of the term for my thesis.           
 
                                                          
women are as capable as men of the highest form of friendship. See also B. Fowers 
(2000), who sees the cultivation of character friendship between couples as a key 




1. 2. Some of the main features of friendship 
 One of the most salient features of friendship is that it is 
constitutive of human flourishing.35 Since human beings are social, 
they need others to live well and this explain why families, 
communities, and poloi (cities, states) are needed for human 
development. But why is friendship also needed? The fact that 
Aristotle acknowledged this need expresses a substantial difference 
between his and Plato’s moral and political philosophy.36 According to 
Aristotle, a happy human life is one in which the human excellences or 
virtues are exercised. A happy life is a virtuous life. But unlike Plato, 
                                                          
35 It seems plausible to say that there are some forms of flourishing human lives 
without friendship, at least in the form that I am describing here. Some religious 
forms of life, that of Buddhist monks, for instance, qualify as flourishing without the 
cultivation of friendships in the Aristotelian terms. They, nevertheless, value and 




notion of noble friendship shares many core ideas with that of character friendship, 
but differs in many others, the main being the value given to attachment that 
seems fundamental for Aristotle and virtue theory – attachment is (unsurprisingly) 
less valued in the Buddhist view. Nevertheless, since cases like those of the monks 
are special, I think I can make the weaker claim that friendship plays a fundamental 
role in regular human flourishing.    
36 See N. Sherman (1987) and M. Nussbaum (1986) on this. According to Nussbaum, 
one of the biggest differences between Plato and Aristotle is that whereas Plato 
thinks that in order to build the Republic affective family ties must be cut, Aristotle 
thinks they are fundamental to sustain the Polis. Affective ties are fundamental 
within the Aristotelian view, according to Nussbaum, because they motivate “…at 
least three mechanisms of mutual influence… [i] that of advice and correction […ii] 
that of leveling or assimilating influence of shared activity […and iii] emulation and 




Aristotle recognizes that virtue by itself is not enough for leading a 
happy human life (NE I.8). There are some external conditions needed 
too, such as health, money, good birth, power, and most of all, friends. 
He even claims that we would not want to have any of the other 
external goods if we do not have friends. Aristotle calls friends the 
“greatest” and “most necessary” of external goods (NE 1169b10, 
1154a4), without whom we would not choose to live “even if we had all 
other goods” (1155a5–6, cf. 1169b16–17).37 Why? I think that in 
Aristotle’s theory character friendship38 plays a fundamental role in the 
development of the kind of theoretical and practical reason that make 
a flourishing human life possible, not only because in his account 
friends are required to exercise virtue, to do fine actions (1170a5-13), 
but also because according to him one of the most important things 
that character friends do is share activities, conversation, and thought 
(1170b5-15, 1171b30-1172a15).39 Part of my thesis is that such 
                                                          
37 Others on the idea that for Aristotle friends are external goods are J. M. Cooper 
(1985), M. Nussbaum (1986), and N. Sherman (1989).   
38 I follow Cooper’s (1980) suggestion of changing the expression virtue friendship 
for that of character friendship, because 1). Aristotle himself suggests the term at 
NE 1164a12, 1165b8–9, EE 1241a10, 1242b36, and 2). It allows us to say that the 
best form of friendship is possible even among non-fully virtuous agents, which 
seems to be also something held by Aristotle.  
39 See Kristjánsson (2014) and Brewer (2005) in which they support this thesis 
about the importance of dialogue with friends to achieve episteme. I think a similar 




sharing has an epistemic and a motivational value that contributes in a 
substantial way to the cultivation of the virtues.  
   As a consequence of this prominent role of friendship in 
human flourishing, it is both instrumentally and intrinsically valuable. 
That is, friendship contributes to and constitutes part of human 
happiness understood as human flourishing. It is an instrument in the 
sense that friends help us to do and achieve things that we would not 
be able to do and achieve by ourselves; friends support us by helping 
us to provide the means to our ends. They are refuge in misfortunes, 
beneficiaries of our prosperity, and co-partners in doing fine actions 
(1155a5-15).40 Friendship is intrinsically valuable, on the other hand, 
because friends love each other for themselves, as well as their 
relationship.41 In the case of character friendship, the relationship itself 
is a good and facilitates a good to those involved, which is the 
possibility to cultivate together their well-being.42 In Sherman’s words:  
The intrinsic worth of friendship, in contrast, is of a much more 
pervasive sort, providing the very form and mode of life within which 
an agent can best realize her virtue and achieve happiness. To have 
                                                          
40 See M. Nussbaum (1986), who claims that friendship (or love, in her terms), plays 
a central instrumental role in the development of good character and appropriate 
aspiration. 
41 The point here is that even if we subscribe Aristotle’s threefold classification of 
friendship (based on utility, pleasure, or virtue) this is a necessary requisite for any 
relationship that could be called friendship. Otherwise it would be an exploitive 
relationship. See Nussbaum (1986: 355), and Cooper (1980) on the idea that all 
three types of Aristotelian friendship entail mutual well-wishing.   
42 It seems to me this would count as a practice in McIntyre’s (1991) terms. I will 




intimate friends and good children is to have interwoven in one's life, 
in a ubiquitous way, persons towards whom and with whom one can 
most fully and continuously express one's goodness. The friendships 
[…] are the form virtuous activity takes when it is especially fine and 
praise‐worthy (1155a9, 1159a28–31). (Sherman, 1989: 127). 
   
The intrinsic value of friendship implies an interesting, and yet 
for many strange, view of self-sufficiency. At the beginning of his NE, 
when Aristotle talks of a happy life, he says it is self-sufficient and 
complete in the sense that it does not lack anything (1097b1-22). This 
idea and what he says on book X of the same work - according to 
which the highest happiness consists in theoretical contemplation - 
have led some scholars to think that the Aristotelian telos is the 
solitary contemplative life.43 Nevertheless, Aristotle’s idea of a happy 
self-sufficient human life44 is a life that involves others and their 
happiness.45 Because a happy and a self-sufficient human life is a life 
that doesn’t lack anything, and one of the most important parts of it is 
                                                          
43 This position has been called Strict Intellectualism, firstly formulated by David 
Keyt (1978). Cooper (1975) holds this position because he claims that in Book X 
Aristotle identifies a person with his theoretical nous or rational part of the soul.   
44 I put emphasis in the word “human” because following T. Irwin’s (1999) 
interpretation, I think Aristotle is contrasting the highest happiness by itself, 
possible only for gods, with the highest happiness for human beings. A happy 
human life could (and should, but not necessarily so) include theoretical 
contemplation, but cannot be by any means a solitary life (See Irvin’s 1999 notes to 
Book VIII, paragraph 6, p. 280). In such a life the exercise of most of the virtues 
would be impossible. There are many other scholars who hold this inclusivist 
position. See, for instance, T. Irwin (1999: 181-183), Whiting (1986) and Heinaman 
(1988).    




the kind of fine activity that friendship implies, a happy human life 
requires friends (1169b3-1170b19). A happy self-sufficient human life 
involves others, because “…having friends is a part of my happiness” 
(Irwin, 1999: 299).   
I think an important pre-condition of this conception of self-
sufficiency is a social notion of the self. Contrary to some modern 
conceptions of it, the Aristotelian self is social by nature.46 The 
Aristotelian self is not defined merely in terms of rationality (such as 
the Kantian self (1791)) or independence (such as the Sartrean self 
(1956)), for instance. The way in which emotions and reasons are 
interwoven, as well as the way in which someone relates to others and 
to her own context define the Aristotelian self.  
With Nussbaum (1986), I would say this makes vulnerability an 
important characteristic of Aristotle’s conception of the good life and 
the self. Since some human goods are relational goods in Aristotelian 
terms, his conception of human happiness and his conception of the 
self are vulnerable to many things in a way that they are not for Plato 
and Kant. A self which is defined in part by its relation with others 
                                                          
46 See K. Kristjánsson (2007): “Aristotle’s view of the development of moral 
selfhood is essentially a non-autonomous one” (p. 108); N. Sherman (1991), and N. 
K. Badhwar (1993) who argues that although this way of characterizing friendship 
pictures it as originating in what some view as a metaphysical deficiency, it is rather 
the acknowledgment of friendship’s moral importance for who we are: humans, 





must count on luck, for instance, to find a loved one to value, must be 
able to trust the other, must remain relatively constant despite the 
changes that come with age and bad fortune, and so on. This is a self 
that is social and embodied and, because of that, vulnerable47.      
 
2. What is a good friend?48  
 It is important to notice here that the thesis according to which 
friendship plays a fundamental role in the moral development of 
human beings, and especially in the cultivation of virtues, is both 
descriptive and prescriptive. It says something about human nature 
and how it is structured, but it also prescribes in the sense that it is not 
about human life and friendship in general but about good human lives 
and good friendships. It claims that a good human life is a life with 
good friends, among other things. As a consequence, we need to 
know something about what a good friend is.  
We said earlier that friendship (not yet good friendship) is a 
relationship characterized by mutual well-wishing, mutual affection 
and appreciation, and mutual acknowledgment of this. With Cooper, I 
think friendship (again, not yet good friendship) also implies that such 
                                                          
47 I will go back to the importance of the notion of “self” within a comprehensive 
theory of virtue cultivation in Chapter IV, section 1.   
48 This is different from the question “What does good friendship require?” A good 




well-wishing is for the friend’s sake.49 Next I will explore two different 
but not mutually exclusive ways of defining a good friend.   
 
2. 1. A good friend has a good character  
According to this approach, a good friend is one we love for 
what she is, for her good qualities.50 This is what Cooper calls 
“character friendship” instead of “virtuous friendship,” because he says 
complete friendship is possible also between people who are not fully 
virtuous (Cooper, 1980: 308). What characterizes this friendship, then, 
                                                          
49 Cooper (1980) argues that any form of friendship must have this characteristic in 
order to be properly called friendship. That is, even in what Aristotle calls pleasure 
or advantage friendship there is mutual well-wishing for the other’s sake. In 
Cooper’s words “…If, as I suggested above, Aristotle means to adopt in 
Nicomachean Ethics 8.2 the Rhetoric’s definition of friendship as always involving 
well-wishing to one’s friend for his own sake, then the three types will have much 
in common: in every friendship, of whichever of the three types, the friend will 
wish his friend whatever is good, for his own sake, and it will be mutually known to 
them that this well-wishing is reciprocated.” (Cooper, 1980: 309). According to 
Cooper, in the Aristotelian view one could love a friend instrumentally (because she 
is pleasant or useful) and yet wish her good for her own sake. It is so, Cooper 
argues, since the “because” here does not mean that one wishes the friend’s good 
in order to keep having pleasure or advantages from her (the “because” is not 
prospective). Rather, one wishes good to such a friend as a sort of recognition of 
her properties that initially made possible the relationship, be they useful or 
pleasant properties (the “because” here is retrospective) (Cooper, 1980: 311). 
Nussbaum endorses this view point too (see Nussbaum, 1986: 355, note).  
50 Assuming that the character defines what someone is. There is some dispute 
about this. See, for instance, Nussbaum (1986, Ch. 12, foot note 33): “It is not clear 
whether Aristotle really wants to accord to character the status of an essential 
property; his discussions of character–he certainly permits some change without a 
change of identity, and he never discusses sudden and sweeping changes. 
Elsewhere he certainly insists that the only essential characteristics are those that a 




is that it is based on the good qualities of both parties (where these 
good qualities are not necessarily identical with virtues). According to 
Cooper, since “on Aristotle’s theory of moral virtue the virtues are 
essential properties of human kind…” (p. 312) people whose 
relationship is based on those properties are friends without 
qualification. On the contrary, people whose relationship is based on 
pleasure and advantage are incidental friends.  
 Although in general this seems to be the most accepted 
conception on the Aristotelian view of what characterizes a good or 
complete friendship, there are some nuances that we must bear in 
mind. The first has to do with the distinction between essential and 
accidental properties, and the second has to do with the idea of 
stability that those positive qualities give to the relationship.  
Firstly, the emphasis on the fact that the good moral properties 
of my friend are what lead me to be her friend seems to entail a 
certain instrumentalization of her. If what I love from her are just those 
properties in abstract, the objection goes, then I could change my 
friend whenever I find someone with the same properties. She seems 




that she is fungible or disposable whenever I find other equal or better 
means to attain the same.51 
This is one of many differences between Plato’s and Aristotle’s 
conception of philia.52 In the Platonic view you love the good qualities 
of the person, not the person herself.53 But there must be something 
mistaken here. If you are a real friend of mine, I will not want to (or be 
able to) exchange you, because you are who I love and appreciate, 
not just your good qualities. As Badhwar claims, in “end love” (or 
friendship) “The object of my love must be you, the person, in your 
concrete individuality, not "Human Being" or "Instance of (some) F" 
(1987:7). 
It appears that part of the problem lays in the way we conceive 
those qualities. First, they could be seen as essential in the sense that 
they share with an idealized Good, as they are conceived in Plato’s 
theory. Under this view, the person’s good qualities are instantiations 
of the Form of the Good, which is permanent, whereas the person and 
what she does or what happens to her is accidental, temporal, and 
because of that not worthy of high consideration. On the other hand, 
                                                          
51 See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/friendship/#1.1 for more on this objection.  
52 Nussbaum (1986) speculates that this has to do with their different sexual 
orientation, which influenced the way they thought about family, close 
relationships and the role of these in the public arena (p. 369-371).   




we could think those qualities as inseparable from the person and her 
history, as Badhwar (1987) suggests:  
On the conception I am defending, a person's essential qualities are 
inseparable from his numerical or historical identity, both in fact and 
as object of cognition and love… (p. 20) 
…An individual's history, as such, is no more accidental than his 
qualities: the essential-accidental distinction is a distinction within the 
individual's historical-qualitative identity. Thus an individual cannot be 
known or loved as an end if he is seen as a set of qualities divorced 
from their expression in his life. (p. 22).   
 
  
Under this viewpoint, a friendship grounded in the good 
qualities of the friends needs not be conceived as instrumental, as 
long as those good properties are seen as unique for being part of 
what the person is, her history, and the way they are expressed in her 
in a unique fashion.54 
Second, we must consider the stability of those qualities and 
how their change could affect the relationship. Although those good 
qualities are stable enough to be considered part of what a person is, 
they are not something rigidly settled as carved in stone. People 
                                                          
54 Nussbaum (1986) also embraces this point: “The best philia does seek traits of 
character in the object. But this search is different in several ways from the search 
enjoined by Diotima. First, he or she seeks out many traits that could have no part 
in a divine or perfect life… Second, he seeks and attends to those repeatable traits 
differently: not as pieces of something homogeneous that turns up in many places 
in the universe, but as forming the essential core of what that concrete person is. 
He attends to virtues and aspirations because those are the deepest that go to 
make another individual the individual he is. He searches not for isolatable bits of a 
form, but for the combination of traits and aspirations that make the wholeness of 




change over time for different circumstances and those qualities 
change too. Despite the first consideration regarding the fungibility 
problem, those changes could affect the friendship. It is not clear 
enough how Cooper understands his expression “friends without 
qualification” as opposed to “incidental friends” mentioned earlier, but 
a proper understanding of good qualities of a person’s character must 
consider the possibility of their change. With Badhwar (1987), I think 
that even complete or character friendship is conditional: it depends 
on the fact that the friend’s changes do not affect her self in a 
substantial and negative way (p. 6, 11). Aristotle also considers this 
possibility (NE 1165b14-22), and his answer is in the same vein. 
Needless to say, this malleability of characters constitutes an 
important part of the value of good friendship, which has to do with the 
possibility of growth, in the sharing that the relationship facilitates.      
Finally, it is important to highlight another element of this way of 
defining a good friend as a character friend. The final form of 
friendship in the Aristotelian theory, which Aristotle calls “complete 
friendship,” is preceded by virtue. It is the relationship formed by two 
virtuous agents, and that is why it is also called “virtue friendship” 
(1156b7-19). But as was mentioned before (section 2.1), some 
suggest to interpret Aristotle as recognizing the possibility of virtue 




equals (Cooper, 1980 and K. Kristjánsson, 2007). I think virtue 
friendship is preceded by some similarities, but in certain sense also 
nurtured by differences. So, if it is not the “level”, or “completeness” of 
virtue that binds good friends together, what is it?  
It is both their good characters (even if they are developed 
unequally) and their shared conception of the good, their shared 
values and ends. An initial and general shared view in these 
fundamental issues makes possible the relationship, the sharing of 
activities and pleasures, and then the construction of a history that 
over time ends up “shaping” one another.55 Since I think this is in part 
what facilitates the cultivation of virtue within friendship, I will say more 
about this idea latter (Chapter III, section 2.1). By now, this connects 
us with another important definition of good friends based on their 
similarities.  
 
2. 2. A friend is a mirror, another self  
It seems this idea catches what is a common experience: we 
tend to associate and share our time with people who are similar to 
us, and in this sense our friends reflect in some way something about 
                                                          
55 On this idea of friends shaping each other, see Nussbaum (1986: 357); Badhwar 





ourselves, something about what we like and value56. In this way, we 
can say friends identify with each other. Aristotle writes: “Equality and 
similarity, and above all the similarity of those who are similar in being 
virtuous, is friendship” (EN 1159b3–5; see also 1156b7–22). And we 
should interpret him here as referring to real or complete friendship. 
The first claim is descriptive, because expresses something we tend 
to do, but the Aristotelian claim is also prescriptive, since it stipulates 
that complete friendship must be based in similarity,57 but not just any 
similarity. Complete or good friendships must be grounded in similarity 
of the friends’ concern for what is valuable.  
   On the other hand, Aristotle also thinks of a friend as another 
self (EN 1161b28, 1166a30-33, 1166bl, 1169b5-7, 1170a2–4, b6–8, 
1170b6f, 1171a20, and 1171b33). According to him, friendship and 
the love we feel toward a friend springs from self-love. That is, he 
claims that one needs to be first a good friend to oneself in order to be 
a good friend of another, and also that the way I feel and behave 
toward myself will be the way I will feel and behave toward my friend. 
                                                          
56 For a criticism of this view, see Cocking and Kennett (1998) who claim the notion 
of a friend as a mirror assigns a passive function to the friend. Instead, they say 
friends are like artists who shape each other.   
57 Bernard Williams (1976) disagree with this idea. He thinks friends must be 
different in character, and that it is a mistake to say a man’s friend is a duplication 
of himself (p. 212). As a consequence, he says, Aristotle does not have a good 
answer to the question of why it is important to commit and get involved with a 




So he finds that the marks of true friendship are present in the 
relationship that a person has to himself (EN 1166a1-10): he wishes 
goods for his own sake, he enjoys the time he spends with himself, 
and so on: “…an extreme degree of friendship resembles one’s 
friendship to oneself” (1166b37). This is the reason why vicious 
people have no true friends (1166b3-28).  
That we think of our friends as other selves seems 
psychologically plausible not only because we feel that they are an 
important part of who and what we are, but also because, as Sherman 
claims, “we experience a friend's happiness or sorrow as our own” 
(Sherman (1989: 136). We feel that in certain way our friend’s 
achievements and failures are ours, and we feel pride or sorrow in 
each case. This is a corollary of a social conception of the self, 
mentioned earlier, in the sense that it includes others and especially 
friends.58 We will come back to this notion of a friend as another self in 
section 3.1.  
Nevertheless, we must be careful with this idea too. Although 
true friendship could require us to think of our friends as other selves, 
it will also require us to have an accurate notion of separateness. 
Otherwise, the requirement of “wishing the friend’s good for her own 
                                                          




sake” would not make any sense.59 If I am hoping for my friend’s good 
but I think that my friend is the same as me, I am just hoping for my 
own good. In other words, the object of friendship’s love must be my 
friend as a self independent from myself. Sherman (1991) explains it 
in this way:  
While a Kantian notion of autonomy is clearly alien to Aristotle, I want 
to suggest, none the less, that the relationship between virtue friends 
exhibits some mindfulness both of the differences between friends 
and of their separateness. This entails that such friends promote 
each other's good in a privileged way (as only another self can), but 
in a way that is still respectful of the mature rational agency of each… 
In this regard, there may be some significance in Aristotle's choice of 
words at EE 1245a35, where he says that a friend is ‘a separate self’ 
(autos diairetos). (p. 139).         
 
I think this notion of a friend as a separate self encompasses 
an emotional and a cognitive component. It captures the emotional 
engagement between friends, and at the same time it points out to the 
necessary requirement of considering the friend as a fully rational 
being. It is what Badhwar (1987:7) wants to remark when she talks of 
character friends as end friends. I love my friend as I love my self, and 
I wish her well-being and help her pursue it as if it were mine (here we 
should think more in terms of the force with which we will pursue it 
than in terms of the content), but I recognize and respect her as a 
rational being that could (and may) look for her ends in different ways 
                                                          




than mine. Or that could even have some particular ends different 
than mine. This, nevertheless, should not lead us to think our pursuit 
of well-being and our friend’s pursuit of hers is a subjective matter. As 
Brewer (2009) argues, the Aristotelian notion of the self is eudaimonic: 
Aristotle regarded the core of the self as nous: there is a sense in 
which the self becomes fully itself—that is, comes to be a genuinely 
unified self—only insofar as its capacity for rationality comes to 
answer to its own constitutive ideal by devoting itself to what is fine in 
itself rather than conforming its verdicts to purely subjective and 
unreasoned desires or pleasures. (Brewer, 2009: 277)60.   
  
 
Despite the differences and the necessary independence of 
character friends, nonetheless, they are similar enough to be a 
privileged source of self-knowledge. Their sharing give them the 
                                                          
60 T. Irwin (1990) shares the same view on what it means to love a friend as another 
self: “In so far as I treat my friend as I treat myself, my reasoning and thinking are 
related to his reasoning, thinking, and action in the same way as they are related to 
mine […] Aristotle claims that this mutual attitude of friends involves concord and 
goodwill. Concord requires friends to share the same views on important questions 
about benefit and harm (1167b4–9). Since the good person is in concord with 
himself, and he regards his friend as another self, he will also be in concord with his 
friend. Concord does not imply that two virtuous friends will immediately give the 
same answer when asked, or that each will automatically defer to the other; for 
this is not the good person's attitude to himself either. Concord implies an extra 
participant in rational deliberation, and hence further considerations to take into 
account; it does not involve conflict or compromise between competing interests. 
Goodwill explains why there is no competition in a friendship between virtuous 
people. The virtuous person is concerned with the friend's good for the friend's 
own sake; if Al is Ann's friend, he wishes good to Ann for Ann's own sake, not just 
as a means to his own good (1167a10–14; cf. 1155b31–4). Al cares about himself 
for his own sake, not merely as a means to anyone else's interest; and so he sees 
that the same treatment of Ann will involve caring about her for her own sake, 
since she is another rational agent who counts for Al in the way Al counts for 





opportunity to better exercise self-awareness and self-examination 
that may not be easy to find in any other experience.61 The trust 
provided by a good friendship facilitates self-disclosure, and the 
constant sharing between the friends functions as a sort of testing 
arena for what is revealed by each other, either by oral testimony or 
behavior.62 You could consider yourself open-minded and say to 
others that you are so, for instance, but your good friend might know 
better if you actually exhibit that virtue.  
   I think one of the most important elements of this way of 
thinking about a good friend is that it reveals a deep acknowledgment 
of our difficulty to know ourselves. Our own knowledge of ourselves 
escapes from us, and we need someone close enough to watch what 
we say and do, to challenge our conceptions of ourselves, of others 
and the world. We need someone similar enough to understand us, 
but different enough to know our limits and to facilitate our growth. 
Finally, we also need someone who can do this with love and respect, 
                                                          
61 See Badhwar (1993: 8), and Branden (1993: 65). I will expand more this idea in 
Chapter III, section 2.2. 
62 An interesting objection to this way of defining complete friends is presented by 
Cocking D. and J. Kennett (1998). There, they say the notion of a friend as a mirror 
assigns her a passive role in the relationship. By contrast, they say friendship is as 
characterized by similarities as it is by differences between friends, and what is at 
the core of their relationship is a sort of drawing of the self of each other. Friends 




and we need to know that this person loves us and respects us. I will 
say more about this later (Chapter III 2.1).     
 To sum up, the definition of complete friendship (CE) would be 
as follows. If A and B are complete friends, then:   
 
CF: (1) A appreciates B, and B appreciates A, (2) A wishes for 
B’s well-being for B’s own sake, and B wishes A’s well-being for 
A’s own sake, (3) A and B are  both motivated to act in a way 
that promotes the other’s well-being for the other’s sake, (4) 
both A and B know of their good mutual disposition to each 
other, (5) their relationship is based on good qualities of their 
characters (6) A and B think of each other as another (but 
independent) self, and (7) A and B share distress, enjoyment, 
as well as similar core values and projects.63 
 
It seems that requires 1-4 are descriptive features of any type 
of friendship and 5 to 7 are normative features of a good friendship. 
Nevertheless, in a certain sense the first four features could also be 
considered normative because they prescribe what a relationship with 
                                                          
63Aristotle (EN 1166a1-10) mentions: “(1) A wishes and does goods or apparent 
goods to B for B’s sake. (2) A wishes for B’s life, for B’s own sake. (3) A spends time 
with B. (4) A makes the same choices as B. (5) A Shares B’s distress and enjoyment.” 




someone must have in order to be considered a friendship. An 
important requirement that all seven of these features share is 
mutuality. This means I cannot say, for instance, that I am friends with 
a famous writer from the 18th century. I can admire Jane Austen’s 
stories and style, I can try to emulate them, and in a way she talks to 
me, but I do not talk to her. We do not have a conversation, and she 
doesn’t know me or appreciate me the way I know her and appreciate 
her.64 Those are, then, prescriptive features in regard to other human 
relationships we may have.  
Although I think that in some ways, friendship without 
qualification facilitates our moral and cognitive development,65 my 
thesis requires a second level of normativity. Since the thesis is that 
character friendship is fundamental for virtue cultivation, we must 
analyze requirements 5-7 in more detail. Those qualifications help us 
to distinguish other forms of friendship from the friendship I consider to 
be fundamental due to the fact that it provides a sort of experience, 
knowledge, and other emotions -besides admiration - that foster 
virtue. I hope to show how this works in Chapter III, but before jumping 
                                                          
64 In the same vein, Nussbaum writes: “…philia must be distinguished from the sort 
of mutual admiration that could obtain between people who had no knowledge at 
all of one another. These people know each other, feel emotion for one another, 
wish and act well towards one another, and know that these relationships of 
thought, emotion, and action obtain between them.” (1986: 355). 




there I want to suggest some of the possible reasons for the almost 
general neglect of friendship within traditional Western ethics.     
  
3. Friendship and moral theory 
 There seem to be at least two main reasons to be suspicious 
about the moral value of friendship. The first reason is connected with 
the Aristotelian suggestion that friendship springs from self-love. If it is 
so then, according to some scholars, what we feel for our friends is 
rooted in egoistic interests. Since in order to be morally good I should 
accommodate more than just my interests, friendship does not have 
moral value. The second reason why friendship has been mostly 
neglected within moral theory has to do with the worry that even if my 
fondness for my friend springs originally from her, from a true love for 
her, and not just from my egoistic interests, my motivations are still 
partial. They are rooted in the fact that I have a relationship with her. 
Since according to the most traditional and influential moral theories a 
good moral justification must be impartial and universalizable, 
friendship does not provide good moral justifications. I will examine 







3.1. Friendship, self-love, and egoism 
The love we feel for our friends, according to Aristotle, springs from 
self-love (NE, Book IX, Ch. 8, and Irwin’s note (p. 295)). If it is so, 
some claim, it is egoistic.66 
When Aristotle talks of the attitudes that belong to friendship, he 
claims that those attitudes derive from features of the virtuous 
person’s attitude to himself (NE, IX, Ch. 4). In order to argue this, he 
holds (1) that there is at least one good kind of self-love, and (2) that 
the friend is another self.  
Regarding (1), Aristotle thinks that there are two kinds of self-love, 
one that comes from the virtuous’ observation of herself and the other 
that comes from the base’ observation of herself. As we can expect, 
the prior is morally permissible but not the latter, because it derives 
from selfishness. Moreover, since this second form of self-love springs 
from competition with others in regard to the possession of goods 
such as money, honors, and bodily pleasures in which one gains while 
others lose, it is harmful for other people, as well as vicious (1168b17-
9). Because this is the most common self-love, Aristotle argues, it is 
understandable that people think it is the only type, and they are 
                                                          
66 On this, see Tara Smith (1993 and 2005). In her 2005, Smith argues some forms 
of egoism are compatible with true friendship. See also D. O. Brink (1993), who 
claims Aristotle justifies rational egoism with his conception of the friend as 




justified in reproaching it. The virtuous person, on the other hand, who 
“is always eager above all to do just or temperate actions or any other 
actions in accord with the virtues, and in general always gains for 
himself what is fine…” (NE 1168b25-7) is a real self-lover and his self-
love is justified. Actions that come out of this kind of self-love are not 
selfish, and their underlying motive is benevolence. In this sense, 
Aristotle claims, it is clear that self-love is sometimes good, and this is 
why the virtuous person has it.67  
Second, since Aristotle conceives the friend as another self 
(1161b28, 1166a31), he argues that the virtuous person is justified in 
treating his friend as he treats himself (1166a30-5), and because of 
that he wants and seeks the best and finest for himself and his friend. 
Base people, on the contrary, cannot be friends with themselves 
(1166b3-25), they cannot have real love for themselves or seek for 
                                                          
67 In regard to the Impartiality Vs. Partiality debate which will be considered in the 
next section, and the issue of self-interest as egoism, N. Sherman (1987) claims 
Aristotle (NE, IX) thinks there is an objectionable and an unobjectionable partiality 
toward the self: “In the first case an individual is partial to himself in the sense that 
he takes more than his fair share of certain "fought for" or scarce (perima-chata) 
goods. We rightly censure this individual for his actions involve a violation of 
justice; they are a case of pleonexia, taking for oneself what others have a 
legitimate claim to. In the second case an individual is partial in the sense that he 
desires to make his own character virtuous and to make himself the seat of virtue. 
This individual is not guilty of a criticizable self-interest, for in wanting that he be 
virtuous, he does not violate others' claims. The implication is that the end of virtue 
is not a scarce resource divided up by principles of distributive justice. Cf. 1168b15-




what is really good for them, and that is why they cannot have 
complete friendships (1166b26-30).  
I agree with (1) – that there is a least one good kind of self-love - in 
that self-love needs not to be selfish. People with good characters 
may recognize and appreciate their good character as they would 
appreciate it in anybody else. In fact, that is part of the reason why 
they engage in character friendship, because they identify someone 
with good character who appreciates it. Since proper self-love, as the 
love for a character friend, is rooted in the appreciation of good 
character, it is not selfish.  
Moreover, we can grant that the attitudes toward our friend are the 
same as the attitudes we have toward ourselves, and deny that the 
love we feel for our friend springs only from self-love. In fact, if 
complete or character friendship requires that I desire my friend’s well-
being for her own sake, and not for mine, this means, first, that there 
must be a demarcation between me and my friend, and second, that 
my desiring her well-being cannot spring from self-love, even if this 
self-love is the proper kind. Rather, I must love her in herself, for who 
she is, and desire her well-being for her own sake. That this attitude is 
the same I have toward me (hypothetically assuming that I am 
virtuous) does not necessarily mean it comes from my attitude toward 




character.68 If proper self-love is not selfish because it is grounded in 
the appreciation of my good character, Aristotle seems to argue, then 
my love for my friend grounded in the same way is not selfish either.  
On the other hand, the other claim on which the objection of 
egoism relies is that, for Aristotle, (2) our friend is another self. I have 
talked above about what this means within the Aristotelian theory 
(section 3.2). We saw this conception of the friend as another self 
derives from his social conception of the self. It also appears to me 
that this notion of self is so important within Aristotelian theory 
because it implies an idea of embodiment. The good character that 
the friend loves in her friend is an embodied character. Such 
embodiment implies that these selves have particularities determined 
by concrete circumstances that must be taken into account when 
engaging in close relationships with them. In (1) Aristotle claims we 
love good characters, in (2) he claims those characters are 
embodied.69 
The notion of my friend as another self also seems to imply an 
emotional component: I should love my friend as I love myself.70 It is 
                                                          
68 This interpretation seems to be supported by Aristotle’s emphasis in the Rhetoric 
in that friendship is a coincidence of wills (1381a10-11, 19-20, 32-34).  
69 With this he seems to tackle the objection raised against Plato, according to 
which he claims we love our friends just as instantiations of The Good. I talked 
about this in section 3.1.  
70 This sounds like the Christian precept “love your neighbor“, which Schopenhauer 




not just a matter of respect or consideration of the other’s well-being, 
interpreted (as it traditionally is) as a cognitive task, from a “rational 
perspective.” Friendship also requires emotional involvement, and a 
willingness to act in favor of the realization of such well-being.  
As I understand it, seeing my friend as another self implies: (a) 
my identification with another and her well-being but, at the same 
time, (b) the recognition of a separation between me and my friend, 
and (c) the acceptance and emotional embracement of the similarities 
and the differences between us.   
Thinking of my friend as another self does not mean, however, 
that her good is an extension of mine. In other words, accepting (a) 
does not entail that when someone acts seeking her friend’s good she 
is simply promoting her own good:  
For a genuine friend truly cares for the other for his own sake. He is 
willing to give of himself to promote the other’s good; he understands 
the other in his own being and interests, and can distinguish the 
other’s interests from his own, even while he is able to care deeply 
for their realization and in that sense identify the friend and his 
good… Thus the sense of identification involved in genuine friendship 
is not a matter of self-interest at all… (Blum, 1993: 200).  
    
                                                          
grounded in the good character of the other. Going even further, this idea of loving 
my friend as myself seems to go along with the Gold Maxim according to which we 
should not do to others what we do not want for ourselves. Friendship seems to be 
in an important sense a matter of taking especial care of selves. But again, in the 




 That is what (a) and (b) mean. We recognize our separateness, 
and yet we think of our friend as another self.71 In this sense, like 
Blum claims, “the terms ‘egoism’ and ‘altruism’ as usually understood 
serve us ill in describing acting from friendship” (Blum, 1993: 201). It is 
so because although acting for my friend’s good for her own sake 
involves certain altruistic features - my actions are not well described 
as sacrifices. Since those actions are directed to my friend and I 
appreciate our relationship and its meaning in my live, they are not 
“disinterested” in the full sense. But as Blum points out, those 
concepts of egoism and altruism “are misleading in the context of any 
genuinely cooperative endeavor, i.e., one in which there is a shared 
goal among the participants…” (p. 202, note 10), and when the 
common goal is more than the sum of individual goals.72 Friendship 
seems a form of cooperative endeavor in this sense. Friends share 
values, ways of seeing and being in the world, projects and goals. 
Such sharing so central to friendship makes the identification of 
friends with each other and with their well-being necessary, but it does 
not make them indistinguishable and inseparable. And that is what (c) 
                                                          
71 See N. Sherman (1987: 607): “Aristotle says an adult friend is "another self," but 
equally, in his own words, "a separate self" (autos diairetos) (EE I245a3o, a35; NE 
II7ob7, MM 12I3aI3, a24). This entails that such friends promote each other's good 
in a privileged way (as only another self can), but in a way that is nonetheless 
mindful of the mature rational agency of each.”  
72 This goes in tune with Aristotle’s remark that “The proverb ‘What friends have is 




means; in complete friendship we are involved with the other in a deep 
way that affects our whole being, our way of understanding, feeling, 
and acting in the world.   
 To finish this section I want to highlight something else. At the 
beginning of this chapter I mentioned that Aristotle claims friendship is 
a virtue or involves virtue. I gave some reasons to treat friendship not 
as a virtue but as involving virtue. But if Aristotle also thought 
friendship is a virtue, it is, along with justice, a special virtue. That is 
so because friendship, analyzed as a virtue, cannot be defined as a 
personal character trait since it doesn’t depend solely on the agent. It 
requires others, and those others involved must be engaged in a 
specific way: they must be appreciated by themselves. Friendship 
implies the cultivation, with other who is valued, of something valuable 
outside of me. This is another good reason to reject the idea that 
friendship is selfish. Nevertheless, even if we succeed in showing that 
friendship is not rooted in an egoist interest, but on a genuine 
appreciation of the friend’s self, we can still doubt the moral 
justification of the concern for particular persons. This is what I will 





3.2. The Impartialism vs. Partialism Debate73  
Friendship is an interesting phenomenon because while it has 
been acknowledged by most moral philosophers, its place within 
moral theory is not clear. The most pressing question seems to be 
about the justification of a special concern for one person, which 
opens up a more general debate about how are we to justify partial 
concerns over impartial concerns.  
Kant (1775-1780), for instance, claimed that friendship “…is the 
whole end of man, through which he can enjoy his existence,” (215) 
but at the same time he considered it problematic, something that 
must be replaced by a higher social concern. He says “Friendship is 
not of heaven but of earth; the complete moral perfection of heaven 
must be universal; but friendship is not universal” (in Pakaluk, 1991: 
215). After all, if what is morally relevant in our acts is whether they 
conform to the Categorical Imperative, there doesn’t seem to be much 
room for concerns for particular individuals.74 What matters is our 
compromise with the universal.75 So while Kantians could allow 
                                                          
73 According to D. Parfit, 2003, another way to see the debate is Moral Theory vs. 
Common Sense Morality.  
74 See Bernard Williams (1976), where he claims that for Kantians, "…the moral 
point of view is specially characterized by its impartiality and its indifference to any 
particular relations to particular persons" (p. 198). 
75 See also S. Kierkegaard, Works of Love (1846-47), where he says that my love to 
my friend has moral value only insofar as it comes from a love that I would have for 




friendly actions, the justification of those actions would come from 
their observance of the moral duty, not from love for the friend.   
On the other hand, teleological or consequentialist theories 
claim that what is morally relevant in the assessment of acts is the 
extent to which their consequences maximize the good of the greatest 
number of individuals. Since friendship seems to fulfill a human need 
and bring happiness to individuals, it is justified. Friendly actions could 
increase overall well-being.76 Here again, the moral value of caring 
about and acting for the good of my friend is grounded not out of 
concern for my friend for her own sake but in contribution to the 
general good. 
The problem, then, is that while the moral value of friendship 
involves concern for another for her sake as the particular person she 
is, the most salient moral theories tell us that we should expand the 
horizon of our concerns and aim at general and universal ideas or 
principles. That is, we should try to be impartial. This is why both 
consequentialism and deontology would recommend friendly actions 
                                                          
76 This may sound similar to the justification within virtue theory. It is different, 
nevertheless, because although both the consequentialist and the virtue theorist 
could be thinking in the same outcome, the later thinks such outcome cannot be 
possible without the proper motivations to act. Those motivations, within virtue 
theory, might include overall happiness as a final goal, but are also constituted by 




under impartial reasons. This way of seeing friendship is subject to 
several objections. 
First of all, it seems to entail the idea that friends are 
interchangeable, which leads us to the fungibility problem.77 Second, it 
appears to neglect an important part of the sources of meaning and 
value of our moral lives and, as a consequence, an important source 
of moral motivation. According to Michael Stocker (1976), this 
generates a lack of harmony or integration between reasons and 
motives to act that leads to moral schizophrenia78. Here it is Stocker’s 
indirect way of showing us how:  
My criticism runs as follows: Hedonistic egoists take their own 
pleasure to be the sole justification of acts, activities, ways of life; 
they should recognize that love, friendship, affection, fellow feeling, 
and community are among the greatest (sources of) personal 
pleasures. Thus, they have good reason, on their own grounds, to 
enter such relations. But they cannot act in the ways required to get 
those pleasures, those great goods, if they act on their motive of 
pleasure-for-self. They cannot act for the sake of the intended 
beloved, friend, and so on; thus, they cannot love, be or have a 
friend, and so on. To achieve these great personal goods, they have 
to abandon that egoistical motive. They cannot embody their reason 
in their motive. Their reasons and motives make their moral lives 
schizophrenic. (p. 457).  
 
                                                          
77 I analyzed this before in section 3.1.  
78 B. Williams (1976) makes a similar point. He claims that the usual 
characterization incorrectly assumes the impartial point of view is moral whereas 
the partial point of view is non-moral, and that there is a “special dignity or 
supremacy attached to the moral,” and something wrong in acting by partial 




Stocker further argues that the same applies to 
consequentialists and deontologists: if they engage in friendship for 
the sake of goodness but not for the sake of their friends, they do not 
have true friendship. So, Stocker claims, “The problem with these 
theories is not […] with other-people-as-valuable. It is simply- or not so 
simply -with people-as-valuable.” (p. 459).  
There have been several responses from deontologist and 
consequentialists to try to accommodate friendship in their framework 
in a way that does not jeopardize the concern for the friend as the 
person she is.79 But since I think the most relevant question for my 
current project here is why Aristotle placed friendship in such a central 
role in his virtue theory, I will not focus on consequentialist or 
deontological theories of friendship.  
According to Aristotle, “No one can have complete friendship 
for many people, just as no one can have an erotic passion for many 
at the same time; for [complete friendship, like erotic passion] is like 
an excess, and an excess is naturally directed at a single individual” 
(NE 1158a11).80 We are authorized (even sometimes compelled) to 
                                                          
79 See, for instance, Barbara Herman (1984). Scott Woodcock (2010) agrees with 
Stocker in that contemporary moral theories impose a sort of “scquizophrenic 
moral psychology,” and claims that although this is not a reductio of those theories, 
the burdens of such moral psychology “are both acceptable and deserving of 
serious consideration” (p. 2). 
80 Aristotle defines virtue as a mean between two excesses. The fact that he claims 




pay more attention to our family and friends than we are required to do 
it with strangers (1160a1-8). But at the same time we should always 
aim at the finest actions and ends (1109a25-30), which seem in many 
respects also independent of our particular interests (since the finest 
is identifiable with what constitutes and promotes human flourishing). 
What is the place of friendship in this picture?  
Recall Aristotle claims there are three kinds of friendship, either 
based on utility, on pleasure, or on virtue, and that only the last one is 
considered complete or full friendship. With Cooper, I call it character 
friendship. The other two are friendships just in the sense that they 
resemble to a certain extent the best form of the relationship. Due to 
Aristotle’s characterization of complete or character friendship, some 
have argued that the concern for a friend with whom we have this 
relationship could be seen as appealing to partial and impartial 
reasons at the same time.  
I have characterized character friendship as a relationship 
between two people based on the mutual appreciation of the good 
character or virtues of each other, in which they wish and act for the 
other’s good for her own sake, and in which they know of this mutual 
disposition and enjoy the other’s company (section 2). They do not 
                                                          
he doesn’t think friendship is a virtue, but involves virtue. I gave some additional 




have to be fully virtuous agents to engage in this relationship, and they 
do not have to be equally developed either. What seems more 
important is their recognition of the value of having a good character 
and their commitment to the cultivation of it.  
In this sense, it is said, in character friendship friends care for 
each other on impartial grounds: on the appreciation of their good 
character. Concern for our character-friend as another self is justified 
by appeal to good character. According to Jennifer Whiting (1991), for 
instance, Aristotelian friendship, as opposed to “brute” friendship in 
which the relationship just happens to exist, regardless of the other’s 
characteristics, is justified by our concern for our friend’s character, 
projects and commitments. Nevertheless, since this sole answer 
“involves rejecting the importance traditionally attached to the 
distinction between self and other and focusing instead on the 
character of whomever - oneself or another - is the intended object of 
concern” (Whiting, 1991: 6), it seems it could lead to the fungibility 
problem again. If what matters is not the friend as a person, but rather 
a type of character (the virtuous character), the relationship does not 
seem to be grounded in my love for my friend for her own sake as the 
person she is.81 
                                                          
81 Recall this is an objection usually directed towards the Platonic view on love and 




Another interpretation advanced is that it is my relationship to 
my friend what makes her valuable and non-exchangeable. It is 
because I happen to be bound to her and she happens to be bound to 
me that we think and feel each other is special.82 When we first meet 
a new friend, there is not time to make all those considerations about 
her good character that the previous view requires, and we just 
embarked in the relationship without knowing the other person well 
enough to say whether she had a good character or whether she was 
well committed to improve it. In this sense, the character-friendship 
account is artificial.83 With time and commitment to each other and the 
                                                          
82 See, for instance, E. Millgram (1987), who defends an interesting interpretation 
in this direction. According to him, the relationship between friends is an instance 
of the procreation relation, like that of parents and their children, or poets and 
their poems. Millgram claims this explains the special concern we have for our 
friends as other selves, and explains also why we love virtue in our friends and not 
in whomever virtuous person.  
83 See Diane Jeske (1997): “Character friendship is a tempting ideal, but, I think, it is 
clear that it betrays our actual moral experience, and overestimates the role of 
choice in the determination of friends. We often begin interacting with persons 
with whom we think we have much in common, only to learn later that they differ 
from us significantly. But through our interactions, we develop affection and 
concern for that other person - we find that we are friends, before we really 
understand the other's character. So friendship is more like familial relationships 
than the Aristotelian model allows. This is not to say that there is no element of 
choice in friendship; as I indicated in section VII above, when deciding whether to 
form any given friendship, we must weigh our reasons, moral and prudential, 
before acting. Coming to know other people, however, is a complex and difficult 
process, because persons are not transparent. We are not, at the time of first 
meeting an individual, in any position to fully judge her character or what the 
character of a friendship with her would be. Sometimes we must become friends 
with someone, i.e. begin responding to her with care and openness, before we can 
come to know that person. Also, as with many other decisions, we often will lose 




relationship, we started seeing the value in us. In this sense, they say, 
the relationship itself bestows value to the friends. 
This strategy, nevertheless, is accused of being egocentric 
since the value of the other seems to derive from my friend’s 
relationship to me.84 The other’s good is considered part or extension 
of my own good, and I end up again putting aside my friend’s good for 
her own sake.85 This way of understand the source of the value of the 
friend and my relationship with her seems to take us again to the 
partial extreme. Whiting (1991) claims, for instance, that this appears 
to “involve either misrepresentation or potentially objectionable 
colonization” (p. 9) of the other’s self. So she goes back to the 
suggestion of interpret Aristotle as adopting a generic strategy in 
which the ground of the concern for our friends is the substance or 
content of their character, independently of their relationship to us. 
                                                          
the first steps. Even the most rational individual must sometimes just act, given the 
opaqueness of persons, and the fact that opportunities for friendship do not come 
along every day” (p. 71).   
84 See, for instance, D. Parfit (2003) characterization of this view. He claims theories 
that are agent based like this one are directly self-defeating because the good of 
the outcomes of our actions should be preferred over who perform them. In other 
words, it shouldn’t matter if I do or you do something good for our children, for 
instance, as long as our children are fine and get the good outcomes (see especially 
Chapter One, part 4).     
85 For more on why this is a wrong characterization of the concern in friendship, see 
Lawrence Blum (1993, specially section V). He is against this form of present the 
value and importance of the relationship for the friends, because among them 
operates what he calls “conditional altruism,” which has moral value (see especially 




This will give us, she claims, “character relative” or “ethocentric” 
reasons for action (p. 11).  
Now, remember I suggested to connect the Aristotelian claim 
according to which what we love (in ourselves and in others) is good 
character, with his social and embodied conception of the self.  It 
seems that the ambiguity of the Aristotelian view in regard to the place 
of friendship within the debate impartialism/partialism has its roots in 
the fact that those notions are treated as separated. Some say his 
view implies that we either love good characters or we love our friend. 
But I think those notions go together, since I assume that the 
conception of a person’s self includes her character. The definition of 
a person includes the way she characteristically acts, thinks, her main 
interests, commitments, projects, and all of this is part of what her 
character is, or derives from it. Like Bernard Williams (1976: 201) puts 
it “…an individual person has a set of desires, concerns, or as I shall 
often call them, projects, which help to constitute a character.” He 
understands character as “having projects and categorical desires 
with which one is identified” (p. 210). In this sense, it seems right to 
say that loving my friend in herself, for who she is, need not be 
different from loving her, in part, for her character. According to 




Aristotle did not distinguish disinterested affection for a person from 
the appreciation of her excellences because he took the appreciation 
of her excellences as such (and not as instruments for one's own 
benefit) to constitute disinterested affection for her (p. 14).  
 
Does this solve the impartialism vs. partialism debate regarding 
the place of friendship within moral theory? I am not sure this debate 
can be solved, because I think it comes from a shortsighted view of 
morality. It comes from the assumption that our concerns, in order to 
count as moral, must be impartial. This is why we feel that we need to 
justify our concern for our friends. But human morality encompasses 
both partial and impartial concerns, and moral theory should be able 
to give room to these two kinds of sources of motivations in order to 
be complete.  
True friendship is possible only if there is a genuine concern for 
the person that my friend is, as she is. That is, true friendship is 
possible only if it is motivated by a partial concern, and this concern is 
a moral concern. It is justified precisely because it springs from a 
genuine interest for the other’s good for her own sake. Genuine 
concern for one person is as moral as genuine concern for all 
humanity.86  
                                                          
86 See Lawrence Blum (1993), who claims that “the moral excellence of friendship 
involves a high level of development and expression of the altruistic emotions of 




A careful look at our day to day moral life will show us that 
sometimes we are required to act out of an impartial concern, and 
other times out of a partial concern.87 Moreover, with Lawrence Blum 
(1980) I think impartiality is required only in specific cases. Say, for 
instance, when we are enacting within our institutional roles. If we are 
a physician, a teacher, a judge, a secretary… we are obliged to treat 
everybody’s concerns impartially. If our friend arrives and needs a 
specific treatment from us while many other people do too, we must 
treat her concern like anybody’s concern. Like Blum puts it, the 
important point here is that having a concern for our friends does not 
conflict with having impartial concerns:  
It is not violation of impartiality if I phone my friend to see if he is 
feeling better, knowing that he has been ill. Such a situation of acting 
from concern for a friend does not impose on me the obligation to 
take into account the interests of all the people whom I might help at 
that point in time, and to choose according to some impartial criterion 
whom to benefit. (p. 46) 
    
                                                          
is not motivated by self-interest (caring for the other as an extension of oneself, p. 
200), nor by self-sacrifice (p. 201). 
87 According to N. Sherman (1987), Aristotle exhibits this position too: “Aristotle 
includes motives of attachment within the ethical sphere, while still acknowledging 
constraints on their permissibility. So in general, Aristotle says, friends are to be 
preferred in the assignment of our help and aid (1155a7-9; 1160a1-8) but not 
always and not at all costs. For example, it would be wrong to help a friend before 
returning benefits due others, or to give a loan to friends before repaying a 
creditor, "except when helping a friend is especially fine or necessary" (1164b25-
1165 a4). Similarly, partiality is inappropriate in specific contexts, such as in the 
case of a public official where the fair adjudication of claims is a part of the 




Going even further, in everyday life accurate moral responses 
would mostly require from us that we pay attention to concerns of 
particulars. We have to act as sons, daughters, siblings, spouses, 
parents, friends, members of our community - and proper responses 
there require that we give special weight to those relationships and the 
particular people involved. This does not mean, however, that we 
have no duties outside of these circles: “The point is that strict 
impartiality is not required or appropriate, but neither is ignoring the 
interests of others simply because the weal and woe of one’s friend is 
at stake” (Blum, 1980: 49).  
   It appears that since we have no clear notion of the kind of 
goods we can and must bring about to others, we tend to picture 
friends and non-friends as competing for our attention and care at one 
and the same time. But as Blum highlights, the picture in which friends 
and non-friends are competing for our beneficence is artificial and 
misleading. Giving advice and criticism to a friend, for instance, or 
comforting her about a private tragedy, or helping her to decorate her 
backyard, are not the kind of goods that I am obligated to give to non-
friends and to feel guilty about for not doing so. It is not that I cannot 
advise, criticize, comfort, and help to decorate the house of a stranger, 
but rather that while those goods seem to be properly required by 




Those goods are an integral part of what being a friend is, and strictly 
speaking it seems that the sort of trust, knowledge, and intimacy 
achieved through friendship make it easier and more natural to 
provide them accurately and beneficially to our friends than to 
strangers.88 I may comfort my friend just by being by her side, in her 
presence, without need of a word, but for a distressed stranger my 
presence may not be comforting and could be discomforting or even 
threatening. In this sense, what I should do for a friend is not 
comparable with what I should do for non-friends, “and therefore when 
we do something for our friends it is wrong to picture us as choosing 
                                                          
88 In this regard, see Nussbaum (1979: 159) “The lover's understanding, attained 
through the responsive communion of sense, emotion, and intellect (any one of 
which, once well trained, may perform a cognitive function in exploring and 
informing us concerning the others) yields particular truths and particular 
judgments. It insists that those particular intuitive judgments are prior to any 
universal rules we may be using to guide us. I decide how to respond to my lover 
not on the basis of definitions or general prescriptions, but on the basis of an 
intuitive sense of the person and the situation, which, although guided by my 
general theories, is not subservient to them. This does not mean that my 
judgments and responses are not rational. Indeed, Alcibiades would claim that a 
Socratic adherence to rule and refusal to see and feel the particular as such is what 
is irrational. To have seen that, and how, Socrates is like nobody else, to respond to 
him as such and to act accordingly, is the deeply rational way to behave towards 
another individual. The man bound by rules looks, from this viewpoint, like one 
afraid to see. The Socratic claim to have a general deductive science (episteme) of 
the good and of love now begins to appear as weird as Socrates. Perhaps "such 
cases do not fall under any science or precept, but the agents themselves must 
consider what suits the occasion, as is also the case in medicine and in navigation" 
(Aristotle, EN 1104a3-10). "The universal must come from the particulars; and of 
these one must have perception, and this is nous" (EN 1143b4-5). She thinks the 
Symposium urges us to make a choice between loving the universal or loving the 




not to do the same or something comparable for someone else” 
(Blum, 1980: 57). That is why “…acting morally is not always or 
fundamentally a matter of equality or impartiality towards all. For this is 
not what it is to act morally within friendship” (Blum, 1980: 55). 
Friendship involves a form of conditional altruism (the condition is my 
special relationship to the other, present also in some other forms of 
altruism) for my friend that is justified as long as such concern does 
not stem from self-concern, and does not involve a despicable attitude 
towards those outside the relationship: 
It is important to recognize that genuine devotion to a particular group 
– family, neighborhood, ethnic community, ethnic group, club - is in 
itself morally good, and becomes morally suspect only when it 
involves a deficient stance towards others… Moral philosophy ought 
to be able to give expression to the moral value of such an attitude, 
and an exclusively universalist perspective cannot do so. (Blum, 
1993: 206)  
 
 The notion of “genuine devotion” to loved ones or to a group is 
meant to sort out a valid source of suspicion against partialism, which 
is that it could justify impermissible practices like racism, for instance, 
or the maintenance of oppressive relationships.   Racists seem to 
belief that those from their same group are better than the ones 
outside it, and that this justifies a negative and differential treatment to 
the outside members. Nevertheless, like Blum suggests, genuine 
devotion to the members of our group has two conditions, (1) it must 




sure racism could fulfill, and (2) it must exclude any bad attitude 
towards others outside the circle, which racism does not fulfill for sure. 
The same applies to devotion to our friends: it must spring from a 
concern from them for their own sake, and must exclude a bad 
attitude toward others.  
Moreover, like Marilyn Friedman (1991) argues, the moral 
defense of partialism depends on the quality of relationships that it 
helps to sustain. In this sense, only “qualified partialism,” understood 
as the partialism that helps to sustain close relationships 
characterized by integrity and fulfilment of those involved, is morally 
justifiable.89 
To sum up, in this section I have been arguing in favor of the 
idea that a complete moral theory should accommodate both impartial 
and partial concerns. My aim was not to defend partialism as such, but 
rather argue for the recognition that genuine (partial) concern for our 
loved ones is as moral as the (impartial) concern for all humanity.90 
  
                                                          
89 In the same vein of defense of the moral value of qualified particularism, see 
Tedesco (2004). He claims that friendship is morally defensible in spite of the 
particularism that it entails, only insofar as we are talking of certain forms of 
friendships.  
90 Nevertheless, I agree with Friedman (1991) in that both ideas of partiality and 





Friendship as a source of knowledge, emotions, and praxis 
necessary for the cultivation of virtues 
 
“Unlike the Kantian, then, Aristotle does not merely permit attachment  
within a theory of morality constituted primarily by impartiality.  
Rather, he makes attachment essential to the expression of virtue  
and living with friends a structural feature of good living…” 
N. Sherman (1987: 593) 
 
 
1. Some caveats  
First, friendship defined as mutual well-wishing, care, and 
acknowledgment of this mutuality plays a role in moral growth. This 
definition encompasses the three kinds of friendships defined by 
Aristotle (see Cooper, 1980), which means pleasure friendships and 
advantage friendships can also contribute to our moral development. 
Nevertheless, the thesis defended here is that complete or character 
friendship plays a more fundamental role in the cultivation of virtue. 
That is so due to the nature of virtue (briefly explored in Chapter I, 
sections 1 and 2), and the nature of character friendship (explored in 
Chapter II).  In this chapter we will explore in more detail how this 
works.        
Second, the thesis according to which friendship plays a 




mean that friendship is necessary for human life in the sense that a 
human would not survive without friends. It means, rather, that 
friendship is necessary for a good human life. This thesis is 
prescriptive, because it is not about human life and friendship in 
general, but about good human lives and good friendships. Against 
Tedesco (2004), this means there are goods of friendship which are 
necessary for a good human life, and also that friendship is in a way 
unique because it gives us goods that nothing else can give us.  
Third, the thesis here defended by no means implies a merely 
instrumental view of the value of friendship. In Aristotelian terms it is 
mistaken to think that the value of character friendship is purely 
instrumental: that it is solely a means for attaining virtues. However, it 
would also be a mistake to think of the value of friendship as purely 
intrinsic. This is because, according to Aristotle, friendship’s non-
instrumental value consists in the fact that it is a constitutive part of 
human eudaimonia. In this sense, its value is intrinsic but also 
relational. In other words, friendship’s intrinsic goodness does not 
derive just from its intrinsic properties but rather from its relation to 




instrumental91 or purely extrinsic.92 Following Christine Korsgaard’s 
(1983) taxonomy of kinds of goodness, we could say that friendship’s 
value is non-instrumental because it is not valued just as a mean to 
something else, but also as an end in itself.93 And friendship’s value is 
not extrinsic either because the source of its value is not outside of it; 
it is in itself and its relation to eudaimonia.94 
And finally, I want to make clear again that I do not intend to 
develop an exhaustive account about the cultivation of every virtue, 
nor even about the cultivation of a particular virtue. Rather, I am 
thinking of a sort of necessary ground for the cultivation of the virtues 
in general (I mentioned this in Chapter I, section 2). I have claimed I 
subscribe to Sherman’s suggestion according to which we can talk of 
                                                          
91 For a good explanation of the distinction non-instrumental/intrinsic/extrinsic, see 
Mark Schroeder (2012): SEP http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-
theory/index.html#IntVal. A criticism of friendship as merely instrumental seems to 
be at the heart of Carol Gilligan's criticisms of Kohlberg (C. Gilligan, 1982). 
92 Although, according to Christine Korsgaard (1983), the contrast between 
instrumental and intrinsic value is false, and the natural contrast to intrinsic value is 
extrinsic, since it refers to the source of the value, “…rather than the way we value 
the thing” (p. 170).   
93 In other words, friendship has both instrumental and intrinsic value (on this, see 
also N. Sherman, 1987: 593-5).   
94 In the same vein, see Brewer (2005), where he claims: “This is not to suggest that 
the point of Aristotelian friendship is to make people virtuous. Such friendship is 
intrinsically valuable and ought to be pursued as such. Indeed, neither genuine 
Aristotelian friendship nor its attendant benefits can be attained by those who 
value their friends merely as a means to some further good, including the good of 
self-improvement.” (p. 3, note 3). Or Cooper (1985) who claims that the 
instrumentality of friendship is not necessarily incompatible with friends being 




“…virtue in a general way as a complex of capacities—perceptual, 
affective, and deliberative,” and say something about how these 
capacities are cultivated (Sherman, 1991: 166). I also think of virtues 
here in general terms, as a sort of complex of capacities, and my goal 
is to show the role of character friendship in their cultivation. 
In chapter II, I subscribed to the Aristotelian definition of 
friendship as a relationship characterized by mutual affection, well-
wishing, and mutual acknowledgment of this well-wishing and 
affection. I have also said that although different forms of friendship 
(based on pleasure or utility, for instance) contribute in distinct ways to 
our moral development, it is fundamentally character friendship which 
helps us in our process of virtue cultivation. Because of that, I tried to 
see what a character friend is, and found that it is a friend we love 
mainly because of her good character -  her good (moral and 
intellectual) qualities. Following Bukowski and Sippola (1996) I think 
that good or character friends are similar to each other in that they 
share “…a concern or appreciation for constructs concerned with 
goodness, such as generosity, honesty, kindness, loyalty, and 
authenticity…” (p. 242).  
Along with this, I also subscribed to the Aristotelian idea 
according to which our friend is a mirror, another self (NE 1161b28, 




and 1171b33). Since good friends base their relationship in the 
acknowledgment and appreciation of their good, if not-yet-perfect, 
characters, this friendship is preceded by a certain similarity in their 
good character. But what is it about this relationship with someone 
else that is so special? Why should we think that such a relationship is 
important for the process of virtue cultivation?  
 
2. What makes friendship special?  
“Aristotle repeatedly emphasizes that correct perception cannot be learned by 
precept, but only through and in one’s own experience. If we now think what it 
would be to understand another person in this Aristotelian way, we begin to see 
that this understanding could not possibly be acquired through a general 
description, through reading an encomium or a character-portrait, or, indeed, by 
any distant and non-engaged relationship. It requires the experience of shared 
activity and the cultivation, over time, and through the trust that comes only with 
time, of an intimate responsiveness to that person in feeling, thought, and action.”  
Nussbaum (1986: 364-5).      
 
2.1. The desire or need of sharing: friendship as a unique form 
of experience    
In Chapter II, section 1.2. I claimed that one of the most salient 
features of friendship is that it is constitutive of human flourishing. I 
argued it is so mainly because human beings are social, and because 
of that we need societies but also need close and intimate 
relationships. Friendship stands as a special kind of such close and 




excellences or virtues are exercised. Friendship plays a fundamental 
role in the development of the kind of theoretical and practical reason 
that make a flourishing human life possible partly because, as Aristotle 
claims, one of the most important things that friends do is share 
activities, conversation, and thought (1170b5-15, 1171b30-1172a15): 
“For in the case of human beings what seems to count as living 
together is this sharing of conversation and thought, not sharing the 
same pasture, as in the case of grazing animals” (Aristotle, NE 
1170b12-14). 
The term homonoia, usually translated as concord or 
consensus (1167a23), is the term used to refer this Aristotelian notion 
of the sharing that is so fundamental to friendship -  closer to co-
inhabiting a way of living, thinking, seeing, and feeling in the world 
than to the idea of co-inhabiting a space.95 Such shared views have as 
their corollary shared activities, which could include appropriate 
eating, talking, investment of money, of free time, and so on. That is 
why Aristotle also claims friends share “distress and enjoyment” (NE 
1166a1-10).     
Although occasional sharing is needed as a pre-condition for 
character friendship, a sustained sense of sharing over time is even 
                                                          




more important. This sense of sharing is constructed through the 
history of the relationship, and involves more than just commonality. It 
has both epistemic and creative functions because it implies mutual 
knowledge and a certain shaping of one friend to another. Such 
sustained sharing between the friends can, for instance, create some 
new characteristics in them.  
Think about two friends, Andrea and Mia, who have been 
friends for 5 years. Andrea loves romantic comedy movies but Mia 
cannot stand them, and prefers drama movies instead. Andrea, on the 
other hand, finds drama movies unbearable. Because they want to 
share time together, each of them think of good examples of movies in 
the genre they like so that they could show their friend the value of 
them and enjoy their time watching movies together. Over time, Mia 
can say there are at least some good romantic comedy movies, and 
Andrea can say the same about drama movies. They have expanded 
their tastes, at least in this regard, and something similar can happen 
on a much deeper level. By sharing with friends we may consider 
another ways to think about other people, other relationships, and 
even about the values and principles that guide our lives.96  
                                                          
96 On how friends provide us new perspectives to evaluate our own principles, see 




  In some other cases, the epistemic and creative functions of 
the sharing that is central to character friendship has been described 
as having a sort of reformative force.  Brewer (2005), for instance, 
claims that one of the core components of the Aristotelian conception 
of friendship is that of shareability (p. 723). Talking about how the 
character friends’ sharing forms and corrects them, he claims:   
The fundamental and quite plausible idea here is that love of the 
good is fostered and refined only insofar as one’s socialization is 
guided by a friend with a properly ordered nous. Such relationships 
provide a context within which we are able to find lovable in another 
that other’s commitment to what is good in itself. […] Virtue, 
understood as a love of the fine that shows up in the concrete form of 
consistently good actions, arises in us and is strengthened to the 
extent that our relationships approximate the proper telos of 
character friendships. These relationships can provide the sort of 
external, objectivity-tracking formative and corrective mechanism for 
our characteristic affects that isolated practical reflection alone is 
unable to provide. (p. 749)  
 
 
Brewer argues that is so because this sharing functions as a 
proper arena to test and correct our evaluative outlooks, and to look 
for the way to make them as close to an objective good as possible (p. 
726-734). In the same vein, Marilyn Friedman (1989) claims the moral 
growth facilitated by friendship depends on sharing between the 
friends:  
My own discussion does not depend on the nature of the friendship in 
question. The notion of moral growth which I discuss […] requires 
only that there be a sharing of personal experiences between the 
friends, whatever the motivation for this sharing, and that each friend 




reliability in question having as much to do with epistemic capacity as 
it does with moral goodness. (M. Friedman, 1989: 12, note 2).  
 
Moral growth is facilitated, in Friedman’s view, by a sort of 
expansion of our own experience through sharing with our friends (p. 
7), which is different from the expansion of experience we gain from 
reading literature in that friends interact with us, but also in the 
authenticity of the shared stories (p. 10).  
My view is that this form of sharing in which character 
friendship consists is a privileged source of a certain kind of motivation 
(via knowledge and emotions) necessary for the cultivation and 
exercise of virtue. This sharing facilitates the acquisition of a special 
form of knowledge and the development of certain emotions that move 
us toward virtue, creating at the same time the perfect arena for its 
exercise. These are the subjects of the next two sections.   
 
2. 2. Friendship as a privileged source of knowledge necessary 
for cultivation of virtue: knowledge of particulars 
“The issue is not simply that our own eyes are biased, but more generally, 
that the project of self-knowledge requires external dialogue and audience. 
We need "to live together with friends and share in argument and thought" in 
order to be fully conscious of the sorts of lives we are leading (1170b11-12). 
Without friends, we act in blindness about who we really are, and indeed 
lack true practical reason”  





According to Aristotle, there are two kinds of knowledge which 
are different in nature: scientific knowledge and practical knowledge. 
Each has a distinctive method, object, and goal. He claims scientific 
knowledge is concerned with universals (1139b29-36) whereas 
practical knowledge or wisdom is mostly concerned with particulars 
(1107a31-32, 1110b6-7, 1110b31-1111a2, 1111a22-24, and 1141b15-
24).97  
Aristotle argues there are “five states in which the soul grasps 
the truth […]: craft knowledge, scientific knowledge, prudence, 
wisdom, and understanding” (1139b16-8), and that “we ascribe 
consideration, comprehension, prudence, and understanding to the 
same people… for all these capacities are about the last things, i.e., 
particulars.” (1143a27-30). Practical wisdom is concerned both with 
universals and particulars (1141b15, 1142a15), but mostly with the 
“ultimate particular” (1142a23). Moreover, from the beginning of his 
Nicomachean Ethics (NE) Aristotle argues that the end of ethical 
inquiry is happiness and is realized in the actions of particular agents 
(1095a4-6,1179a35b4, 1098a16-18, and 1098b18-20). Because 
practical wisdom is concerned with actions, and actions have to do 
                                                          
97 As we can see, the term particulars in Aristotle is in opposition to the term 
universals, and seems to refer to specific and concrete instances knowable only by 




with particulars, practical wisdom requires knowledge of particulars, 
among which, I think, are individuals.98 
Nevertheless, it is clear to Aristotle that we cannot attain 
scientific knowledge (episteme) of particulars (NE 1180b13-23, 
1142a11-25) because they are variable.  Scientific knowledge is about 
what is, by necessity, and implies knowing the reason or cause of 
regular phenomena, their explanation and the principles that rule them 
(Met. 981b10-13). This cannot be said of variable phenomena, of 
“what admits being otherwise” (1140b26-29). But we can attain a 
certain kind of knowledge of particulars through experience (Met. 
981a12-24; NE 1112b34-1113a2):  
In a theoretical science like physics, experience has the single role of 
serving as the stepping stone to our grasp of universals. In practical 
knowledge, experience has not only this role but also the more 
important one of providing a grasp of the salient features of particular 
situations in which decisions are to be made. The knowledge of 
particulars provided by experience "completes" practical knowledge, 
assuring that it achieves its end in action. (Devereux, 1986: 498).   
 
                                                          
98 There is a dispute about this interpretation. According to Cooper’s (Reason and 
Human Good in Aristotle, 1975: p. 30) Aristotle is referring here to particulars as a 
class, not to individuals. Devereux (1986) claims that by knowledge of “particulars” 
Aristotle does not mean knowledge of specific types or knowledge of concrete 
individuals, but “…knowledge of facts based on experience, and these facts may or 
may not be about specific individuals.” (p. 492). I agree with Devereux in that it 




The virtuous agent’s exercise of practical wisdom partly 
consists in knowing or “seeing” the salient features of a situation that 
call her to act in a certain way. She needs to be attentive to context, 
and that implies knowing the particulars in it, amongst which are 
individuals. All sorts of different human experiences and relationships 
help us to know the particulars, understood as situations and 
individuals (persons). My thesis is that a special and unique kind of 
knowledge of human beings is provided by friendship, due to the 
experience that its sharing provides. But what kind of knowledge is 
this?   
According to Nussbaum, the knowledge of the particular other 
is not reducible to knowledge by description or knowledge by 
acquaintance,99 because it is also a “knowing how” (1979: 160)100. In 
other words, it is not just a matter of whether knowing my friend 
amounts to having a judgement or a concept of her (which would be 
knowledge by description), or if it is having direct awareness of her, as 
someone “given” or “presented” to me without mediation of judgement 
or concept (knowledge by acquaintance), because it implies another 
kind of knowledge: knowing how to act toward her of with her. Here, 
                                                          
99 In modern philosophy, the distinction is attributed to Bertrand Russell (1910-11).  
100 The distinction between “knowing-how” and “knowing-that” (or “propositional 




the notion of knowing how could be better understood as a sort of 
ability or disposition to act appropriately. In Nussbaum’s words:  
Alcibiades suggests, then, that there is a kind of practical 
understanding, an understanding of the good and the beautiful, that 
consists in a keen responsiveness of intellect, imagination, and 
feeling to the particulars of a situation: an ability to pick out its salient 
features, combined with a disposition to act appropriately as a result. 
Of this sort of intuitive practical wisdom the lover's understanding of 
the particular beloved is a central and particularly deep case—and 
not only a case among cases, but one whose resulting self-
understanding might be fundamental to the flourishing of practical 
wisdom in other areas of life as well. (p. 160) 
 
 My knowledge of my good friend is not reducible to my 
being able to describe her, to say things about her, or to my bare 
perception of her. It entails, over all, my ability or disposition to see, to 
understand, and to act in a way that will be aware and attentive to her 
specific best interests and needs – it entails not just that I know how to 
be a friend, but that I know how to be her friend. More broadly, is a 
disposition to act in a way that takes care of my friend’s self, the 
cultivation of her excellences and the seeking of her well-being for her 
own sake. In this sense, friendship has epistemic value because it 
allows us to know in a special way.  
First, friendship is a relationship that gives the parties 
knowledge of the particular persons they are.101 For example, we 
                                                          
101 Although there are some objections to this idea, according to which friends are 




might think that being compassionate to someone whom we do not 
know well consists in some specific action, but being her friend would 
put us in a better position to judge what would count as being 
compassionate to her. This does not mean, however, that we need 
knowledge of everybody whom we feel compassion towards, but 
rather that having close relationships like friendship would make us 
more capable of imagining the different forms being compassionate 
could take102.  
Moreover, friendship not only gives us the opportunity to know 
the other in a privileged way, but also the opportunity to know 
ourselves better (Cooper, 1980). Since our self is not always 
                                                          
friends faults, I agree with N. K. Badhwar (1993, pp. 6-7) in that a friendship based 
in the evasion of the selves of the friends as they are, is deficient as friendship.   
102 For more on this, see Friedman (1989), where she claims her position is 
empiricist because it considers experience as fundamental for moral knowledge. In 
this way, she argues, friendship provide us with at least two different kinds of 
inductive moral knowledge: “First, one can see how a friend is affected by the 
various social arrangements in which she lives and by the behavior of others 
toward her. These effects reveal something about the adequacy of the standards 
which shape the social arrangements and the human actions which impinge upon 
her. Second, one can observe how the course of her life "tests" the moral 
guidelines according to which she herself lives. One can reflect on that which 
motivates, guides, or affects her. One will be inspired to take it seriously because 
one takes her seriously. It becomes a living option for oneself. Through intimate 
knowledge of one's friend, one participates vicariously in the living which embodies 
and realizes her divergent values. One learns what life is like for someone who is 
motivated by springs of action different from one's own, and one sees how the 




transparent to ourselves,103 friends can show us that and help us see 
our self better. Friends come to know us so well that sometimes they 
can see our real intentions or reasons better than we can.104  
As Badhwar (1993) claims “…friendship does seem to have 
features that make it a privileged source of self-knowledge and even, 
perhaps, necessary for adequate self-knowledge” (p. 8). She says this 
is due, in part, to friendship’s differences from agape and parental 
love, both instances of unconditional love:  
…neither in agape nor in parental love do we see ourselves mirrored 
in the other as the particular persons we are. Nor do these loves 
invite the intimate self-disclosure that enables friends to gain better 
insight into themselves. Moreover, their unconditionality ensures their 
constancy and thus deprives them of an important incentive that 
friendship contains for self-examination, an incentive that comes from 
the possibility of the demise of friendship. (ibid.) 
 
                                                          
103 Self-knowledge has been a big source of discussion within philosophy. The 
ancient aphorism “Know Thyself” is still a matter of debate. In contemporary terms, 
the issue about the possibility of self-knowledge just via introspection, for instance, 
is called into question. For more on this, see Jesse Wade Butler (2006) and Anthony 
Hatzimoysis (2011). 
104 In the same vein, N. Sherman (1987: p. 611) claims: “…knowing the heart, Kant 
tells us, is a difficult and seemingly inscrutable matter. We can never be fully sure if 
we have told ourselves the truth. However there are ways of knowing the heart 
explicit in an Aristotelian account of friendship that need to be explored if the issue 
of transparency is indeed to be taken seriously. These involve, as we have just seen, 
informal methods of self-reflection that seem possible only within intimate and 
trusting relations. Before a friend, Aristotle suggests, we can bare ourselves, and 





Second, friendship gives us knowledge of human experience, 
in much the same way as literature and movies do, from within a 
specific narrative and context different than our own. Knowing and 
understanding others consists, partly, in understanding the narratives 
within which they act.105 We come to understand and sometimes 
judge fictitious character’s actions in a movie or a novel differently 
when we know the circumstances, reasons, and emotions that led 
them to act in a certain way.106 Similarly, knowing my friend’s story - or 
at least part of it - makes me aware of different and often valid ways of 
seeing things and acting, and different ways of living a good life.   
Third, and maybe more importantly, this knowledge of human 
experience touches us in a distinctive way, since in friendship we 
establish a sort of dialogue that makes us grow. The knowledge about 
the person who is my friend, and the knowledge of her narrative (her 
story, or part of it) has a different status than our general knowledge 
about others, such as family members or fictitious characters, and our 
knowledge of their narratives. We establish a special sort of dialogue 
with friends. It is a dialogue distinct from that with our family members 
mainly because it is freely established and cultivated, and it is different 
                                                          
105 For the importance of the concept of narrative in moral discourse, see A. 
MacIntyre (1981). 
106 Concerning the value of literature and movies for moral understanding, see 




from the dialogue with fictitious characters mainly because friends 
confront us in a more vivid way. They are persons with real projects, 
values, and goals, who actual need us, as we need them.    
Before moving forward, it is important to mention a corollary of this 
knowledge provided by friendship, related to the next section due to its 
conative force: this particular knowledge of a close other and of my 
self is a source of pleasure. At a basic level, it could be interpreted as 
the fulfillment of a human need for what Nathaniel Branden (1993) has 
called “psychological visibility.” It could be that but also more.    
According to Branden, there is a special pleasure we derive from 
contemplating something alive, even just a plant: “I thought of the 
motive of people who, in the most impoverished conditions plant 
flowers in boxes on their windshields – for the pleasure of watching 
something grow. Apparently, observing successful life is of value to 
human beings” (1993: 65). There is an even greater pleasure we 
derive, he argues, from “interacting and communicating with a living 
consciousness” (p. 66) like, say, playing with a dog. Lying under this 
pleasure is what Branden calls “the Muttnik’s principle” (named after 
his pet) or “the Principle of Psychological visibility”: “Human beings 
desire and need the experience of self-awareness that results from 
perceiving the self as an objective existent, and they are able to 




other living beings” (p. 72). The pleasure will be highest, he says, 
within friendship and love, because in those relationships we admire 
and care for the person with whom we are involved (p. 71).        
Friendship is a source of deep pleasure not only because we 
become visible to someone we value, but also because it is 
pleasurable to see whom we value. Branden claims that 
contemplating all forms of life is a metaphysical experience that tells 
us successful life is possible and, because of that, the sight of another 
person is even more pleasurable:  
The success and achievements of those around us, in their own persons 
and in their work, can provide fuel and inspiration for our efforts and 
strivings. Perhaps this is one of the greatest gifts human beings can offer 
one another. A greater gift than charity, a greater gift than any explicit 
teaching or any words of advice –the sight of happiness, achievement, 
success, fulfillment. (p. 66) 
  
I think the pleasure could come partially from what Branden 
describes as the fulfillment of the psychological need for visibility, but I 
think there is more to it than that. It is clear that Branden is explaining 
what Aristotle might be saying when he defines a friend as another 
self. Branden even say friends are mirrors. But in Aristotelian terms 
friends also give us the possibility to see virtuous actions. It is not just 
that my friend reflects my-self in a certain sense. The pleasure I 
experience by engaging in friendship comes also from seeing my 




And if we have the honor of having a character friendship, such a 
relationship will give us both the pleasure of witnessing virtuous 
actions. Moreover, it seems to me that until now we have only 
discussed the pleasure we experience as a result of the special 
knowledge we attain in friendship. That is, the pleasure we experience 
by contemplating my self, the other self, and virtuous actions. But we 
also experience pleasure from the emotions we foster when engaged 
in virtue and from the sustained practice friendship facilitates. I will talk 
about those emotions and such practice in the next two sections.  
 
2. 3. Friendship as a privileged source of emotions necessary for 
virtue cultivation: love, admiration, shame, trust, and hope  
Appropriate motivation is a sine qua non condition for virtue. The 
virtuous agent not only must know what she is doing but also want to 
do it. Such motivation must precede actions, accompany and follow 
them in order to count as virtuous, because “…virtue of character is 
about pleasures and pains” (1104b9), and how we are affected by 
them in the right way (1104b28-9). I will argue here that the desire to 
be a good friend motivates us to seek the best ways to become 
one.107 Among the first requirements to be a good friend is to be 
                                                          
107 I need to highlight here an important difference with the view I am trying to 




genuinely worried about the friend’s well-being for her own sake. 
Close relationships like friendship help us to develop morally relevant 
emotions for virtue, such as love, admiration, shame, hope, and trust.  
 
2.3.1 Love or philia 
 
“…loving is the virtue of friends”  
Aristotle (NE 1156b1). 
 
“Love, furthermore, eases the difficult task of the educator:  
for gratitude and affection enhance the forcefulness of the parental command… (NE 
1180b3-7).  
Take intimacy and felt love away and you have, Aristotle concludes, only a ‘watery’ 
sort of concern all round, without the power to mold or transform a soul”.  
M. Nussbaum (1986: 362).   
        
 
At the beginning of Chapter I, I claimed that when Aristotle talks of 
philia he could be thinking of a wide variety of affective relationships 
we have with others, such as family members, romantic partners, and 
friends. Nevertheless, I stated that I will be restricting the application 
of the term just to friends in the regular sense we use it – to designate 
non-family members - because I think Aristotle himself ended up 
talking about a sort of relationship that is in certain sense chosen. I will 
                                                          
relationships in which the virtue learner is motivated by an emotion that could be 
translated as: “I want to be like her” (the emotion of admiration, following L. 
Zagzebski 2017), my emphasis is on emotions that could be translated as: “I want 





do so also because translating philia as friendship highlights the 
contingency which is characteristic of the sort of relationship we 
establish with friends, which makes it fragile and, at the same time, 
powerful.   
 This does not mean family members cannot be character 
friends nor that my thesis is grounded on the view of friendship as an 
essentially unstable relationship that could easily end while the parts 
remain in deep ways unchanged. Family members can cultivate good 
friendships, but that would be a matter of their choice, and it will make 
the friendship relationship as fragile as a normal friendship is. In the 
same way, friends’ lives are interwoven in many and important senses 
by virtue of their choice and mutual commitment to keep cultivating the 
relationship. Nevertheless, the special character of it is chosen, and 
that makes it fragile but powerful. This contingency makes friendship 
an important source of vulnerability for human good (see Nussbaum, 
1986: 343-500).108 But it also makes of friendship a privileged source 
of emotional value. It is because we are attached to our friend in the 
way we are that we care for her. The strong affective element of 
                                                          
108 Like she points out, this vulnerability is what makes the human good human. 
Simply put, only gods are not vulnerable. Aristotle, contrary to Plato, embraces 




friendship is what keeps friends together and makes possible a shared 
history. 
In this way, it is important to have in mind here that under the 
rubric love I am including also what others have called care 
(Noddings, 2003, 1994, 1992; and Smila, 2009) and attachment 
(Sherman 1991, 1982; Nussbaum, 1986). I am referring to the 
affective ties that bind the persons involved in the relationship of 
character friendship, and act as a motivational force for the virtue 
cultivation of the friends.   
 Interestingly, relatively few scholars (Sherman 1991, 1982; 
Nussbaum, 1986,109 1980, 1979; Badhwar 1987, 1993) have 
emphasized the importance of attachment or love for the cultivation of 
virtue, and even fewer have focused on its importance for moral 
development in general (Friedman, 1989,1993; Blum, 1986; Murdoch, 
1970). Love, nevertheless, seems to be an important element in 
                                                          
109According to Nussbaum: “The two strongest sources of human motivation, he 
[Aristotle] tells us in Book II of the Politics, in criticism of Plato, are the idea that 
something is your own and the idea that it is the only one you have (1262b22ff., EN 
1180a3ff). The intensity of concern that binds parents and children in the 
enterprise of moral education cannot simply be replaced by a communal system… 
for it is the thought that it is your own child, not someone else’s, together with the 
thought that you are unique and irreplaceable for that child and that child for you, 
that’s most keenly spurs the parent to work and care for the education of the child, 




character development.110 Character friendship, specifically, requires 
a form of love according to Aristotle: love of the other for the other’s 
sake (1155b31-34).   
I think Nancy Sherman (1982 and 1991) has formulated the most 
detailed neo-Aristotelian developmental account of virtue cultivation, 
and has best emphasized the role of affective attachment within it. In 
Aristotle’s Theory of Moral Education, she claims Aristotle’s theory is 
the middle course between traditionalists and Socratics on the issue of 
moral education, “…preserving on the one hand the role of filial ties in 
the transmission of values, and on the other, the importance of 
practical reason in providing a critical assessment of attachments” 
(1982, p. iii). According to her, Aristotelian moral training is a 
“…training of ‘right pleasures and pains’, or attachments to certain 
ends and objects of value” (ibid.). This explains why such training 
starts within the family, since affective attachment among parents and 
children makes it possible.111 During this period, she claims, respect 
                                                          
110 In EN x.9, Aristotle claims that parental training has the power of responding 
with accuracy to the individuality of the child. Such power is constituted by two 
elements: closeness and affective involvement (Nussbaum, 1986: 362). 
111 Sherman claims that for Aristotle “…against Plato, the development and 
sustenance of virtuous character will be throughout a social and political process, 
and one which reserves a primary role for the family. For on Aristotle's view, we 
become moral agents in response to and through the help of others whom we 
deeply care about and whose lives intertwine with our own. Through the early 
attachments and affections of philia we are made ready for the sorts of friendships 




and shame are the main motivational forces (ibid., pp. 77-88). Aristotle 
claims that after this period, paideia112 should be developed through 
music and tragedy as an element of extended moral training outside 
the family. This stage of paideia creates an attachment to the 
characters that music and tragedy express as one of the motivational 
forces for improvement (besides fear and pity, ibid., p. iv).  
Although Sherman acknowledges the broad meaning of the word 
philia113 for ancient Greeks, most of the time she uses it to refer to 
love towards family members, more specifically the parents and the 
role they play as models for children’s character development. In other 
places (1991, 1987) where she specifically talks of friendship as the 
perfect arena for cultivating virtue, she does so only in passing.114 
                                                          
112 Paideia was the Greek term for children’s formation, which included the 
transmission of both technical and moral knowledge. 
113 Philia is usually translated as “brotherly love” or “friendship”, but within the 
ancient Greek culture it would include both love for a family member and for a 
friend, and even for a romantic partner in the modern sense. For this reason, some 
translate it as love (see M. Nussbaum, 1986). 
114 Some of those comments: “…identificatory emotions: emulation, respect, love. 
The limited point now is that attachment emotions, characteristic of love or 
friendship, create new objects of care or fear for us. This role of emotions will have 
crucial importance in moral development, and in learning in general. We learn best 
from those with whom we can identify and from those whom we value positively. 
This underlies Aristotle’s view that friendship (philia) is the central arena in which 
character development takes place” (N. Sherman (1999B: 41). And in a note to this, 
she says: “Aristotle himself (Poetics IV) emphasizes the importance of identification 
(or mimesis) as a learning method, and combines this in the books on friendship 
with the importance of an empathetic, responsive relationship as a context for 
learning.” Although her (1987) is specifically about Aristotle’s notion of character 
friendship, her concerns there are mainly about how this notion is related to his 




Moreover, she refines her neo-Aristotelian developmental account of 
cultivation of virtue in which she claims that “Aristotle might accept 
something like this picture: there might be an early period in which 
affective capacities are cultivated, followed by the more active 
development of rational (and deliberative) capacities, and then 
eventually the emergence of full rationality” (1991, p. 158). I do not 
think this development implies the abandonment of the cultivation of 
affective capacities, and that is why friendship is as important as 
having role models for virtue cultivation from late childhood to 
adulthood, even if rationality has fully emerged.    
 
2.3.2. Admiration  
Imitation, mimesis, seems to be connatural to human beings. Little 
children, as any mammal offspring, imitate others’ behavior. This may 
be part of the reason why most virtue theories claim role models are 
fundamental in the process of cultivation of virtue. We admire 
someone and that moves us to want to emulate them.  
Linda Zagzebski’s (2017) theory explains this process well. She 
claims that by direct reference to exemplars we identify what a good 
person is (or should be), which counts as a reason to act, and moves 
us to emulate them. In her theory, the emotion of admiration is the 




general allows us to pick up exemplars of moral goodness, and moves 
us to want to be like them. In this sense, the process of 
teaching/learning virtue is prompted by exemplars (real and fictitious) 
where emotions, beliefs, and comprehension could be attained 
through them, although not always by emulation. Trying to emulate an 
exemplar, I could enact the emotion for compassion or courage, but I 
cannot immediately acquire the exemplar’s beliefs about compassion 
or courage. Nevertheless, my admiration for her could include 
epistemic admiration and count as evidence in favor of the truth of 
those beliefs. In the same way, this admiration could help me gain 
understanding of different moral situations. By merely emulating, 
however, we do not gain understanding. Zagzebski claims we do not 
acquire the ability to see the connection among beliefs and among 
motives and acts by emulating an exemplar, and says that with 
another’s help we develop it by ourselves; but she does not seem to 
have in mind friendship here.  
I basically agree with her in that admiration is one of the key 
motivations driving virtue cultivation, and it does so by helping us 
identify and emulate exemplars. Nevertheless, I would like to highlight 
that in her theory, as in Sherman’s (1987, 1999), character friends 
help us cultivate virtue, but only insofar as friends are also taken to be 




The supposition is that character friends will realize to a different 
degree (and in a different manner) particular virtues. Each is inspired 
to develop himself more completely as he sees admirable qualities, 
not fully realized in himself, manifest in another whom he esteems. 
Remarks Aristotle makes about the notion of emulation in the 
Rhetoric are pertinent here. Emulation, he says, is felt most intensely 
‘before those whose nature is like our own and who have good things 
that are highly valued and are possible for us to achieve’ (1388a31–
2). Character friends, as extended yet different selves, are eminently 
suited as models to be emulated. (1999: p. 134).  
 
My claim is that this process is more complex. Friendship is an 
experience that consists mainly in a form of sharing that allows a 
special sort of knowledge – the knowledge of a particular, a person - 
and propagates emotions of crucial importance for the cultivation of 
virtue. Put simply, the value of character friendship shows that there is 




2.3.3. Shame, trust, and hope, or the value of the friend’s gaze 
 
“…we are more ashamed in front of those 
who are always present and who attend to us, for in both cases eyes 
are upon us"  
Aristotle (Rhetoric, 1384a 33-34). 
 
                                                          
115 Another interesting variation of this thesis is suggested by Benjamin Polansky 
(2014) where he claims that admiration does not necessarily drive us to want to be 
like the exemplar, but to be with them. To admire admirable persons from a 
distance is a distant second-best. We want to be better because we want to 
deserve their friendship. I like this idea, among other reasons, because it claims 






The emotion of shame also seems to be natural for human 
beings. Although its manifestation and causes vary throughout our life, 
and it is in many ways conditioned by our culture, we seem to have a 
natural predisposition to feel ashamed. Against the thesis according to 
which shame impedes our moral development and cultivation of virtue, 
following Kristjian Kristjánsson (2014) I contend shame is an important 
emotion that could prompt moral learners, especially from early 
adolescence to adulthood. In particular, I contend that some of the 
shame that a character friend might make us experience moves us 
toward our better selves. 
With Kristjánsson (2010), I think “emotions are essential to the 
creation and sustenance of selfhood” (p. 75).  In order to better 
understand the self, Kristjánsson opposes what he calls the 
“‘dominant’ self-paradigm,” which is mainly anti-realist and cognitive-
based, and proposes his “‘alternative’ self-paradigm,” which is in 
certain sense cognitive but mostly emotion-based and realist (p. 4). 
According to him, there are at least three categories of self-relevant 
emotions: self-constituting (that define who we are), self-comparative 
(involve the self as a reference point for comparisons with 
expectations), and self-conscious emotions: “Those emotions not only 




intentionality - about the self. The self is, in other words, their direct 
attentional and intentional object: The self is not only the stage; it is on 
stage” (p. 77).  Those self-conscious emotions could be of self-
enhancement or self-diminution, and could or could not attribute 
responsibility to the self, and so we will have:  
Pride (pleasurable self-enhancement feeling relating to a positive 
outcome for which I am responsible, such as passing a difficult exam), 
self-satisfaction (pleasurable self-enhancement feeling relating to a 
positive outcome for which I am not responsible, such as being born 
handsome), shame (painful self-diminution feeling relating to a negative 
outcome for which I am responsible, such as failing an exam), and self-
disappointment (painful self-diminution feeling relating to an outcome for 
which I am not responsible, such as being born ugly). (K. Kristjánsson, 
2010: 84).  
  
Through these self-conscious emotions we are reviewing and 
evaluating ourselves constantly. That is why Kristjánsson highlights 
the moral role of the self-conscious emotions which, in Hume’s words, 
“begets in noble creatures, a certain reverence for themselves, as well 
as others, which is the surest guardian of every virtue” (1972, p. 276). 
According to K. Kristjánsson, this position is supported by current 
emotion theory (Tracy & Robins, 2007).  
I interpret all this as a reason to think that shame is a valuable 
and necessary emotion for our moral development, for the cultivation 
of virtue during adolescence, and then for the cultivation and 
sustainment of virtue during our adult lives. This idea seems to be in 




proper of immature individuals and societies.116 Shame, on such a 
thesis, is a negative emotion experienced as a sort of fear for the sight 
of the other - it is just the result of the other internalized, whereas guilt 
is a more ‘mature’ emotion, proper of mature individuals or societies. 
In his essay on shame, Kristjánsson (2014) exposes 
contrasting interpretations of the emotion of shame, according to the 
moral value assigned to it. In one hand, there is the claim that shame 
should be avoided because it is morally ‘ugly’, which Kristjánsson calls 
the ‘orthodox’ view, and on the other hand there is the interpretation 
that defends the moral value of shame, which he calls ‘heterodox’. 
The heterodox interpretation corresponds to ancient philosophy, 
especially Aristotelian, and the orthodox to contemporary social 
psychology, psychological anthropology, educational psychology. He 
highlights how persistent and pervasive the intent of avoidance of 
shame in our contemporary milieu has been.  
For Aristotle, on the contrary, shame seems to be a positive 
emotion. Although emulation and shame – the two emotions he says 
are proper for young people - are ‘negative’ in that experiencing them 
is not pleasurable, Aristotle claims they have positive moral value in 
that they prompt cultivation of virtue. Aristotle defines shame as “…a 
                                                          





kind of pain or uneasiness in respect of misdeeds, past, present, or 
future, which seem to tend to bring dishonor…” (1383b22-1-2). In this 
way, on a modern interpretation it is a “negative” emotion. Moreover, 
since he claims shame is not an emotion for the fully virtuous, 
because the virtuous would not have anything to be ashamed of 
(1128b21-32), one might be inclined to argue that Aristotle actually 
holds the so-called orthodox interpretation and talks in favor of the 
avoidance of shame. Nevertheless, shame is for him a morally 
significant emotion that is structurally similar to virtue in its capacity to 
be felt for the right reasons, in the right way, at the right time, etc. 
(1115a14). Shame is not, as the modern interpretation holds, only a 
harmful emotion. Moreover, it is a valuable emotion appropriate for 
some people (1128b10-36, 1179b11), especially for youth (1128b17-
21).  
Aristotle’s position might appear puzzling – how can shame, a 
non-virtue not only lead to virtue, but disappear once virtue is 
achieved? In order to solve this puzzle, we need to recall that Aristotle 
distinguishes between true and conventional shame (1384b23-24), 
and he attributes a higher positive moral value to true shame. As 
Marlene K. Sokolon (2013) puts it, Aristotle:       
… differentiates between the things for which we feel shame before 
friends as opposed to strangers […] In front of intimates, we feel 
shame for things which seem shameful according to the truth 




considered disgraceful due to custom or law (nomos).” (p. 452). […] 
before friends, brothers and intimates, we feel shame for actions 
considered truly shameful and are expected to be honest, candid or 
frank in our speech. (p. 553)  
 
The true shame felt before our good friends is one that 
connects us with our self and helps us to examine it. This distinction 
between true and conventional shame has another important 
implication: it problematizes the distinction made on the modern 
interpretation according to which shame is primitive because it is 
heteronomous (is triggered by others) while guilt is civilized because it 
is autonomous (is triggered by oneself). It seems to be true that 
shame comes as a sort of anticipation of the possible look of another, 
regarding past, present, or future misdeeds. But the Aristotelian 
distinction suggests that there is a middle ground between the 
mutually exclusive possibilities of judging ourselves autonomously and 
judging ourselves heteronomously. We can judge ourselves by 
thinking from the perspective of our good friend. From Aristotle’s 
perspective, my good friend is certainly another, she is outside of me, 
but she is at the same time another self. Since she can see me from 
outside she could be sometimes a better judge of me, and since she is 
another-self she also judges me, in a certain sense, from inside.  
Moreover, it seems that true shame does not depend only on 




imagination of the other. This is what Bernard Williams (1993) calls 
“the internalized other” (p. 84). A story of my teenage daughter could 
be illustrative at this point. After four and a half years of living in the 
USA she has made many new friends here. Three Halloweens ago 
she was with some of them who were smoking marijuana and she was 
offered to smoke. She rejected the offer, and few days later she told 
me the story. I was concerned by what her friends were doing but at 
the same time I felt pride for her response, so I spoke to her about 
that. After several minutes the scene was still in my head and I could 
not help but ask her why she said “no.” I expected many different 
answers. For instance, that since they were in a park they could be 
caught by the police, or since I was going to pick her up later I might 
smell it or notice it, and that I was going to be mad, ground her, and 
tell her father and the rest of the family, and so on. Her answer 
surprised me. She said: “I thought about my friends in Colombia, 
about what they would say if they knew I smoked weed.” The chances 
that they would find out about this episode were exceedingly low, 
whereas all the other possible reasons were much more likely, but the 
image of her friends was what prevented her from smoking. Some 
would say that the possible consequences of being caught by the 
police or her parents could have been really bad for her and that these 




But it seems she was not refrained by the thought of a possible 
punishment, or at least not one in the traditional sense.    
According to Williams (1993), because contemporary culture 
does not recognize the importance of the other’s gaze, we easily 
make the mistake of thinking that the notion of shame is primitive 
whereas the notion of guilt is civilized. He claims that “If guilt seems to 
many people morally self-sufficient, it is because they have a 
distinctive and false picture of the moral life, according to which the 
truly moral self is characterless” (p. 94). On the contrary, that 
imagined gaze of the other helps us, in his words, “to rebuild the self” 
(p. 94). This is why shame still does the same work that it did for 
ancient Greeks, even if we do not recognize it: “By giving through the 
emotions a sense of who one is and of what one hopes to be, it 
mediates between act, character, and consequence, and also 
between ethical demands and the rest of life” (p. 102).  
Finally, the other’s gaze, which I claim to be central to the 
power of character friendship, seems to trigger other emotions 
important for the cultivation of virtue, such as trust and hope. As 
Victoria McGeer (2008) puts it, people who trust and hope in us reflect 
back to us an idealized image of ourselves. We become better by the 
way they see us and treat us, we become our own exemplar in the 




improvement. In this sense, she claims, trust imposes normative 
expectations on the trustee:  
…it is an attitude we take towards the character of their agency—in 
part, I will argue, by taking the same attitude towards our own. That is 
to say, it is an attitude that both empowers us in our trust—making it 
possible for us to think and act in trustful ways—and empowers them 
through our trust, by stimulating their agential capacities to think and 
act in trust responsive ways. (p. 242) 
 
Again, we see that the process of virtue cultivation could be 
triggered by admiration, but here admiration does not conduce to 
emulation. It does not lead the learner to want to be like the exemplar, 
but rather to actualize the possibility expressed by the normative 
expectations of trust and hope of a good friend. McGeer claims:  
… we are sometimes encouraged to look outside ourselves for role 
models, finding in others’ thoughts and actions laudable patterns on 
which to fashion our own. And this may serve us pretty well. 
However, something similar can occur, often more effectively, 
through the dynamic of hopeful scaffolding. Here we look outside 
ourselves once again; but instead of looking for laudable patterns in 
others’ behavior, what we find instead are laudable patterns that 
others see—or prospectively see—in our own. We see ourselves as 
we might be, and thereby become something like a role model for 
ourselves. The advantage in this is clear: Instead of thinking, ‘I want 
to be like her,’—i.e., like someone else altogether—the galvanizing 
thought that drives us forward is seemingly more immediate and 
reachable: ‘I want to be as she already sees me to be’. Hopeful 
scaffolding can therefore serve as a very powerful mechanism for 
self-regulation and development. (p. 248-9) 
 
 
 In the same vein, Friedman (1989) claims friends guide us or 
inspire us, because “When we don't know what to believe, we can try 




stimulate our moral transformation (p. 9). I think shame, trust, and 
hope, emotions in which the other’s gaze is central, function in a 
similar way. All of them are powerful mechanisms for self-regulation 
and development. The thought of the potential or real shame 
experienced by what a good friend would think and feel about possible 
misdeeds could keep the learner from acting in that manner. In the 
same way, the hope and trust of a good friend could redirect the 
learner’s formation. 
  
2. 4. Character friendship as a special praxis. Collaborative 
interactions and dialogues   
According to T. Irwin (1999), Aristotle uses praxis or action in three 
different senses: (1) along with the cognate verb prattein, for all 
intentional actions (animals and children would be capable of action in 
this sense). (2) Confined to rational action on a decision (animals and 
children won’t be capable of action in this sense). (3) Most strictly 
“…confined to rational action which is its own end, and is not done 
exclusively for the sake of some end beyond it. It aims at ‘doing well’ 
(or ‘acting well’, eupraxia), for itself… It is a complete activity” (T. 
Irwin, 1999: 315). Moreover, Irwin claims complete activity in 
Aristotelian terms is also actualization (energeia) of capacities without 




where the activity implies the loss of the capacity. Seeing or living, 
Irwin says, would be an example of complete activity, whereas house-
building is an instance of incomplete activity. You do not lose the 
capacity to see by seeing, nor do you lose the capacity to live by 
living. But you lose the capacity to build a house after you build a 
house (p. 315).117  
I think character friendship is praxis or activity in this most 
complete sense, because the people who are engaged in it have no 
further end, and because by being engaged in such a way they 
actualize their capacities without losing them. This is one of the 
elements that better distinguishes my view from the traditional theory 
about virtue cultivation: my view gives a central place to sustained 
activity or praxis with another. In contrast with theories focused on 
                                                          
117 See McIntyre’s (1981) conception of the notion of practice, where he defines it 
as “Any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human 
activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the 
course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, 
and partially definitive of that form of activity, with the result that human powers 
to achieve excellence, and human conceptions to the ends and goods involved, are 
systematically extended” (MacIntyre 1985: 187). This definition of practice adds to 
the third definition proposed by Irwin a social component. In that sense, practice or 
“complete activity” would entail also goods internal to the practice within a 
cooperative activity. For while Irwin considers “seeing” as a practice in the third 
sense, McIntyre would not. “Living,” on the other hand, seems to count for both of 
them. I think McIntyre’s characterization of practice could be more useful for my 





vertical relationships in which the learner identifies models to emulate 
without even necessarily having direct contact and engagement with 
them, my view focuses on horizontal relationships and emphasizes 
the importance of close interaction with someone for virtue cultivation. 
A central element of my thesis is the idea that a collaborative 
relationship is a privileged arena for cultivation of virtue throughout 
life, and I contend that this collaborative or cooperative dimension of 
character friendship is expressed both through actions and through 
dialogue.  
First, the collaborative, cooperative dimension of character 
friendship is expressed in actions mainly through mutual care and 
attentive responsiveness in the friends’ interactions. When doing a 
favor for each other, for instance, good friends respond adequately, at 
the needed time, in the needed fashion, and do it in a way that reflects 
care and takes care of their friend’s real needs. They do not do it just 
because it is their one kind action of the day, or because they feel 
obligated by their religion, or because it was an easy thing for them to 
do. This is important for the cultivation of virtue because, as we know, 
having the right motivations is fundamental to acting virtuously. Acting 





This sort of cooperative interaction, which action in character 
friendship consists in, provides the friends with a sort of practice that 
is fundamental for cultivating virtue. As Zena Hitz claims, one of the 
ways in which friends help in the process of virtue cultivation is by 
“…improving and augmenting virtuous activity” (Hitz, 2011: 13, note 
44). Although following Exemplarist Moral Theory (Zagzebski, 2017) 
we could recognize the importance of the learner’s emulation of the 
exemplar’s emotions and beliefs, what children may have learned by 
emulating their exemplars needs to be constantly exercised. 
Friendship constitutes another important sort of “critical or intelligent 
habituation,” (borrowing Annas’ (2011) terms), since it provides friends 
the opportunity to practice their virtues-in-formation.  
The second way that the collaborative or cooperative dimension of 
friendship is expressed is through discussion. We have already 
mentioned that, according to Aristotle, one of the central elements that 
defines character friendship is sharing in conversation and thought 
(1170b5-15, 1171b30-1172a15). With K. Kristjánsson (2015), I want to 
highlight here that, contrary to what some have thought (Sanders, 
2012), discussion is an important element of the Aristotelian picture of 
character development. Aristotle refers to it several times (1157b10-
14; 1170b11-14). And it seems clear that his “…description of 




radical intellectual reassessment of the traits of character (hexeis) that 
one has been sensitised to, and internalised previously, in a less 
intellectual fashion” (K. Kristjánsson, 2015: 122). Such intellectual 
reassessment is not just a matter of pulling yourself up by your own 
bootstraps, but rather requires critical engagements with others. 
Dialogue and critical exchange with your character friend seems the 
perfect arena for this.118 As we have already seen, your special 
knowledge and love for your good friend, as well as hers for you, 
would greatly facilitate this re-examination. 
We have seen that while character friends need not be similar in 
many aspects, they need at least to be similar in that they both share 
some fundamental ways of seeing the world, some interests, and 
some goals. Maybe this similarity is what makes them equal in the 
relevant way, and makes them feel authorized or invited to intervene 
in the other’s process of virtue cultivation. On the other hand, the fact 
that character friendships are chosen makes them contingent or 
accidental, which means we must put in effort and time to maintain 
them. Because character friends enjoy and appreciate each other and 
want to keep the relationship, they care about what they say or do to 
each other.  
                                                          




 The fact that good friends are in a deep and close relationship 
characterized by mutual knowledge and appreciation makes them feel 
safe to say and do things they would not say or do to other people. 
Because they know each other well and love each other, they can say 
and do things to one another that can make them grow, and that 
nobody else could say or do. Their mutual knowledge puts them in a 
sort of privileged position to harm or help one another, but their mutual 
love makes them use this power for the other’s well-being, ultimately 
for the other’s flourishing.  
 
3. Why the role model account is incomplete   
 Although in the role model approach friendship is mentioned, 
theorists usually claim we learn virtue from our friend qua role model, 
i.e. by emulating her. My thesis is that it is not just from the friend that 
we learn virtue, but from the relationship itself. I have been arguing 
that character friendship is an experience which provides necessary 
elements for human cultivation of virtue that the experience of having 
a role model cannot give us. The special form of sharing in which 
character friendship consists facilitates self-knowledge and the 
knowledge of the good friend (knowledge of particulars), and triggers 
other emotions important for the process of virtue cultivation besides 




argued that character friendship is a praxis in which the mutual 
collaboration through actions and dialogue cultivates the friends’ 
virtues. 
I have mentioned that, within the Aristotelian view, practical 
wisdom requires knowledge of particulars. I take it that with the notion 
of particulars Aristotle is referring, among other things, to individuals. 
According to him, practical wisdom is a sort of master virtue, the virtue 
that regulates the exercise of all the virtues as a whole. As a result, it 
seems that from the Aristotelian point of view it is not possible to be 
virtuous without knowledge of particulars. My suggestion is that we 
cannot get such a knowledge just from a role model, and that is why 
we need character friendship.  
Take the case of a lucky moral learner who is in a character 
friendship with her role model. The role model account of virtue 
cultivation is committed to the view that that moral learner will not 
learn anything relevant to the cultivation of virtue from her role model 
as a friend; and further that she will not be cultivating virtue in her 
participation in the praxis of the character friendship, but only in her 
practice of emulating her role model outside the bounds of the 
friendship119. But that is a highly implausible view120. I have shown 
                                                          
119 I owe this analysis to Benjamin Polansky.  
120It is also very indirect. Emulating doesn’t directly cause the right emotions, so in 




how much a moral learner might derive from her character friend and 
from character friendship in her cultivation of virtue, regardless of 
whether or not she is in a character friendship with a role model, a 
virtue-superior.  
The overemphasis on the emotion of admiration and on emulation 
in the role model approach overlooks the importance of this training 
through the experience and praxis of character friendship, as well as 
the importance of reciprocity. The collaborative or cooperative 
dimension of character friendship, facilitated by certain equality of 
power between friends, is something that a role model qua role model 
cannot provide.121 But character friendship constitutes the perfect 
arena for the training of the reason through discussion, and functions 
as a bridge between the habituation for virtue at home and the public 
life that implies an important cognitive step further in virtue 
development.  
Before finishing this chapter I want to highlight another important 
difference between what I propose and extent theories about the value 
of friendship for moral growth and virtue cultivation. Although I have 
already mentioned there is not much work done in this direction, there 
                                                          
because she cares for her (because when she is helping her friend, her emotions are 
properly aligned). I thank Seth Robertson for this comment.   
121 To see some empirical evidence that seems to support this thesis, see J. Dunn 
(2004) especially p. 38 and 61; and Walker et al. (2015), especially p.p. 13-14. I will 




are a few authors who consider friendship an important school for 
virtue. However, they are almost exclusively focused in the cognitive 
value of the relationship. Brewer (2005), for instance, focuses on the 
Aristotelian idea that friends allow us to contemplate human 
excellence (p. 724). He claims: 
In elaborating this view, I believe myself to be adhering closely to 
Aristotle’s claim that the proper object of personal love (whether self-love 
or love of another) is the person’s nous—that is, the intelligence or 
understanding by which the person grasps the arche or substantive 
origins of proper thought in any area of inquiry (p. 737).  
 
Kristjánsson (2015), on the other hand, considers that the value of 
character friendship derives mainly from the dialogue that fosters and 
is fostered within it. He claims such a dialogue helps us to cultivate 
virtue, because through it we examine and refine our reasons. I agree 
with Brewer and with Kristjánsson in that contemplating human 
excellence and engaging in dialogue constitute an important part of 
the value of friendship for virtue cultivation, but this is just part of the 
story. Friendship moves us to our better selves not only in virtue of its 
cognitive value but also because of its emotional value. I hope I have 
succeeded in showing why.  
The way we conceive and value our friends and our relationships 
with them has important consequences for how we foster moral 
development in general, and cultivation of virtue in particular. Since a 




emotions, its cultivation requires the development of those reasons 
and emotions. This cultivation starts in early childhood with the help of 
parents, teachers, and tutors, and in this stage admiration and 
emulation are fundamental. But I suggest that from late childhood to 
adolescence and beyond, the cultivation of the type of motivation 
needed to act virtuously is, in fact, mostly driven by character 
friendship.  
Since at this point my thesis is developmental, in the next chapter I 
will explore some literature from psychology to see if there is some 
empirical evidence that could support it. To be clear, I am not claiming 
Aristotle drew a developmental account of the cultivation of virtue, but 
I think that from his works we can derive some clues to construct a 
good developmental theory about how could we become virtuous. 
Again, I think character friendships play a fundamental role in this 






Chapter IV. Friendship, virtue, and education:   
empirical support and practical implications 
 
In chapter I, I examined different answers to the question of 
whether virtue can be taught. I reviewed Plato and Aristotle’s answers 
to this question and concluded that after some clarification of the 
concepts involved in the notion of teaching virtue, it is possible to 
interpret both as thinking that virtue can be taught. Then I reviewed 
three neo-Aristotelian theories that consider this question. Julia Annas 
(2011) talks of learning virtue as learning a practical skill, Rosalind 
Hursthouse (2001) speaks of learning virtue by educating our 
emotions, and Linda Zagzebski (2010 and 2017) talks of cultivating 
virtue through the emotion of admiration. I concluded that chapter 
claiming that, although these theories could be partially correct, they 
are incomplete because they focus too much on the idea of a model 
who directs the process of virtue cultivation and is conceived of as 
superior to the learner in several relevant senses. So I called attention 
to the Aristotelian notion of character friendship as a possible antidote 
to this concern.  
In chapter II I explored some views about friendship and then I 
summarized the notion of “character friend” (or “good friend”) as I 




characterized by mutual appreciation, mutual well-wishing, and mutual 
acknowledgement of that appreciation and well-wishing. In character 
friendship such fondness between the friends is grounded in their 
mutual appreciation of their good characters, and their mutual 
aspiration and pursuit of the good life in the Aristotelian sense.      
In chapter III I explained why I think qualified friendship is 
fundamental for learning and cultivating virtue. I said character 
friendship is a unique experience in which we gain a special kind of 
knowledge and foster certain emotions that facilitate a praxis central 
for virtue cultivation. Such a praxis is characterized by collaborative 
interactions and dialogues.  
In this chapter I have two main goals: (i) to explore some 
practical evidence that seems to support the thesis that character 
friends are fundamental for virtue cultivation, and (ii) to examine some 
practical implications of this thesis, specially with respect to character 
education.  
Recall that since my general aim is not exegetical, I do not try 
to prove that in fact Aristotle held the thesis that character friendship is 
fundamental for the cultivation of virtue. Rather, I have tried to show 
that my interpretation makes sense within an Aristotelian framework, 
and in this chapter I attempt to show that it could also be true and 




psychology, I hope to show that my thesis seems to be supported by 
some findings, and could be useful if applied to better conceptualize 
interactions with and among moral learners in different stages of their 
lives besides early childhood.  
As the role modelling approach claims, role models are 
fundamental in childhood and continue having influence throughout 
our lives.  But, from early adolescence to adulthood, friendship is at 
least equally important. The contrast here is with the type of 
relationship that is usually considered as the one that motivates and 
inculcates virtue cultivation. Whereas contemporary theories about 
cultivation of virtue focus on a vertical relationship in which moral 
learners are “guided” by models who are usually their superiors 
(parents, teachers, mentors), I argue that the complete process of 
virtue cultivation requires also horizontal relationships.  
My focus is on the case of character friendship, and on the idea 
that in a developmental account that considers adolescents and adults 
as moral learners, good friends are either as important as models, or 
are models themselves, although they are not necessarily seen as 
moral superiors. That is so because, if we agree with Sherman (1982) 
that emotional attachments as well as the active cultivation of rational 
and deliberative capacities play a fundamental role in moral 




natural and appropriate arena for the cultivation of virtue beyond the 
family and before the public life. 
 
 1. Some empirical evidence 
“Carol Gilligan suggested that children’s relationships may provide critical 
evidence ‘about both the promise of moral wisdom and the danger of lost 
moral insight’: it is in their friendships that the promise of moral wisdom is 
especially clear”.  
 
Judy Dunn (2004: 43).  
 
There is abundant empirical support for the claim that 
friendship is fundamental for human well-being.122 There is also some 
empirical evidence that shows human beings distinguish among 
different kinds of friendships.123 Even more related to the interests of 
this dissertation, there is some empirical evidence according to which 
people from childhood to adulthood give descriptions of their 
friendships that seem to fit Aristotle’s taxonomy of types of friendship 
                                                          
122 Attachment theory (J. Bowlby, 1969/1982) is an approach that in general terms 
supports this idea, but there are more specific approaches too. These approaches 
range from instrumental versions of friendship (P. DeScioli and R. Kurzban: 2009; 
M. Gifford-Smitha, C. A.  Brownellb, 2002) to versions that consider friendship as a 
constitutive good (B. Fowers, 2015; Roelfs, Yogev, 2013). Particularly in what has to 
do with friendship and well-being for children and adolescents, see Demir, M. & 
Davidson, I. (2012); E. Vaquera and G. Kao (2007), B. L. Weimer et al. (2004).   
123 Besides differences overtly recognized by subjects, it is worth mentioning that 
there are also contextual differences in the concept of friendship not always 
recognized by the subjects involved, such as cultural interpretations of the notion 
of friendship (D. Narvaez, 2014; L. Krappmann, 1996), anddifferences marked by 




(Fowers, unpublished; Walker et al., 2016; Bukowski, Nappi, Hoza: 
2001; Bukowski and Sippola, 1996). But is there some empirical 
evidence providing at least indirect support for my claim that character 
friendship is necessary for the cultivation of virtue, especially from 
early adolescence onward?  
In order to answer this question, let’s start by unwrapping some 
of its basic assumptions. First of all, at the base of the thesis is the 
idea that friendship in general (without qualification) is fundamental for 
moral development. Second, it assumes that the best or most 
complete kind of friendship is (at least) possible among early 
adolescents (9-13 years approximately). Do we have empirical 
evidence for these assumptions? 
I would like to highlight here some of the difficulties in dealing 
with these issues. Although there has been abundant empirical 
research on friendship, it has mostly focused on how friendship 
impacts the well-being of adults. On the other hand, studies in 
developmental psychology have been mainly focused on young 
children, and those studies have worked mostly on parents/children 
relationships rather than on peers’ relationships, and even more rarely 
on the sort of close interpersonal relationship that friendship 
(especially character friendship) is. This means there is relatively 




those studies focus on the bad influences of peers and friends for 
adolescents (Simona C. S. et al., 2014; and Engels, Kerr, Stattin, 
2007). There is, nevertheless, some valuable work in the same 
direction of my thesis, although not always focused on early 
adolescence. I will have to extrapolate from some findings in 
developmental psychology focused on the period of mid-to-late 
childhood to derive indirect support for my thesis.   
Judy Dunn’s (2004) work on children’s friendships, for instance, 
is a good start to find some empirical evidence for the first issue, i.e., 
the idea that friendship is fundamental for moral development.124 She 
starts by describing a scene that happens in a nursery school in 
Pennsylvania, where she and her team work are researching on 
friendship. In it, two four-year-olds, Harry and Joe, embark in a game 
in which they pretend to be pirates searching for a treasure. Then, 
Dunn points out that their joint adventure or enterprise, in which they 
share a narrative, “…is so unlike what happens with their parents, with 
the other children in the nursery, or with Harry’s (for the most part 
despised) younger sister” (p. 1). She claims such an adventure 
depends on the children´s coordination of ideas and imagination, it is 
                                                          




a considerable intellectual task that is the beginning of intimacy, and it 
is emotionally valuable for both children.  
Dunn has good reasons to call such a relationship friendship: it 
is characterized by companionship, reciprocity or mutuality of 
expressed affection, and it is voluntary (p. 2). The conditions for that 
sort of relationship seem to start developing early in life,125 and they 
evolve over time.126 And even more important for our quest, she 
claims that what makes those relationships special is that they give to 
the children involved a sort of understanding of one another and an 
emotional engagement to each other that positively impacts their 
cognitive and emotional development (p.p. 1-11), and that they are 
different from other relationships. She remarks:  
Is the developmental story that emerges simply an account of 
growing social skills? No. There is an important distinction between 
social skills, and friendship as an intimate bond. Social skills can be 
used for self-promotion and gaining self-interest goals, or to 
                                                          
125 The youngest age Dunn reports is 15 months old. She claims empirical 
observations have shown that toddlers and preschoolers are capable of 
maintaining close and lasting relationships characterized by caring and supportive 
behavior (p. 33).  
126 She places the beginnings of intimacy in toddlers and preschoolers, when they 
start sharing cooperative games and what she calls “pretend” (p. 30), but also 
when they show incipient instances of self-disclosure (p. 35). Then, she claims that 
if those relationships have the opportunity to continue, at around four-years-old 
children show more mutual caring and affection (p. 31), and early instances of 
conciliation and compromise (p. 37), where “…children were significantly more 
likely to use reasoning that took account of the other’s person point of view or 
feelings that when they were in conflict with their siblings” (p. 38). While children 
move through the school years, loyalty, self-disclosure and trust become more 
important in friendship (p. 42), and their shared make-believe or “pretend” starts 




cooperate with, care for, and support another; they can be used to 
win arguments and get your own way, or to solve disagreements in 
the interests of the other, or of both. Friendship is indeed a forum for 
developing social skills and understanding of another, but is much 
more. (p. 3)  
 
One of the elements Dunn mentions as fundamental for 
children’s moral development that is facilitated by friendships is other-
oriented reasoning. According to her, researchers have found that at 
the early age of two, children behave in different ways with parents, 
siblings, and friends. Part of the difference has to do with the fact that 
there is more other-oriented reasoning in children’s actions with 
friends (p. 38), which Dunn attributes to a certain “equality of power” 
(p. 38). She explains that:   
 … one general conclusion from the pattern of results is that 
individual differences in mind-reading and emotion understanding 
carry wide implications for children’s social and moral lives. And 
friendship, we have seen, may well have a special place in the 
development of this understanding. (p. 61)   
   
According to Dunn, then, friendship may play a unique role in 
moral development due to the mind-reading and emotion 
understanding that the equality in power between friends entails. 
Interestingly, Piaget (1950) had already talked about the centrality of 
what Dunn calls equality of power in moral development:  
…the individual, left to himself, remains egocentric…the relations of 
constraint and unilateral respect which are spontaneously 
established between child and adult contribute to the formation of a 
first type of logical and moral control…There is progress here, no 




common truth, but this progress is big with danger if the supreme 
authority be not in its turn criticized in the name of reason. Now, 
criticism is born of discussion, and discussion is only possible among 
equals: cooperation alone will therefore accomplish what intellectual 
constraint failed to bring about. (p. 409, my emphasis)   
 
 This remark may support my idea that emulation of role models 
is insufficient for the cultivation of virtue through a whole life. In the 
case of friendship, coordination with the equal, not just conformation 
to the role model image is what drives the moral and intellectual 
growth of the friends (Hartup, 1996: 218).127 This provides some 
support for the first assumption in my thesis, according to which 
friendship as such is fundamental for moral development. I assume 
that what Dunn claims about the importance of friendship for moral 
development in children would apply for moral development in later 
stages of life.  
Now let’s examine the second assumption. It states that the 
best or most complete kind of friendship is possible among early 
adolescents. Is there empirical evidence for this assumption? Is it 
possible that early adolescents know what a good friend is? In other 
words, are they capable of virtue or character friendship in the 
Aristotelian sense?128 
                                                          
127 Vygotsky’s theory (1981) and George Herbert Mead (1934, 1938) also support 
this idea.  
128 Recall Aristotle claims virtue friendship is between virtuous people (1156b7-33). 




It seems to me that the evidence just mentioned (Dunn, 2004) 
shows children know what good friendship requires. Someone could 
argue, nevertheless, that this does not necessarily imply children are 
capable of virtue or character friendship in the Aristotelian sense. 
Children, they could claim, have not yet developed something that 
could be called “character”, and the notion of being engaged in virtue 
or character friendship requires a sort of reasoning little children are 
not able to perform (this line of reasoning will naturally follow from 
Kohlbergian approaches, for instance129). 
David Walker, Randall Curren, and Chantel Jones (2016) 
challenge these kinds of approaches in their theoretical and empirical 
work. They conducted 14 focus-group interviews with children aged 
nine and ten, as part of broader research on character cultivation in 
schools across the United Kingdom. Although initially the researches 
                                                          
process of character formation (not yet virtuous) are not capable of engaging in 
character friendships. As a consequence, they could say that since adolescents are 
in such a process they cannot have character friendships in the Aristotelian sense. 
But recall also that we have been following Cooper (1980) in his interpretation of 
Aristotle as allowing not fully virtuous people the possibility to engage in what 
Cooper proposes to call character friendship, instead of virtue friendship. 
Moreover, despite this and other Aristotelian remarks (1156a32-1156b6) that seem 
to lead to think children cannot be or have character friends, K. Kristjánsson (2007) 
argues “there are sound Aristotelian reasons for holding that parents and their 
children are capable of true character friendship with one another” (115). The 
possibility I consider here is whether early adolescents can be character friends, 
and since my project is not purely exegetical, even if Aristotle did not think it was 
possible, I do. 




were not focused specifically on friendship, children’s answers to 
questions about the qualities they admired or expected in people 
made them focus on the categories used by the children to describe 
their friends. Surprisingly for the authors, they found evidence 
suggesting that “…at least some pre-adolescent children value and 
exhibit virtues of character important to friendship quality.” (p. 2):  
We interpret the data […] as evidence that by age ten some children 
will have: (1) learned – perhaps largely through their experience of 
friendship – that a variety of moral virtues are desirable in friends, 
and (2) adopted aspirations to exhibit those virtues of friendship 
themselves. The limitations of this study do not enable us to estimate 
the extent to which these aspirations are reflected in the acquisition 
and consistent expression of those virtues, but we interpret the data 
as indicating the possession of moral motivation focused on the 
wellbeing of others, as well as motivation to engage in activities of 
friendship that would be consistent with and develop the relevant 
virtues (p. 3).  
 
 
Contrary to what the tradition130 says about children’s capacity 
for conceiving what Walker et al. call “eudaimonic friendship”, they 
found that “In describing qualities of a good friend, the language of 
virtue seemed to come naturally to many of the children” (p. 11). They 
cite some other research which supports the claim that pre-adolescent 
children value their friends for their good qualities and seek the well-
being of the other for the other’s sake (Bigelow, 1977; Damon, 1977; 
                                                          




Sullivan, 1953). They claim, nevertheless, that the evidence is not yet 
decisive and more research is needed (p. 9).     
How does this evidence connect with my thesis that character 
friendship is fundamental for virtue cultivation? Walker at al. suggest 
friends-coaching is a distinct and valuable form of active habituation. 
In their words:  
Habituation of this kind would have three distinctive features: (1) a 
child learning to be a good friend would be coached by peer-friends, 
who admonish and advise on the basis of their own developing 
understanding of how friends should treat each other; (2) the 
importance of the friends and friendships to the child may be an 
unusually direct source of aspiration to self-improvement (Dunn, 
2006, pp. 5–7, 38–40, 42–44); (3) the forms of goodness or virtue 
required of friends seem to have a natural basis that makes them 
identifiable (if not necessarily nameable) to children in the course of 
their experience with friendship. (p. 8).  
 
Both Dunn’s and Walker et al.’s works show friends are 
important for our moral development from an early age, and this 
importance could increase over time.131 They also suggest that the 
kind of experience that friendship is and facilitates is, in a way, unique. 
In the same vein, Willard W. Hartup (1996) reports some 
studies that suggest: (a) friends know one another better than 
nonfriends (Lad & Emerson, 1984); (b) friends and nonfriends have 
different expectations of one another; specifically, friends expect 
                                                          
131 For more on this, see Bukowski et al. (1996), and works exploring the 





reciprocity, commitment, and equality (Bigelow, 1977; Rotenberg & 
Pilipenko, 1983-1984; Collins & Repinski, 1994; Armsden & 
Greenberg, 1987); (c) friends may provide one another with affective 
contexts that facilitate problem solving (Schwartz, 1972); and (d) 
“friends are more motivated than nonfriends to maintain contact with 
one another and to behave in ways that continue their interaction” 
(Hartup, 1996: 228) (Hinde et al. 1985). Hartup concludes:  
The evidence suggests that cooperation between friends differs from 
cooperation between nonfriends. Empirical studies are not numerous 
but friends, as compared with nonfriends, are more talkative, 
mutually oriented, task-oriented, affectively expressive (positively), 
affirmative as well as argumentative, and equitable in managing 
conflicts… (p. 232-233) 
 
It seems to me this connects with my thesis that some of the 
main elements that drive virtue cultivation between friends are the sort 
of special knowledge they gain by engaging in the relationship, as well 
as their mutual admiration, love, hope, and trust for each other. In this 
way, there is some evidence to conclude that (i) friendship in general 
is fundamental for moral development, and (ii) children are capable of 
character friendships. Why do I claim (iii) character friendship is 
fundamental for virtue cultivation, and (iv) is so especially from early 
adolescence onward?  
I will start by answering (iv) first. I want to make clear that my 




adolescents’ and adults’ virtue cultivation, nor that friendship is 
unimportant for very young children’s virtue cultivation. Rather, the 
thesis is based on what I consider to be part of the development of the 
human being’s moral and social self.132 According to Nancy Snow and 
Darcia Narvaez (retrieved from 
http://smvproject.com/about/overview/), three distinct approaches 
explain the development of the moral self in early life: the “Affective 
Core,” the “Trait Dispositional,” and the “Conscience” approach. In 
their words: 
 
The third approach, pioneered by Kochanska (1991, 1993, 1997a, 
1997b, 2002a, 2002b), considers conscience as an inner-guidance 
system responsible for norm-compatible internalized conduct (rule-
compliance without surveillance) and moral emotions (empathy). 
Individual differences in conscience are traced to two sources: 
biologically prepared temperament and socialization experiences in 
early caregiving relationships. In Kochanska’s model, emerging 
morality begins with the quality of parent child attachment. A strong 
mutually responsive orientation (MRO) to caregivers orients the child 
to be receptive to parental influence. The MRO is characterized by 
shared positive affect, mutually coordinated enjoyable routines, and a 
cooperative interpersonal orientation marked by a joint willingness to 
initiate and reciprocate relational overtures. Within the context of an 
MRO the child displays committed compliance to the norms and 
values of caregivers, which motivates moral internalization and the 
work of conscience. It should be noted that Kochanska has found 
multiple pathways to conscience (Kochanska et al., 2010). 
(http://smvproject.com/about/overview/).  
 
                                                          
132 For more on the notion of the self, see C. Sedikides et al. (2007) and K. 




There is not much said here about how the moral self of the 
adolescent develops, but I think close relationships with peers play a 
fundamental role in a similar way that relationships with parents do. 
Specifically, the sort of attachment between good friends, their 
responsiveness or lack of it, and the richness of the content of their 
interactions determine a great part of their moral development. During 
adolescence, there is a sort of emotional and cognitive switch away 
from parents, teachers, and other authority figures to peers,133 and the 
quality of the relationships established with good friends contributes a 
great deal to the virtue cultivation of the people involved.134   
                                                          
133 For some developmental evidence in this regard, see Hart and Carlo (2005), 
Eisenberg (2005), and Ch. L. Carmichael et al. (2007), where they claim: “Because 
self-knowledge is most malleable in early life, early caregivers (usually parents) are 
particularly influential in shaping self-knowledge about almost every domain of 
human activity (Collins, Maccoby, Steinberg, Hetherington & Bornstein, 2000). 
Later in life parental influence diminishes, whereas others begin to play a more 
significant role. Peers, siblings, friends, and mentors acquire importance during 
childhood and adolescence (Harter, 1999), and romantic partners become 
influential, often singularly so, during adulthood” (p. 289-290). See also L. Steinberg 
and S. B. Silverberg (1986), who from a study with 865 10-16 years-old concluded 
that “…the transition from childhood into adolescence is marked more by a trading 
of dependency on parents for dependency on peers, rather that straight forward 
and unidimensional growth in autonomy” (p. 841).   
 134 On how an appropriate integration of the ideal self-concept to the actual self-
concept among adolescents influences prosocial behavior, see Hart and Fegley 
(1995). They claim the data “…suggests that the care exemplars, in comparison to 
the comparisons, are more likely to identify their actual selves with their ideal 
selves and with their parents. In contrast, the comparison adolescents were more 
likely than the care exemplars to have actual selves that incorporate the self-with-
best friend, the self-expected-by-the-best-friend, and the representation of the 
best friend” (p. 1356). This seems to go against my thesis, but in defense of it I must 
say they do not provide a clear concept of what they call “best friend.” In other 




This brings me to question (iii) above –i.e., why do I claim 
character friendship is fundamental for virtue cultivation, and not just 
friendship as such? Well, while I think all forms of friendship might be 
important for development in general,135 I argue the good quality of the 
friendship is fundamental for virtue cultivation due to the very nature of 
virtue. Since virtue involves appropriate motivations to act, engaging 
in genuine close relationships characterized by mutual care and 
appreciation of the good qualities of each other’s character, and 
seeking the other’s good for her own sake is part and parcel of 
cultivating virtue with character friends. In addition to that, the 
friendship must be guided by the friends’ shared aspirations to virtue 
in order to cultivate their virtue.  
Another reason for such a qualification of my thesis has to do 
with the fact that I recognize the power it gives to friendship during a 
period of time that is complex and fragile in human development: 
adolescence. My thesis is based on the acknowledgment of the 
positive power that friendship has for human beings’ development, but 
emphasizes the higher power character friendship has for virtue 
                                                          
135 It is important to have in mind that although my thesis seems to be focused on 
what is called “moral development,”  which tends to be equated with moral 
virtues, it also encompasses “cognitive development,” or what some might call 
intellectual virtues. In this regard, several studies have shown the positive impact 
that friends could have on academic achievements, for instance. See W. W. Hartup 




cultivation, specially from adolescence on. And while it could seem 
obvious to claim that good friendships help adolescents and adults 
become good persons,136 both the vast literature trying to support the 
contrary thesis, according to which bad friendships could make us bad 
people (S. Caravita et al., 2014), and the fact that virtue theorists have 
underappreciated the role of friendship, shows us the need to work in 
the direction I am suggesting.  
Finally, I want to make clear that I am fully aware of a possible 
difficulty with my thesis. Aristotle claimed we need virtue in order to 
have virtue friendship, which seems to imply virtue comes first and 
then the possibility of character friendship opens up. In a way, it 
makes sense to say it would be quite difficult for two people who have 
no good character qualities at all to establish a friendship based on 
the mutual appreciation of their good characters. Nevertheless, I am 
claiming we need character friendship to cultivate virtue. So, which 
comes first? Am I inverting the order of things here?  
My thesis is intended to be a sort of developmental neo-
Aristotelian approach to virtue cultivation, and I think the question 
about which comes first (virtue or virtue friendship) is misguided. 
                                                          
136 Luckily, I am not alone in this. There have been some studies showing the good 
influences of positive friendships for adolescents (see, for instance, M. Demir and 




There is a developmental interdependence of character friendship and 
virtue. My hypothesis is that human beings require character 
friendship to cultivate virtue, especially from early adolescence 
onward, but also that character friendship requires at least some good 
character traits in order to be possible. That is why I chose the term 
“cultivation” of virtue instead of “acquisition.”  
This seems to me in tune with the Aristotelian idea that full 
virtue requires natural virtue (1103a19-1103b3), also required within 
the traditional framework of virtue cultivation theory. In fact, role 
models would find it difficult to carry through their task of cultivating 
their apprentices’ virtues if there were not already a sort of natural 
disposition toward virtue in them.  
 
2. Education. Some practical consequences of the thesis  
“It would only make sense to play down friendship if we knew that almost all 
children were going to be determined loners or Nietzschean Übermenschen 
who might furthermore actually be harmed if they were educated in an 
atmosphere which fostered and celebrated the ties of friendship. As things 
are, it would be strange, to echo Aristotle, to bring up children in a way which 
did not acknowledge the very large place friendship has in the lives of most 





In this section I want to explore some of the possible practical 




a fundamental role in the cultivation of virtue. Since my hypothesis is 
that within a developmental account this thesis would apply mostly to 
late childhood and adolescence, I will primarily focus my attention to 
that period of time. As a consequence, I will explore some answers to 
questions about what parents/teachers, and schools should and could 
do.  
 
2. 1. Should we do something?  
I will start with the question whether parents/teachers should do 
something. I will explore to what extent it is paradoxical to argue that 
the cultivation of virtue requires more than relationships with 
superiors, and then say that because of that teachers and parents 
should do something at home and schools about adolescents’ 
friendships. In other words, I want to explore the question whether we, 
as adults, should intervene. After attempting a positive answer to this 
question, my second concern will be what we could do.  
The question about what adults should do seems to me related 
to the most general concern about the justification of moral education. 
It is what K. Kristjánsson (2007) calls “the paradox of moral 
education,” an expression coined initially by R. S. Peters (1981) to 
“describe the inevitable need for and the apparently inevitable 




by K. Kristjánsson, 2007: 31). In modern terms, such a worry is 
expressed by saying that, although character education is needed, it 
cannot but be indoctrination, authoritarian, paternalistic, and anti-
democratic (McLaughlin and Halstead, 1999). As K. Kristjánsson 
posits “is heteronomously formed autonomy [or authenticity] morally 
possible and justifiable?” (p. 32).  
Now, related with my thesis, the question is whether adults’ 
intervention in children’s and adolescent’s cultivation of character is 
justified, having in mind that the goal of character cultivation is to form 
flourishing intellectual and moral agents. I agree with K. Kristjánsson’s 
solution to this paradox. He reminds us that the project of virtue 
cultivation in Aristotelian terms seems to be less worried about the 
need to fulfill the liberal agenda in which freedom and autonomy are 
the main goals, and more worried about how to develop in humans 
what is constitutive of and/or conducive to eudaimonia (p. 46). Here 
we have his Aristotelian answer:  
 
We know from experience that however theoretically puzzling this 
may seem, habituated reason develops, if all is well, into critical 
reason, and heteronomously formed selfhood develops into a self 
that can make autonomous decisions […] The moral and political 
justification of heteronomously formed autonomy will be found in the 
specially human substantive good of eudaimonia. If it happens that 
autonomy can be formed only in this way and that autonomy is 
conductive to eudaimonia, or even constitutive of it, then 
heteronomously formed autonomy is morally justified. This is, at any 





 Following Kristjánsson, then, we could say that within an 
Aristotelian framework adult intervention is morally justified in virtue of 
the aim of helping learners to attain fulfillment as human beings, their 
eudaimonia. And this seems to be part of the core intuition behind the 
role modelling approach as I understand it here. My approach, 
nevertheless, focuses on horizontal relationships by claiming that 
character friendship   - mostly established between equals - is also 
fundamental for virtue cultivation. Asking what we, adults (as 
superiors), should do about this thesis could seem even more 
paradoxical.  
 Let me re-state this once again. My thesis calls attention to the 
importance of character friendships for virtue cultivation, specially from 
adolescence onward, as a sort of complement to the role model 
approach. It does not entail that adult’s intervention in children’s moral 
development ceases to be necessary. And while I think my thesis has 
some empirical support since evidence seems to show that in general 
adolescents’ attention is moving from authority figures to their peers, 
the task of guiding the process of virtue cultivation is still normative, 




required.137 As a consequence, I think that if adults could help children 
and adolescents in any way to engage in good friendships and 
maintain them, they should do it. This is why my next concern is what 
we can do.   
 Before moving to that concern, though, I need to address a 
more specific difficulty related to the question whether we should do 
something to help adolescents engage in character friendships. It has 
to do with the very concept of friendship and what an external 
intervention would mean. Almost every modern definition of friendship 
claims friends are bound together as a result of their will to be so.138 
Friendship is a voluntary association. Friends like each other, enjoy 
their time together, share values and goals, and look after each 
other’s well-being because they appreciate each other for who they 
                                                          
137 Moreover, evidence shows parents/adolescents relationships still have a big 
influence on peer affiliation and other issues among adolescents. According to B. B. 
Brown et al. (1993): “Data from a sample of 3.781 of high school students (ages 15-
19) indicated that specific parenting practices (monitoring, encouragement of 
achievement, joint decision making) were significantly associated with specific 
adolescent behaviors (academic achievement, drug use, self-reliance), which in 
turn were significantly related to membership in common adolescent crowds 
(jocks, druggies, etc.)” (p. 467).  
138 But that is in modern terms. Recall the ancient term philia refers also to family 
ties. Like Krappman (1996) shows, by examining the philological roots of the verbal 
equivalents to the word friend, we could discover interesting nuances to the way 
central features of the relationship (as that of voluntariness) are valued in different 
cultures: “… friendship may even be defined in some cultures as indissoluble blood 
brotherhood, thus restricting a person’s capacity to terminate friendships” (p. 20). 
In this regard, J. Annas (2003) claims friendship in general need not be freely 
chosen. Since in ancient thought philia referred to filial bonds and bonds with 




are. Whether the ground of such associations is pleasure, utility, or 
virtue, they are together because they want to be. Would not adult 
intervention in adolescent’s friendships – or for that matter, any sort of 
extrinsic intervention on any friendship- undermine the very possibility 
of the relationship?   
 There are at least two lines of answers to this concern. First, 
we could question its premise, i.e., the idea that we freely choose our 
friends. Second, with certain modifications of the premise we can 
accept that we choose our friends and, nonetheless, recognize that 
there are good and bad ways to exercise such freedom. As a result of 
this, we could also see that we might benefit from learning how to do it 
better, and that help from others need not be seen as jeopardizing the 
relationship.  
 In fact, within philosophy and psychology there are supporters 
of the idea that we do not choose our friends freely. Jennifer E. 
Whiting (1991), for instance, claims there are epistemological and 
practical limits to who I befriend and how many friends I have, even in 
the case of character friendship. In her words:  
 
Character-friendship begins with eunoia, which is generic (or 
impersonal) affection for the character and ends of another. The 
beliefs and values which explain my having established a certain 
character in myself will place epistemological constraints on who may 
-given my beliefs and values- become an object of my eunoia […] My 




more accessible to me than the similar virtues of others I encounter. 
So I will come to spend more time with some rather than others. 
Increased familiarity may increase my interest in another person 
[…and…] Increased investment in a person or a relationship may 
(like increased investment in an activity) increase my sense of 
reward, thus strengthening my commitment and preventing me from 
forming other attachments and commitments I may still regard as in 
some sense equally worthy. (p. 23) 
   
Some psychologists, on the other hand, have shown there are 
certain personal and societal conditions that seem to determine 
friendship selection and quality. Frances E. Abound and Morton J. 
Mendelson (1996), for instance, study how similarity between friends 
may determine how children and adolescents choose their friends. 
They claim that according to the evidence, 
Similarities in sex, race, age, and activity preferences seem to be 
important in friendship at all ages. Similarities in socioeconomic and 
school status appear important beyond childhood, as do similarities 
in attitudes, values, and social perception […] The personal attributes 
of physical attractiveness, cognitive ability, sociability, aggression, 
and withdrawal predict children’s attraction to peers, although other 
attributes might be relevant to friendship […] Unlike the case of 
similarity, personal attributes may become relatively more important 
for older, than for younger, children. (pp. 105-106) 
 
So it seems that, after all, we might not choose our friends as 
freely as we thought. Those epistemological or practical limits, either 
explained in psychological or sociological terms, do condition the 
formation and quality of the friendships. Notwithstanding this, 




of friendship is not freedom from any constraint (be it internal or 
external), but freedom from other people’s interferences.  
In fact, some have argued that what this aspect of friendship 
means is that the relationship is not based on biological ties or social 
laws (Krappman, 1996). Although we allow the possibility of becoming 
friends with a member of our family or with someone with whom we 
may have some other affiliation ruled by laws (such as a partner in a 
business, for instance) the concept of being friend with someone, as 
we understand it now, implies that we choose to engage in such a 
special relationship. No family member or ruler could tell us to be good 
friend with someone we do not appreciate.  
I think this is a more substantive meaning of the element of 
freedom in the concept of friendship, and one that if lacking could in 
fact undermine the relationship. In this way, the first line of answer to 
the concern does not fully work. Although we recognized we do not 
choose our friends as freely as we thought, we still have certain 
margin of personal freedom from other’s interference, and the concept 
of friendship seems to require such freedom.  Moreover, the 
restrictions on choice of friends mentioned are merely reducing our 
total number of options – not restricting our freedom. Even within 





Now, regarding our question about what adults should do with 
children’s and adolescents’ friendships, we can try the second line of 
answer suggested above. Acknowledging the importance of freedom 
to friendship, we can recognize there are better and worse ways of 
engaging in the relationship and nurturing it, and because of that any 
person would benefit from learning how to do so well. I am thinking 
here that both good friends and good role models (parents, teachers, 
and tutors) help with that. Specifically, what can adults do in this 
direction?   
 
2. 2. What we could do 
2. 2.1. Acknowledge, care, facilitate  
“For many of the troubles that children experience in their friendships 
-jealousy, exclusion from a clique, dominance, competitiveness- 
parents can do little directly to help, though of course their general support,  
sympathy and love can be enormously important as a buffer for the child.”  
J. Dunn (2004: 161)   
 
I am strongly inclined to believe that the first and most 
important thing we, as adults, could do regarding children’s and 
adolescent’s friendships is questioning the most common view (at 
least in the psychological literature) of these friendships as mainly a 
source of evils. Like any powerful thing, friendship can harm us or heal 
us, can make us good or bad. Surprisingly, the literature on friendship 




towards the negative side. My first suggestion, then, is just to 
acknowledge the importance of friendship for moral development in 
general, and specially for virtue cultivation.  
Second, with such an acknowledgement should come an 
attitude of care for children’s and adolescents’ friendships, as well as 
respect for their capabilities and abilities to establish and nurture those 
relationships. A simple openness to the idea that children and 
adolescents do establish real friendships that are important for them 
(both subjectively and objectively) could make a great difference in the 
way we, as adults, view and treat these friendships. In a way, such 
respect could take the form of considering children and adolescents 
also as teachers of virtue.139 
Thirdly, such an acknowledgment and attitude would facilitate 
children’s and adolescents’ friendships by constructing what Nel 
Noddings (2008) calls “a moral climate – an educational world in 
which it is both desirable and possible to be good” (p. 168). The 
ground for such facilitation is, in one way, negative, since it means no 
interference. It is, in Patricia White’s words, just “making space for 
                                                          
139 Here I am specifically talking of them being teachers of other children, but I 
definitely think they could also be teachers of virtue to adults. In fact, at the 
beginning of my research I thought also how adults cultivate their virtues when 
being parents, thanks to the relationship of parenthood itself and to what children 




friendship” within homes and schools (P. White, 1990: 87). But caring 
about children’s and adolescents’ friendships, and facilitating them 
also means, in a more positive sense, being responsive and 
supportive. Adults need to understand the complexities of children’s 
and adolescents’ friendships and, at the same time, their powerful 
value in the formation of their characters and overall well-being.  
As a consequence, I agree with Horn, Daddis and Killen’s 
(2008) conclusion in which they claim that since “… peer interactions 
and relationships are central to children’s social and moral 
development […] moral education programs that ignore the peer 
context or view it as a barrier to overcome are missing important 
opportunities to facilitate the direction of social and moral development 
in young people” (pp. 282-283). Let’s explore, then, how a more 
substantive attitude towards children’s and adolescents’ friendships at 
home and school would look like.  
 
2. 2. 2. Implementing some strategies 
I think one of the most immediate responses to the recognition 
of the importance of character friendship for virtue cultivation is to say 
that maybe adults could become friends with children and then help 
them within the framework of that relationship. K. Kristjánsson (2007), 




Aristotelian point of view, parents and their children can become 
character friends. He argues there are no structural barriers and no 
moral reasons that prevent the formation of true character friendship 
between parents and their children (non-adults and adults) (p.p. 113-
124).  
I agree with him, and I also think that with some modifications, 
the analysis could be cautiously applied to the teacher/student 
relationship. In the same vein, Blaine Fowers and Austen R. Anderson 
(unpublished) write:  
 
Given its centrality to education, it is strange that the virtue of 
friendship has been so thoroughly neglected. It is vital that character 
educators include the relational processes of education highlighted 
by the concept of friendship in their materials and training so that 
teachers can systematically and consciously cultivate excellence in 
their relationships with students.  
 
We suggest that it is only reasonable to ask students to cultivate 
character strengths in a trusting, stable environment characterized by 
commitment, support, encouragement, positive models, and a 
tangible concern for the students’ welfare. We contend that character 
development can only ensue to the degree that these conditions are 
actualized. The most complete instantiation of educational 
friendships will take the form of virtue friendships, which are 
characterized by shared goals, seeing the good in each other, 
teamwork, and genuine interest in each other’s welfare. Aristotle’s 
eudaimonic ethics clarifies that virtue friendship is a necessary 
element of a flourishing life. We have argued that, as an integral 
aspect of human life, the best educational processes will have the 
form of virtue friendship (p.p. 23-24).  
 
Again, I agree with Fowers’ and Anderson’s suggestions. My 




children and adolescents among them, and in this section of the 
chapter my question is how adults could help in a substantial way to 
improve such relationships. There are some approaches that give 
positive guidance to adults about how to help children and 
adolescents in establishing good relationships with their peers. 
According to J. Dunn (2004), for instance, talking things over seems a 
good strategy. She claims that “…in general, discussions that help 
children to understand relationships between people, and to reflect on 
their own responses and the feelings of others, are likely to be helpful” 
(p. 162).  
Some others have recommended a sort of mixture of different 
strategies. In this direction, when talking about the construction of a 
moral climate, N. Noddings (2008) recommends (a) modeling: “If we 
would teach the young to be moral persons, we must demonstrate 
moral behavior for them. From the care perspective, we must show 
them what it means to care” (p. 168); (b) dialogue: “It is in dialogue 
that we show care for another. But much more occurs. Language is 
expanded and polished. Logic is learned, exercised, corrected, and 
applied. Thinking is encouraged within the safety of caring relations…” 
(p. 170); (c) practice: “Every human encounter presents an opportunity 
to care [… In classrooms] working in groups can provide opportunities 




refers to “…a carer’s conscious act of affirming the morally best in 
another. In acts of confirmation, we attribute the cared-for the best 
possible motive consonant with reality” (p. 171). 
I find Noddings approach very useful to construct what I think 
could help to foster friendship among children and adolescents. 
Moreover, it seems to me that the very same things she recommends 
adults to do at home and schools – modeling, dialogue, practice, and 
confirmation - are already occurring in character friendships.140 Those 
strategies would function, then, when adults are trying to help children 
and adolescents to engage in good relationships, but also when 
children and adolescents want to engage or are already engaged in 
them.  
I would like to explore further two notions of Nodding’s theory. 
The notion of dialogue, and of what she calls interpersonal reasoning. 
In her (1994) she talks of three kinds of conversation relevant to moral 
                                                          
140 In Chapter III I said character friendship (a) constitutes a unique form of 
experience in which we share or inhabit a substantial way of seeing with a close 
other; (b) facilitates a unique form of knowledge, the knowledge of a particular 
person (my-self and the other’s self); (c) develops other emotions important for the 
cultivation of virtue besides admiration, such as love, shame, trust, and hope; and 
(d) is a praxis in which cooperative interactions and discussions function as a bridge 
between habituation of virtue at home and the public life. Noddings 
recommendations of modeling, dialogue, practice, and confirmation within school 
practices sounds to me like incorporating in the classroom some of the elements I 
see as constitutive of character friendship (see especially c and d). I want to call 
special attention to what she calls confirmation, because it seems to be the 
practical application of the element of hope and trust I mentioned as a constitutive 




education. She claims the first is formal or philosophical conversation, 
which in modern terms could be characterized as the result of a 
revision proposed by Habermas to the categorical imperative: "Only 
those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the 
approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical 
discourse" (Habermas, 1990, p. 66, cited by Noddings, 1994: 2). 
Noddings calls theories of this nature “competence theories” (p. 2), 
because in order to participate in the conversation, the participants 
must comply some rational requirements (Kohlberg’s theory belongs 
here). But this, she argues, is artificial, idealized conversation. 
Noddings worries “… about the emphasis on a ‘generalized other’ 
rather than a concrete other. This concern is, I think, well considered. 
We are not well prepared in discourse ethics to meet and respond to 
real people with all their needs and foibles” (p. 3).  
The second form of conversation relevant for moral education 
is seen as participation in a tradition, what has been called “immortal 
conversation,” a form of dialogue-instruction. The tradition could be 
religious (character education comes from it (p. 5)), or what we know 
as liberal studies. But Noddings claims:  
…studying what great thinkers have said about immortal questions is 
no guarantee that one will be more honest, decent, loving or even 
open-minded. Without mentioning names, I can easily think of four or 
five superbly educated persons (all of whom deplore the condition of 




responding generously to views that differ from their own. Again we 
have a performance gap. (1994: 6)  
 
Thirdly, Noddings talks of ordinary conversation, and claims 
that the quality of ordinary conversation may be at the very heart of 
moral education (p. 8). She says this is important because for many 
children and adolescents, “…real conversation in which all parties 
speak, listen and respond to one another” is a rare experience (p. 8). 
It is important to highlight that Noddings is talking here about the sort 
of interactions of adults with children and adolescents, and arguing 
that there are not many real or ordinary conversations among them. 
She argues this is bad because this kind of conversation, if meet with 
some special qualities, could be even more formative than the two 
previous kinds of conversations. Those special qualities are, in her 
words:  
First, the adult participants must be reasonably good people –people 
who try to be good, who consider the effects of their acts on others 
and respond to suffering with concern and compassion. Secondly, 
the adults must care for the children and enjoy their company. When 
children engage in real talk with adults who like and respect them, 
they are likely to emulate those adults [… Third] Perhaps most 
significantly of all, in ordinary conversation, we are aware that our 
partners in conversation are more important than the topic. 
Participants are not trying to win a debate; they are not in a contest 
with an opponent. They are conversing because they like each other 
and want to be together. The moment is precious in itself” (1994: 8). 
 
Noddings claims a big part of the reason why ordinary 




quality – i.e., the partner of conversation is more important than the 
topic or the truth141- helps the participants in such interactions engage 
in constructive conflicts in which all learn from each other and from the 
relationship itself (pp. 9-10).  
This idea of constructive conflicts has to do with the second 
notion I want to explore from Noddings, the notion of genuine 
interpersonal reasoning. In her (1991) she argues that teaching critical 
thinking or mathematical reasoning at schools is as important as 
teaching genuine interpersonal reasoning, but the two kind of 
reasoning are quite different (p. 157-158). Moreover, she says that 
while people at schools have been mostly worried by the development 
of the first kind of reasoning, the second has been dangerously 
neglected:  
I want to suggest, however, that we face an even more important 
challenge in the area of interpersonal reasoning. The capacity of 
moral agents to talk appreciatively with each other regardless of 
fundamental differences is crucial in friendship, marriage, politics, 
business, and world peace. We see evidence everywhere that the 
                                                          
141 This third quality is related to my thesis in that it requires to see the other as a 
friend. Recall that one requirement of friendship within the Aristotelian view is the 
love of the friend for herself, and the seeking of the other’s well-being for her own 
sake. Noddings argues that the sort of ordinary conversation that is of high value 
for moral education is one in which the participants consider each other and the 
relationship more important than the topic or the truth. We must have in mind, 
nevertheless, that Aristotle wrote “…though we love both the truth and our friends, 
reverence is due to the truth first” (1096a15). And he says this is specially so for 
philosophers. I think it would require an additional exegetical work to elucidate 
what this statement means in light of his whole work and the value he attributes to 




capacity is sorely underdeveloped, and yet we have so far given the 
task little attention in educational circles. (p. 157) 
 
Noddings claims interpersonal reasoning develops through 
direct contact, practice, and close relationships (pp 164-169); requires 
discernment, receptivity (p. 166), and mutual knowledge (p. 167). 
Finally, she recommends practical strategies for schools, designed to 
extend contact among students and teachers (pp. 167-169).  
I think what Noddings proposes would facilitate, encourage, 
and nurture good relationships among children and adolescents, as 
well as good relationships between them and adults. The formation of 
closer bonds, as we have seen those of friendship are, are mainly a 
matter of choice. The formation, continuity, and good quality of them 
are also a matter of time and continued effort from the parties 
involved. But if we, as adults, recognize the privileged place that good 
friendships have in all human lives, we must inculcate the adequate 
conditions for them to flourish, and if we recognize their power to 
shape characters we must cherish and cultivate them.  
In Chapter II we saw how Blum (1980) defended the idea that a 
complete moral theory would incorporate both impersonal and 
personal (or impartial and partial) concerns. Human lives are so 
complex that every day we have to deal with moral requirements 
whose response cannot be properly delivered or performed while 




tell us. A complete moral theory would also give place, among other 
things, to close relationships such as friendship. Many theories have 
already recognized the high value of character friendship for human 
flourishing, but less than a handful have recognized its value for moral 
development and especially for the cultivation of virtue. Among them 
P. White (1990), who writes this finishing note in her paper on 
Friendship and Education:    
This discussion of friendship is part of a larger piece of work on the 
democratic virtues, that is, those dispositions, like self-respect, self-
esteem and courage, which are needed to sustain a democratic 
community. The fraternal feelings not discussed here which citizens 
should have towards fellow citizens are perhaps more obviously 
linked to the democratic community. But the intimate notion of 
friendship which has been the focus of this treatment seems to me 
just as much to characterise a democratic society. In such a society 
friendship can be publicly celebrated as something of intrinsic value 
which may on occasion override other values. This would be an 
impossible stance in a totalitarian society. In the latter, when 
friendship competes with the subject’s allegiance to the party or 
state, it can never win out. (p. 90) 
 
 When Noddings claims that only having philosophical 
conversations “We are not well prepared in discourse ethics to meet 
and respond to real people with all their needs and foibles” (1994: 3), I 
think her complaint is similar to that of Blum and White. A complete 
theory about character education needs to give a special place to the 






3. Some practical applications 
It is very difficult to find schools or actual projects based in the 
notion that character friendship plays a fundamental role in the 
development of good character traits (or virtues) in students. Whereas 
theoretical and empirical research about peer relationships among 
children/adolescents and their performance at school is abundant,142 it 
is not the case for what has to do with the deeper relationship that 
friendship is. There might be several possible explanations for this, 
one of them that friendship is supposed to emerge spontaneously and 
freely between individuals. As I previously argued, this may be true to 
a certain point. Nevertheless, the recognition of this does not imply 
that we do not need to know more about the nature of friendship and 
how to nurture it. We need to know more about children/adolescents’ 
                                                          
142 Of special relevance to my thesis is the work developed by H. Marsh and 
colleagues (started during the 1980s), through which he formulated and tested 
what he called the Big-fish-little-pond effect (BFLPE). According to the BFLPE, 
children who attend a high-ability school show a negative academic self-concept 
but positive academic achievements. They explain that upward comparisons have 
negative effects on children’s academic self-evaluations when such comparisons 
are forced (H. Marsh et al., 2008: 95), but this comparison seems to motivate, at 
the same time, children’s self-improvement (p. 97), at least in academic matters. As 
a consequence of this, we could say that “…upward comparisons (comparisons to 
people who are "better" than us) might produce admiration, but they also can 
produce low self-esteem and defensiveness as people feel inferior to those 
admirable people. How do these comparisons operate, though, when we compare 
ourselves to peers versus more powerful others, moral superiors/exemplars?” I 
thank Dr. Brown for pointing this out to me. I will have to leave the answer to this 




friendships because we should help them and can help them to 
engage and maintain good quality friendships.  
 While we advance in that endeavor, here we have some 
examples of current projects working in the more ample and 
necessary task of procuring a nurturing environment for the 
emergence of good relationships among students.143 They are 
projects based on what is called pedagogies of empowerment. Those 
pedagogies have as their theoretical successors the theories of 
cooperative learning and collaborative learning, in which students are 
encouraged to play a more active role in their learning and the 
learning of their classmates. Some of these projects are:  
 
1. The Collaborative Classroom:  
“…is a model that honors all teachers and supports all students with 
intentional, field-tested practices that create safe environments. In 
Collaborative Classrooms, teachers facilitate an authentic exchange of 
ideas and children learn to become caring, principled people as well as 
thoughtful, disciplined learners. Teachers who use the Collaborative 
Classroom model make an intentional shift from having a classroom 
where they do the majority of the talking to constructing a learning 
situation and then facilitating it through student thinking and talking. 
The Core Principles of the Collaborative Classroom 
- Social and academic curricula are interdependent and integrated. 
- Fostering caring relationships and building inclusive and safe 
environments are foundational practices for both the student and 
adult learning community. 
- Classroom learning experiences should be built around students’ 
constructing knowledge and engaging in action. 
- Honoring and building on students’ intrinsic motivation leads to 
engagement and achievement. (Retrieved from: 
                                                          







2. Collaborative for Academic, Social, and Emotional Learning:  
 “Social and emotional learning (SEL) is the process through which 
children and adults acquire and effectively apply the knowledge, 
attitudes, and skills necessary to understand and manage emotions, 
set and achieve positive goals, feel and show empathy for others, 
establish and maintain positive relationships, and make responsible 
decisions.  
SEL programming is based on the understanding that the 
best learning emerges in the context of supportive relationships that 
make learning challenging, engaging, and meaningful.  
Social and emotional skills are critical to being a good 
student, citizen, and worker. Many risky behaviors (e.g., drug use, 
violence, bullying, and dropping out) can be prevented or reduced 
when multiyear, integrated efforts are used to develop students' 
social and emotional skills. This is best done through effective 
classroom instruction, student engagement in positive activities in 
and out of the classroom, and broad parent and community 
involvement in program planning, implementation, and evaluation.  
Effective SEL programming begins in preschool and 




3. Responsive Classroom:  
“The Responsive Classroom approach is a way of teaching that 
emphasizes social, emotional, and academic growth in a strong and 
safe school community. Developed by classroom teachers, the 
approach consists of practical strategies for helping children build 
academic and social-emotional competencies day in and day out. 
 
Guiding Principles 
The Responsive Classroom approach is informed by the work of 
educational theorists and the experiences of exemplary classroom 
teachers. Seven principles guide this approach: 
-The social and emotional curriculum is as important as the academic 
curriculum. 
-How children learn is as important as what they learn. 
-Great cognitive growth occurs through social interaction. 
-To be successful academically and socially, children need to learn a 
set of social and emotional skills: cooperation, assertiveness, 




-Knowing the children we teach—individually, culturally, and 
developmentally—is as important as knowing the content we teach. 
-Knowing the families of the children we teach is as important as 
knowing the children we teach. 
-How we, the adults at school, work together is as important as our 
individual competence: Lasting change begins with the adult 
community. (Retrieved from: www.responsiveclassroom.org 
Emphasis mine) 
  
It is difficult to find similar projects focused on adolescents 
(both in high-school and college), not only in terms of the general 
issue of how good relationships among them function and how they 
are best fostered, but also in terms of more intimate relationships like 
friendship. Again, I think this is a serious lack within educational theory 
and practice in general. Moreover, if we consider that the task of virtue 
cultivation lasts our entire lives, neglecting the fundamental role of 






V. Conclusions and further developments 
 
 In her seminal paper “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Elizabeth 
Anscombe urged a change in the focus in moral philosophy away from 
deontology and consequentialism towards Aristotelian ethics. She 
pointed out some gaps that need to be filled “… by an account of 
human nature, human action, the type of characteristic a virtue is, and 
above all of human ‘flourishing’” (1958: 15). Since then, a good 
number of moral philosophers have been trying to fill these gaps and 
advance the development of new theories that help us to answer one 
of the biggest questions posited since ancient times: how should we 
live?   
 As expected, virtue theory answers that we should live virtuous 
lives. The elucidation of what this means requires, as Anscombe 
claimed, understanding the basic concepts involved. Yet, while we are 
occupied in this task another pressing Aristotelian question comes to 
us: how can we become virtuous? And despite the fact that Aristotle 
said ethics should be more concerned about answering this question 
than trying to uncover what virtue is, the matter of virtue cultivation 
has received less attention in contemporary virtue theory. There are, 




 In Chapter I, I presented three good examples of such works 
within contemporary philosophy. They have something in common 
with the majority of the other works on the subject matter: they argue 
that we become virtuous mainly by emulating role models, either real 
or fictitious, directly or indirectly known, close or distant. Although I 
agree with the idea that we need good models to cultivate virtue, my 
motivation to begin this research was the thought that this may not 
capture the whole picture. The fact that Aristotle himself devoted two 
books of his Nicomachean Ethics to friendship suggests a method for 
filling out the rest of the picture.   
 After this research, my main conclusion is that much more work 
is needed in this direction. I found that within philosophy there is an 
unjustified and prevalent suspicion regarding the moral status and 
value of friendship, despite an almost general agreement regarding its 
fundamental connection with human flourishing. Virtue theorists 
should pay attention to friendship if they want to understand what it 
means to live a good human live. Moreover, in trying to answer the 
specific question of how to become virtuous they should take a look at 
what other disciplines such as psychology have found about this 
matter. Psychologists have good evidence that supports the 




some of this evidence works as indirect evidence to support the idea 
that character friendship is fundamental for the cultivation of virtue.  
 Nevertheless, much work in this direction is also needed within 
psychology. Almost every single scholar consulted had a complaint 
about how scarce the work is on the subject of children’s friendships. 
The complaint is even louder when it comes to adolescent’s 
friendships.  
 I think philosophers and psychologists must work together in 
trying to understand the ethical dimensions of children’s and 
adolescent’s friendships. This is important because a sound moral 
theory cannot be oblivious anymore to facts about human nature. And 
moral theorists here need the help from empirical and social sciences, 
because something so vitally important must not only be conceived in 
the abstract. 
Besides the issues of how friendship works among children and 
adolescents, and the ethical dimensions of these relationships, I think 
we could benefit from recognizing some contextual differences that 
may affect the connection between friendship and happiness. In 
particular, we must recognize how different cultures and societies 
understand, interpret, and live these concepts144.  
                                                          
144 Luckily, I found this work that shows how much more research on this is needed: 
“Friendship and Happiness Latin America: A Review”, by A. Garcia, F. Nogueira Pereira and 




There is another shocking but unfortunately unsurprising gap in the 
literature about friendship: there is even more scarce research on 
friendship and women. Are women’s conceptions and practices of 
friendship in any way different, special, or unique? Is character 
friendship between men and women possible? If there is any 
substantial difference between the way women and men conceive and 
practice friendship, what implications does this have for our treatment 
of human nature and human flourishing? 
Another interesting venue to keep exploring friendship is its 
political implications. In (1980), M. Nussbaum argues that one of the 
main differences between Aristotle’s and Plato’s view about political 
unity is that Aristotle considers self-respect as fundamentally 
developed within the framework of character friendship (p. 427). That 
is so, she claims, partially because political unity within Aristotelian 
terms requires emotional ties, but also because character friendship 
refines self-awareness and self-criticism. On the other hand, in regard 
to the subject of friendship in totalitarian states, M. Shanley (1993) 
argues that liberal polity should make possible the conditions for 
friendship to flourish. And although N. Badhwar (1993), shows 
interesting relations between friendship and justice (1993: 26), she 
nevertheless claims friendship is sabotaged by the liberal conception 




as that of Mary Dietz (1985) and Jane Mansbridge (1975) where we 
can find suggestions about how friendship offers models for a type of 
civic bond that emphasizes democratic values, participatory 
citizenship, and egalitarianism (p. 12, note 9). With them, many others 
have worked on the exploration of the rich notion of civic friendship. 
All of this has to do with an interesting question that has been 
pressing me for a while. Is there any substantial and justified way in 
which what we learn from friends and our relationship with them could 
be extended to others (people with whom we are not character 
friends)? According to Friedman (1989), “…commitment to a person, 
such as a friend, takes as its primary focus the needs, wants, 
attitudes, judgments, behavior, and overall way of being of a particular 
person. It is specific to that person and is not generalizable to others” 
(p. 4). I agree, but I think some of the things we learn and gain in 
friendship could be generalized. For instance, by learning to care 
about particulars we could “generalize” that sort of care to others. In 
many cases, attending to humanity as such should encompass 
attending to how “humanity” manifests in different ways, depending 
(for example) on things such as society, time, gender, age, or race. In 
many cases being fair implies taking care of particularities, even to 
respond to “humanity”. I think those works that suggest friendship as a 




claimed there would not be need for justice in a society where good 
friendships among the citizens exist.  
I am not sure if the lack of research on how children, adolescents, 
women, and different cultures understand and live friendship is just a 
coincidence. Regardless of the motivations and causes for such a 
deficiency, it shows there is still a long path to walk before we fully 
understand what the question “how should we live?” involves. If those 
gaps are not filled, the “we” in that question will be always 
misunderstood, and the answer to the question about human 
flourishing will remain ever elusive.  
In the specific subject of virtue cultivation, we need to explore more 
deeply how other relationships besides the relationships with parents, 
teachers, and role models in general operate. We also need to move 
on from our predominant focus in moral development on younger 
children. The cultivation of virtue is a never-ending-task, and for that 
reason we need to understand how the different relationships that 
impact us at different stages of our lives can also shape our 
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